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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Upon waking, one might think immediately of the important email that must be sent to 
one’s supervisor, in advance of the 10am meeting. This thought may then trigger the 
recollection of a cascade of intentions that must also be realised later that morning, day, 
or even week, such as cancelling a tv channel subscription, posting an important tax 
return, and/or picking up cat food after work. Once embarked upon one’s morning 
routine, one must likely retrieve many more intentions and execute them after a much 
shorter delay, such as replacing the cap on the tube of toothpaste, remembering to 
unplug the clothes iron and taking antibiotics in an hour. 
It is thus clear that the demands placed upon us in contemporary daily life are varied, 
complex and many. Integral to meeting such demands is the ability to anticipate them, 
and then plan, coordinate and execute their resolution at the appropriate moment in the 
future, usually in the face of ongoing activities. This process is commonly referred to as 
prospective memory (PM; Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). PM tasks are highly prevalent, 
and their failures account for 50%-80% of all daily memory failures (Terry, 1988), the 
consequences of which range from personally or socially inconvenient, such as forgetting 
to post a letter or pass on a message to a friend, to disastrous, such as forgetting vital 
medication or forgetting to unplug the iron and causing a fire. Thus, good PM 
performance is critical to the effective navigation of daily life, and the ability to live 
happily, safely and independently; conversely, serious difficulties with PM would likely 
result in problems with social functioning, employment and independent living, 
problems characteristic of the autistic population (Anderson, Shattuck, Cooper, Roux, 
& Wagner, 2014; APA, 2013; Howlin, Goode, Hutton, & Rutter, 2004; Shattuck et al., 
2012). Low levels of independence have been linked to mental health problems such as 
depression and anxiety in other clinical populations (Andersen, Wittrup-Jensen, Lolk, 
Andersen, & Kragh-Sørensen, 2004) so poor independence may well be contributing to 
the mental health problems also prevalent in autism (Salazar et al., 2015; Simonoff et al., 
2013; Simonoff et al., 2012).
The purpose of the current thesis is to focus on PM and its underlying mechanisms in 
the autistic population, to better understand the environment under which optimal PM 
performance can be achieved. This understanding could then be used to inform effective 
interventions and strategies to improve daily functioning, supporting autistic individuals 
in realising their potential for independence and well-being. A full, detailed introduction 
to the PM process, autism and PM in autism is given in the review presented next, in 
Chapter 2, and so the current introduction will provide only a broad outline of these 
issues, followed by a chapter summary.
1.2 PM PROCESS
Whilst the everyday PM tasks described above exemplify well their complex and varied 
nature, common to all PM tasks is an underlying process comprised of four phases: 1) 
forming and encoding an intention; 2) delaying the intention whilst engaged in other 
(ongoing) task (OTs); 3) inhibiting and switching from OTs to retrieving the intention 
at the appropriate/planned moment in the future; 4) and, finally, executing the intention 
(Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002). The cognitive processes serving each 
phase are thus also common to all tasks: episodic memory processes are needed to 
encode and retrieve the intention (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Smith & Bayen, 2004; 
West & Krompinger, 2005), whilst executive control is needed to monitor the 
environment for cues, and then to inhibit and switch from the OT to perform the PM 
task (e.g., Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002; Smith & Bayen, 2004; West, 2011). Recently, 
theory of mind (ToM) has been implicated in the PM process (Altgassen, Vetter, Phillips, 
Akgün, & Kliegel, 2014; Ford, Driscoll, Shum, & Macaulay, 2012) as has episodic future 
thinking (Altgassen, Kretschmer, & Schnitzspahn, 2017; Nigro, Brandimonte, Cicogna, 
& Cosenza, 2014), thought important to projecting oneself into the future to imagine 
various PM tasks, and their execution. 
Figure 1.
Cognitive processes found to be important to PM.
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY PROCESS
PM process:
Formation-encoding-retrieval-execution
Social/cognitive processes
Episodic function
Social understandingExecutive function
Future thinkingEpisodic memory
Working memory
Task shifting/inhibition Theory of Mind
Mentalising
 
Despite these commonalities, the extent to which these mechanisms are needed, and to 
which they interact, varies broadly depending on the task composition and context. One 
major between-PM-task difference involves the nature of the moment the intention is to 
be retrieved and executed, that is, either at a specific time (time-based prospective 
memory; TBPM) or at a specific event, or cue (event-based prospective memory; EBPM). 
TBPM is supposed to be the most cognitively demanding, given that, in the absence of 
an external cue or prompt, one must rely on only internal processes, and must regularly 
monitor the time necessitating continuous employment of executive control (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1996). In the case of EBPM, however, one can off load much of the 
attentionally demanding monitoring processes (Gilbert, 2015) pre-retrieval, and instead 
await the occurrence of the cue. According to the inf luential multiprocess framework 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; see figure 2) a model referred to throughout the current 
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thesis, the level to which EBPM tasks are cognitively demanding is determined by 
various task components that inf luence the allocation of attentional resources and/or 
invoke spontaneous or effortful intention retrieval. Such factors include: the perceived 
importance of the PM task (relative to the OT); OT versus PM task difficulty; PM cue 
salience (distinctiveness, relative to the OT) and PM cue focality (extent to which the 
cue is processed as part of the OT); and individual differences e.g., executive function 
and social understanding. 
1.3 AUTISM
Autism spectrum conditions (henceforth, autism) are characterised by social communication 
difficulties, repetitive behaviours and atypical (hypersensitive/hyposensitive) reactivity to 
sensory input (APA, 2013). In addition to these established diagnostic traits, autism is also 
characterised by evidence-based cognitive and behavioural differences, including executive 
difficulties with, for example, planning (Mackinlay, Charman, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; 
Ozonoff et al., 2004) and switching f lexibly between different tasks or foci of attention 
(Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, 
& Wallace, 2008; Leung & Zakzanis, 2014; Ozonoff et al., 2004), impairments in episodic 
memory and theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leekam & Perner, 
1991; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; see Baron-Cohen, 2000 for a review) and 
reduced episodic future thinking (e.g., Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler, & Raber, 
2014; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014; Terrett et al., 2013). These memory and 
executive difficulties may well be related, given their correlations found in other clinical 
populations (Baudic et al., 2006; de Vito et al., 2012; Greene, Hodges, & Baddeley, 1995). 
It is interesting to note here, that executive function, seen as important to PM, is posited 
to be driven by attentional processes (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008; Posner & Rothbart, 
2000). Attentional processes have been shown as impaired in autism, evidenced by, for 
example, problems with disengagement, (Landry & Bryson, 2004) visual attention 
(Mann & Walker, 2003), joint attention (e.g., looking at or listening to people, Klin, 
Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; Schultz, 2005) and reduced divided attention (Althaus, 
deSonneville, Minderaa, Hensen, & Til, 1996; Ciesielski, Knight, Prince, Harris, & 
Handmaker, 1995) (cf. a review,Allen & Courchesne, 2001). It may be, therefore, that 
impaired attentional processes are in fact driving the aforementioned executive and 
(possibly associated) memory impairments seen in the population (e.g., Corbett et al., 
2009; Lind & Bowler, 2010).  Indeed, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, 
problems with attending to relevant sensory information have even been situated as core 
to autism (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Sander Van de Cruys 
et al., 2014; S. Van de Cruys, Van der Hallen, & Wagemans, 2017). Such problems would 
thus have a profound impact on PM performance in autism.
The myriad of possible ways in which these various characteristics develop and interact, 
with each other and with the environment, quite possibly underlie the heterogeneity 
common to autism. However, irrespective of varied and idiosyncratic phenotypes, the 
majority of autistic individuals experience difficulty with daily functioning, exemplified 
by low levels of independent living and employment, even compared to other disability 
groups (Anderson et al., 2014; APA, 2013; Howlin et al., 2004; Shattuck et al., 2012). 
Given the prevalence of PM in everyday life, it may be that problems with PM contribute 
to problems with independent and safe daily living, problems which themselves have 
been linked to mental health problems in other clinical populations (e.g., patients with 
dementia; Andersen et al., 2004). It is further possible therefore, that difficulties with 
PM are indirectly linked to the high prevalence of mental health problems in autism 
(Salazar et al., 2015; Simonoff et al., 2013; Simonoff et al., 2012). It is thus critical to 
further investigate PM in autism to better understand the underlying mechanisms and 
possible causes of any impairment, to inform tangible ways with which to improve daily 
living and well-being.
1.4 PM IN AUTISM
Despite the importance of PM to daily functioning, and the apparent daily functioning 
problems in autism, investigations into PM ability in autism are relatively scarce. 
However, the overall picture of PM ability in autism, gained from these studies 
(Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012; Altgassen & Koch, 2014; Altgassen, Schmitz-
Hubsch, & Kliegel, 2010; Altgassen, Williams, Bölte, & Kliegel, 2009; Brandimonte, 
Filippello, Coluccia, Altgassen, & Kliegel, 2011; Henry et al., 2014; Kretschmer, 
Altgassen, Rendell, & Bölte, 2014; Sheppard, Kvavilashvili, & Ryder, 2016; D. Williams, 
Boucher, Lind, & Jarrold, 2013; D. M. Williams, Jarrold, Grainger, & Lind, 2014; Yi et 
al., 2014) appeared to be in line with the multiprocess framework, and the established 
difficulties in autism in the above-mentioned cognitive functions. That is, autism PM 
performance parallels non-autistic performance when the cognitive demand of the PM 
is task is low, and automatic intention retrieval is facilitated. The more demanding a PM 
task is, as are TBPM tasks, or EBPM tasks with cues of low salience/focality, and so the 
more strategic monitoring is needed, the worse is autism performance (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2.
The prospective memory process, as described by the multiprocess framework, with associated autism performance.
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY
Time-based PM Event-based PM
POST LETTER IN RED LETTERBOX
ON WALK HOME
No cues Salient/focal cues
Automatic retrieval
Strong
StrongWeak
Weak
Non-salient/focal cues
Long delay to PM target Short delay to PM targetModerate delay to PM target
Self-initiation/monitoring Less automatic retrieval
Easy/unimportant ongoing taskDemanding/important ongoing task Equally challenging/important OT
DOCTOR APPOINTMENT 5PM
AFTER BUSY WORK DAY
PASS MESSAGE TO COLLEAGUE 
AT WORK
Autism performance, relative to
neurotypical performance
Attentional demand relative to
individual diﬀerence
Figure 2. Prospective memory task composition and associated cognitive demand, based on the multiprocess framework.
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In sum, the difficulties in processes, such as executive function and memory, deemed key 
to PM, apparently corroborated by (scarce) existing literature, point to problems with PM 
in autism. However, the inf luence of various task-based factors on the PM performance 
of autistic participants can thus far, aside from TBPM vs EBPM studies (e.g., Williams, 
Jarrold, Grainger, & Lind, 2014), only be inferred. For example, differences in cue 
salience could be inferred as important to EBPM performance of autistic participants, as 
studies employing cues low in salience (Brandimonte et al., 2011) found impaired 
performance, whilst studies employing cues high in salience (Altgassen et al., 2010) 
found intact performance. It is critical, then, to further investigate these factors more 
closely as experimental variables, which was a main aim of the current thesis.
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter 2 first presents a systematic review of all current literature investigating PM in 
autism (including the studies described in Chapters 3, 4 and 6), and a traditional analysis 
based on autism, PM and the hitherto common conceptions of PM underlying cognitive 
mechanisms, namely, executive function, episodic memory and episodic future thinking. 
The second half of the chapter advances a new theory on autism, and, consequently, PM 
ability in autism, based on recent predictive coding accounts of autism.
Whilst previous studies had attempted to elucidate PM in autism, none had specifically 
investigated the way in which the severity of the condition inf luenced PM ability. Indeed, 
none of the previous work in autism, in any field, had included autism severity as an 
experimental factor. This is, perhaps, due to the difficulties inherent in including severely 
autistic individuals in traditional laboratory paradigms, such as participant task 
understanding and motivation, and control group matching. Thus, the aim of Chapter 3 
was to include for the first time in autism research, a group of severely autistic children 
and compare their PM performance, on three (more) naturalistic EBPM tasks to mildly 
autistic group and a non-autistic group.
According to the MPF, task importance plays an important role in motivating the 
allocation of attentional resources during EBPM tasks. Previous studies with non-
autistic participants had indeed found that if PM tasks were considered as important, 
either from a personal or a social perspective, then PM performance was better. Given 
the characteristic social difficulties experienced by autistic individuals, it is important to 
investigate the role of social and personal motivation and task importance in PM and 
autism, and is thus the focus of Chapter 4. In this study, autistic and non-autistic 
adolescents participated in a TBPM experiment whereby, via task instructions, perceived 
task importance was manipulated by way of three conditions, namely, a social, personal 
and standard condition.
Motivation for PM tasks was further investigated in Chapter 5, along with the effects of 
cue-intention association; that is, the extent to which cues associated with the intention 
facilitate intention retrieval, thus supporting those with less developed executive 
function and episodic memory. Given that, prior to this thesis, undeveloped/impaired 
executive function was considered an important factor in the hitherto impaired PM in 
autism, it was important to study PM and motivation in a different population with 
comparably undeveloped executive function. Therefore, the study of Chapter 5 compared 
the EBPM performance of young non-autistic children, aged 5- and 7-years-old, further 
comparing performance with and without a promised reward, and with target pictures 
that bore either a high or low association with the intention.
A further element of EBPM, critical to inf luencing the intention retrieval process is the 
salience of the PM cues, relative to the context/ongoing task. More specifically, the MPF 
claims that cues that are highly salient are more likely to more automatically evoke 
retrieval of the intention than cues that are low in salience. Saliency in this context 
refers primarily to the perceptual, sensory (visual, auditory) characteristics of the cue, 
and is thus an important factor to consider for PM in autism, given the atypical sensory 
processing that characterises in the condition. Thus, in Chapter 6, we manipulate visual 
and auditory cue salience in autistic and non-autistic children, investigating whether 
increasing cue salience in these modalities does indeed support PM performance, 
especially in populations known to exhibit atypical sensory processing and atypical PM-
dependent cognitive functions.
Chapter 7 is a general discussion which summarises all findings on prospective memory 
in autism, as found in the empirical chapters and the review chapter. The embodied 
predictive coding account of autism and prospective memory are also summarised, and 
future research directions and clinical implications are discussed.
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PROSPECTIVE MEMORY IN AUTISM: 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter is based on:
Sheppard, D. P., Bruineberg, J. P., Kretschmer-Trendowicz, A., & Altgassen, M. (2018).
Prospective memory in autism: theory and literature review. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 1-35.
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ABSTRACT
Objective: The current article set out to review all research conducted to date investigating 
prospective memory (PM) in autism.
Method: All studies on PM in autism are first described, followed by a critical review 
and discussion of experimental findings within the multiprocess framework. PM in 
autism is then considered through an embodied predictive coding account of autism.
Results: Overall, despite somewhat inconsistent methodologies, a general deficit in PM 
in autism is observed, with evidence mostly in line with the multiprocess framework. 
That is, for tasks that are high in cognitive and attentional demand (e.g. time-based 
tasks; event-based cues of non-focality or low salience) PM performance of autistic 
participants is impaired. Building upon previous work in predictive-coding, and the way 
in which expected precision modulates attention, we postulate mechanisms that underpin 
PM and the potential deficits seen in autism. Furthermore, a unifying predictive-coding 
account of autism is extended under embodied predictive-coding models, to show how 
a predictive-coding impairment accounts not only for characteristic autistic difficulties, 
but also for commonly found differences in autistic movement. 
Conclusions: We show how differences in perception and action, core to the development 
of autism, lead directly to problems seen in PM. Using this link between movement and 
PM, we then put forward a number of holistic, embodied interventions to support PM 
in autism. 
2.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC; henceforth, autism) are characterized by impairments 
in social communication, restricted interests and activities and, most recently, atypical 
reactivity to sensory input (APA, 2013). The clinical picture and cognitive skills of 
autistic1 people may differ in severity (Hill, 2004). However, even autistic adults of 
average or above average cognitive ability find everyday life problematic (e.g., 
housekeeping, financial matters). They have, for example, difficulties obtaining and 
maintaining employment that corresponds to their intellectual ability (Howlin, 1998) 
and coordinating social activities, e.g., organizing appointments with peers (Häußler, 
2008) and living independently (Anderson, Shattuck, Cooper, Roux, & Wagner, 2014). 
Autistic children often have problems in school due to poor time management and 
organization, e.g., homework is often left at school (Mackinlay, Charman, & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2006). These apparent organisational difficulties in autism are supported by 
empirical work revealing problems with prioritizing, coordinating and sequencing 
activities and hence, with planning ahead (Mackinlay et al., 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004); 
such difficulties have been related to deficits in prospective memory (Altgassen, Koban, 
& Kliegel, 2012; Mackinlay et al., 2006). PM describes the ability to remember to execute 
intentions after a delay at a certain time (time-based tasks; TBPM) or event (event-based 
PM tasks, EBPM, Einstein & McDaniel, 1996), such as remembering to go to the 
hairdresser at 3 pm, or to buy batteries in the corner shop on the way home. Many 
occupational and social demands require PM, and PM is essential for the development 
and maintenance of autonomy and independence. Frequent failures to remember to 
complete planned activities may endanger professional careers, social relationships or even 
impose serious risks on physical well-being (Kliegel, Jäger, Altgassen, & Shum, 2008). 
Prospective remembering is complex, and comprises multiple processes and phases, 
across varying time-spans. First, the individual has to form the intention, and store it in 
(retrospective) memory while being engaged in other ongoing tasks (OT). This (filled) 
delay between encoding and retrieval of the intended action may range from seconds 
over minutes to several hours or days (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000). When the appropriate 
moment for intention initiation arises, other ongoing activities have to be inhibited and 
the individual has to switch to the prospective action and execute it as planned (Kliegel, 
Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002). Research differentiates between a prospective 
(remembering ‘that’ you have to do something) and a retrospective component 
(remembering ‘what’ and ‘when’). The prospective component is supported by attention 
demanding processes that are closely aligned with executive functioning which serve to 
monitor the environment for prospective cues (e.g., Smith & Bayen, 2004), inhibit 
performing the ongoing activity, and to switch to the prospective intention at the 
appropriate moment (Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002; West, 2011). The retrospective 
component supports the encoding and subsequent retrieval of the intention when a 
target stimulus is encountered and shares many processes with explicit episodic memory 
in recognition and cued-recall tasks (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Smith & Bayen, 2004; 
West & Krompinger, 2005). Recently, episodic future thinking, the ability to mentally 
simulate and thus pre-experience future events (Atance & O’Neill, 2001), has been 
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linked to the intention formation phase (Altgassen et al., 2014). In line with these 
behavioural data, imaging studies indicate an involvement of frontal and medial-
temporal structures in prospective remembering (for a recent review see Burgess, 
Gonen-Yaacovi, & Volle, 2011). Frontally mediated (executive control) processes seem 
to inf luence PM performance more strongly than temporally mediated (retrospective 
memory) processes (Brunfaut, Vanoverberghe, & d’Ydewalle, 2000; Kliegel, Eschen, & 
Thöne-Otto, 2004). Most recently, Cona and colleagues (2016; 2015) further specified 
the underlying neural networks and involved cognitive processes in their ‘Attention to 
Delayed Intention’ model. Specifically, they state that a dorsal frontoparietal network 
supports top-down attentional and memory processes that are needed to monitor for the 
PM cue and to keep the intention in mind, whereas a ventral frontoparietal network (in 
addition to the insula and posterior cingulate cortex) is mainly involved in the retrieval 
phase and supports bottom-up attentional processes (externally by the PM cue and 
internally by the mental representation of the PM cue and the intended action). 
Importantly, different PM tasks vary in the extent to which they require these cognitive 
resources. TBPM tasks have been assumed to put higher demands on individuals’ executive 
control resources than event-based tasks; there is no external cue that may prompt retrieval 
of the intended action, and the individual has to actively keep track of the elapsing time 
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). However, depending on the specific task features, EBPM 
tasks may also put high demands on executive control processes. Specifically, with regards 
to EBPM, two prominent conceptual models have been developed that allow for theory-
based predictions on factors that determine the involvement of executive control in PM; 
namely the multiprocess framework2 (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) and the preparatory 
attention and memory processes theory (PAM, Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). For 
the multiprocess framework, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggested a range of factors 
and contexts that can determine the extent to which an EBPM task invokes relatively 
effortful or automatic retrieval processes: task importance, the type of PM cue (e.g., salient 
versus non-salient cues or cues that are more or less focal to the OT), the OT (e.g., more 
versus less demanding), and individual differences (e.g., in cognitive resources, personality). 
Given that PM tasks are dual task situations consisting of an ongoing activity and the 
embedded PM task, both tasks compete for (limited) attentional and executive control 
resources (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996).
Hence, characteristics of both task levels will affect the more or less controlled allocation 
of those resources (please see McDaniel, Umanath, Einstein, & Waldum, 2015, for a 
recent discussion of the multiprocess framework). In contrast, the PAM model posits that 
that all PM tasks require executive control resources for the PM cue to be detected, but 
that the extent to which these resources are needed depends on task characteristics.  
Thus, there is good evidence that strong executive control, episodic memory and future 
thinking abilities, are critical for successful PM, particularly so when PM tasks involve, 
for example, cues of low salience or low focality (EBPM) that are difficult to detect, or 
no environmental cues at all (TBPM). It is therefore of concern that problems with 
executive control and memory are well known in autism. Executive difficulties are 
typically seen in planning (Mackinlay et al., 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004) and switching 
f lexibly between different tasks or foci of attention (Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, 
Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008; Leung & 
Zakzanis, 2014; Ozonoff et al., 2004; but see Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 2009 for a 
critical review). Tasks assessing the inhibition of prepotent responses have resulted 
in more ambiguous findings (Corbett et al., 2009; Geurts, Vertie, Oosterlaan, Roeyers, 
& Sergeant, 2004; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; Pellicano et al., 2017). Evidence 
from retrospective (episodic) memory studies indicate impairments in free recall tasks 
that provide little memory support (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice, & Saavalainen, 2000), 
whereas more structured tasks that put lower demands on self-initiated processing, such 
as cued recall and recognition tasks (Barth, Fein, & Waterhouse, 1995; Bowler, Gardiner, 
& Grice, 2000), seem to be spared. In line with the well-documented deficits of autistic 
individuals in episodic memory and theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; see Baron-Cohen, 
2000 for a review), reduced episodic future thinking has been reported in autism (e.g., 
Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, Bowler, & Raber, 2014; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 
2014; Terrett et al., 2013). It may be that these memory deficits are in some way related 
to impaired executive functioning, given the correlations found in other clinical 
populations between executive functions and episodic memory (Baudic et al., 2006; 
Greene, Hodges, & Baddeley, 1995) as well as future thinking (de Vito et al., 2012) 
Furthermore, it is possible that these executive functions, seen as important to PM, are 
driven by attentional processes (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008; Posner & Rothbart, 
2000), processes which have also been shown as impaired in autism (e.g., problems with 
disengagement, Landry & Bryson, 2004) visual attention (Mann & Walker, 2003), joint 
attention (e.g., looking at or listening to people, Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; 
Schultz, 2005) reduced divided attention (Althaus, deSonneville, Minderaa, Hensen, & 
Til, 1996; Ciesielski, Knight, Prince, Harris, & Handmaker, 1995) (cf. a review,Allen & 
Courchesne, 2001). Indeed, problems with attending to relevant sensory information 
have even been situated as core to autism (Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & 
Burr, 2012; Van de Cruys et al., 2014; Van de Cruys, Van der Hallen, & Wagemans, 
2017). Such problems would thus have a profound impact on PM performance in autism.
In summary, PM represents a ubiquitous daily process, critical to independent living. 
Successful execution of PM tasks requires the recruitment and coordination of several 
(socio) cognitive processes, processes that may rely fundamentally on effective attentional 
and executive control processes. Given the weight of evidence demonstrating autistic 
impairment in such processes, and the potentially debilitating PM failures this may lead 
to, it is vital to better understand prospective remembering in autism, its underlying 
mechanisms and the environmental conditions that best support it.
Therefore, the first section of the current review will summarise all l iterature directly 
investigating PM in autism to date, arriving at the conclusion that, relative to the non-
autistic population, PM in autism appears to be impaired. Then, in an attempt to better 
understand why autistic individuals in particular may demonstrate such difficulties, we 
will consider the complex dynamic nature of PM, the environment in which it is situated, 
and the demands this puts on individuals to coordinate and act under such an 
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environment. With this in mind, we will build upon the cognitive explanations of the 
PM process offered by the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) by 
considering PM as embedded within a complex dynamic environment, and, as such, 
apply and further develop an existing account of autism, namely the Bayesian predictive 
coding account of Van de Cruys, et al. (2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2017). Finally, we will 
describe how this account, and the multiprocess framework, lead to useful, embodied 
interventions, many of which are already widely implemented in practice.
2.2 PM IN AUTISM – LITERATURE REVIEW
A literature search was conducted on the Web of Science for all papers including the 
terms “autism” and “prospective memory”, in the title, published up until December 
2016. The search returned 36 studies. After the inclusion of two of the current authors’ 
unpublished works, and subsequent screening, thirteen studies were available for review 
(see Fig. 1). The following section will review each of the studies, beginning with three 
studies demonstrating spared PM ability, followed by five studies demonstrating a PM 
deficit, and ending with five studies revealing mixed results (e.g. preserved EBPM but 
diminished TBPM). For brevity, the studies will only be summarised, with key points 
highlighted. A full description of the methods and results is presented in Table 1, but, 
for an in-depth description and critique of all studies, including further statistical data 
(such as effect sizes), we refer to the recently published meta-analysis of Landsiedel, 
Williams, and Abbot-Smith (2017) on PM in autism. Finally, an overall summary will be 
presented, describing patterns or commonalities evident between the studies to help 
elucidate variations in performance, and to discern possible cognitive functions that 
may contribute to the variation in PM performance.
Figure 1. 
PRISMA flow-chart (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, & Group, 2009) illustrating literature search process. 
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2.2.2 Impaired PM in autism
Two of the studies to find impaired PM in autism investigated only TBPM (Altgassen, 
Sheppard, & Hendriks, 2017; Altgassen et al., 2009).  Both studies employed a standard 
Einstein-McDaniel computer-based TBPM paradigm, the primary difference between 
versions being that participants press a button at given target times, rather than on 
presentation of a cue. Participants’ time monitoring behaviour is recorded as the 
frequency with which they check the clock (via key press), thought to be a measure of 
strategic, attention switching processes.
Overall, both studies saw TBPM deficits in autistic children and adolescents, compared 
to non-autistic controls. Furthermore, whilst all participants in both studies increased 
their time monitoring as the target time approached, the autistic participants in Altgassen 
et al. (2009) checked the time less frequently overall. Whilst this time monitoring 
behaviour was spared in the autistic participants in Altgassen et al. (2017) the autistic 
participants of both studies appeared to check the time less frequently in the critical 
time interval closest to the target time, although this difference was only close to 
significance in the study of Altgassen et al. (2009) p = .06).
Altgassen et al. (2017) went further by investigating the role of motivation, manipulated 
via the PM instructions. Results revealed that performance was better for all participants 
of both groups in the “personal motivation” condition (“If you also manage to press this 
button every minute, you will receive 5 euros”), compared to the social (“It would really 
help me out if you could remember to press this button every minute” and the low 
(standard instruction) motivation conditions; the performance within the latter two 
groups did not differ. Planned comparisons, however, revealed this effect to be driven 
by the control group only.
Regarding OT performance, controls in the Altgassen et al. (2009) study were more 
accurate than autistic participants, while groups did not differ in response times. In 
contrast, there were no group differences in terms of accuracy in the Altgassen et al. 
(2017) study and autistic participants responded faster to OT stimuli than controls. 
Moreover, the cost to OT of the additional PM task, seen in both groups in Altgassen et 
al. (2017) was only evident in the control group in Altgassen et al. (2009).
Taken together, these results demonstrate that when PM tasks rely primarily on strategic 
retrieval processes (as is the case with TBPM), and comprise OTs with high demands on 
attentional control resources (visuo-spatial working memory task and 2-back task, 
respectively), autistic individuals perform less well than non-autistic controls. The lack 
of any motivation effect on PM in the autistic participants could be a result of a general 
lower level of motivation for the tasks, possibly linked to a less developed sense of self 
(discussed in more detail later in the current paper). However, given that OT performance 
was also impacted, and time monitoring was less frequent and/or less strategic, it may be 
that attentional resources were at capacity, rendering the ability of the manipulation to 
inf luence attention less effective.
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However, reduced PM performance is also possible from EBPM paradigms, as 
demonstrated by the studies of Brandimonte et al. (2011) and Yi et al. (2014). Whilst 
both studies saw impaired EBPM in the autistic group, they varied considerably in 
methodology. Brandimonte and colleagues (2011) employed a standard EBPM computer-
based paradigm and found the autistic children to respond slower, and with less success, 
to the black and white PM target pictures than non-autistic controls. Yi and colleagues 
(2014), on the other hand, applied the same card-naming paradigm as employed in the 
landmark study of Kvavilashvili, Messer, and Ebdon (2001) in which young children 
named a stack of cards (OT), passing any cards that had a heart in one corner to the 
experimenter (PM). Yi and colleagues compared the performance of the autistic children 
to that of age-matched controls and to ability-matched controls, with the latter group 
being significantly younger than the two other groups. Results showed that the autistic 
children remembered to pass significantly less PM target cards to the experimenter than 
both control groups, an indication that EBPM is difficult for young autistic children, 
even in the face of a very simple OT. 
In contrast to the previously described EBPM studies that saw preserved PM in autistic 
participants, these studies included PM cues of arguably low salience (line drawings in 
same format as OT picture trials and a small red heart in the corner of a card, in the 
Brandimonte et al. (2011) and Yi et al. (2014) studies, respectively. Thus, the task of 
controlling attention, identifying the relevant cue and retrieving the intention was, 
according to the multiprocess framework, necessarily more strategic, placing higher 
demands on attentional control resources, likely compounded by the younger age of the 
participants (around 8-years-old).
The study described henceforth examined both TBPM and EBPM within one sample 
by way of the Dresden Breakfast Task (Altgassen et al., 2012), a task designed to assess 
PM ability under naturalistic conditions. Participants were required to prepare the table 
for breakfast for their 3 friends’ arrival. This was to be completed in a particular way, 
as per a given set of rules and a photograph, within seven minutes; participants were 
encouraged to plan their actions beforehand. Four PM tasks were embedded within 
the main task: 2 EBPM, and 2 TBPM (also see Table 2 for a description of the main 
assessment techniques). 
Analysis of the video-recorded performance of the participants revealed that controls 
outperformed the autistic participants in every measure of the Dresden Breakfast Task, 
other than switching. That is to say, controls were better at forming plans and adhering 
to them, adhering to rules, executing plans fully and effectively, and performing all 
TBPM and EBPM tasks. Furthermore, controls outperformed autistic participants on a 
standard laboratory PM task, and scored better at self-report and computer-based 
executive function measures. This study therefore provides evidence that, under complex 
and naturalistic conditions, which require participants to coordinate themselves and 
their execution of several tasks, either sequentially or in parallel, PM performance is 
severely impaired in autistic individuals, even for EBPM. However, this was the first 
study to investigate both TBPM and EBPM in the same sample under such conditions, 
and so it is useful to compare the results with a study with similarly complex and multitask 
demands, namely with one employing the Virtual Week (Kretschmer et al., 2014).
Kretschmer et al. (2014) employed a computerised version of Virtual Week (also see 
Table 2 for a description of the main assessment techniques), a board game that imitates 
daily PM task demands, originally devised by Rendell and Craik (2000). In brief, players 
roll virtual dice and move their tokens around the board a total of three times (three 
virtual days). When passing an event square, players must pick up a card and choose an 
activity from one of three options (e.g. have toast for breakfast), and are only permitted 
to move on once they roll the number corresponding to their chosen option (OT). 
EBPM and TBPM tasks are embedded within the game, equally split into either “regular” 
tasks (e.g. take medication at breakfast - EBPM), or “irregular” tasks (e.g. call plumber 
at 5pm - TBPM). To perform the task, players press the “perform task” button, which 
presents the task within a list of (distractor) tasks. The virtual time, which is linked to 
the movement of the tokens on the board, can be seen on a digital clock produced on-
screen via key press.
Half of all participants were assigned to an ‘implementation intention’ condition in 
which they repeated ‘if-then’ statements on presentation of the PM task, such as “when 
it is 5pm I will press the ‘perform task’ button and select ‘phone the number.’” 
Implementation intentions have been posited to strengthen the task-cue association, 
thereby increasing the probability that the retrieval of the task would be more 
automatically triggered by presentation of the cue (Gollwitzer, 1999). Indeed, much of 
the previous work on implementation intentions in populations with reduced planning 
ability (e.g., older adults; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, Einstein, & Moor, 2007) has shown 
that this particular encoding strategy can be effective in improving PM performance 
(Chasteen, Park, & Schwarz, 2001), and so the authors hypothesised that this may also 
be important for their autistic participants.
The autistic participants performed less well than non-autistic controls across all PM 
tasks, replicating the PM difficulties experienced by autistic participants in multitask 
conditions, as seen in (Altgassen et al., 2012). Both groups performed better on the 
regular tasks than the irregular tasks, and a group x regularity interaction revealed the 
autistic participants to have performed worse than controls on the irregular tasks. 
Surprisingly, the implementation-intentions did not benefit either group.
2.2.3 PM in autism – mixed results
Thus far, studies reviewed have demonstrated either intact or impaired PM in autism, 
across both EBPM and TBPM paradigms. Three of the four following studies also 
included both event- and time-based cues, but, rather than showing a complete deficit, 
reveal only TBPM, but not EBPM deficits. The final study to be reviewed employed only 
a EBPM paradigm, but the results were mixed in that differences emerged between 
participants grouped according to a measure of autism severity. The first study discussed 
will be that of Henry et al. (2014) as it, like that of Kretschmer et al. (2014), employed the 
Virtual Week, but with children, rather than adults.
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Other than participant age, the methodology employed by Henry et al. (2014) was much 
the same as Kretschmer et al. (2014), but was adapted to include tasks relevant to 
children. Also, rather than an implementation condition in this study, the authors 
included a “low OT absorption” condition, which allowed children to move on from an 
event card with any dice roll, rather than the standard specific number; furthermore, 
participants were not required to move the token manually around the board as this was 
done automatically, further reducing overall cognitive demand. 
In contrast to Kretschmer et al. (2014) the main group effect, whereby controls 
outperformed autistic participants, was qualified by a group by cue-type interaction, 
revealing that, whilst both groups performed better on EBPM than TBPM tasks, autistic 
participants only performed worse than controls on the TBPM tasks. This pattern was 
somewhat mirrored by a cue-type x regularity interaction, in that varying the regularity 
of the tasks did not result in differences in EBPM performance, but performance in 
irregular TBPM tasks was worse than that of the regular TBPM tasks. 
This pattern again emerged in the studies by Williams et al. (2013) and Williams, 
Jarrold, Grainger, and Lind (2014) which investigated both EBPM and TBPM in autistic 
children and autistic adults, respectively. In Williams et al. (2013) the PM of autistic 
children was investigated by way of an engaging computer game in which the children 
had to drive a car down a road, taking care to avoid obstacles and other vehicles (OT) 
whilst collecting gold coins (also see Table 2 for a description of the main assessment 
techniques). Using a within-subjects design, children’s PM was assessed across two 
separate sessions in which they either had to remember to press a certain key when 
passing a lorry (EBPM), or to refuel after 80s (TBPM). Performance in the TBPM 
condition was further supported by the fuel gauge turning red with 20s to go. Upon a 
fail, the car would stop, the OT score would be reset to zero, and a reminder presented 
on screen of “Don’t forget to refuel!”. In a fashion similar to that of previous TBPM 
studies, participants could press a certain key to check the fuel level. 
No differences emerged between groups in OT performance, with both groups performing 
similarly on the car driving game. The PM results, however, revealed a TBPM deficit, but 
not an EBPM deficit, in the autistic children, compared to non-autistic children. 
Furthermore, only the autistic children fared better in their EBPM performance compared 
to their TBPM performance, although some caution is needed with interpretation as the 
autistic children were at ceiling in the EBPM task. Fuel monitoring behaviour showed the 
expected linear increase towards the TBPM target time, for both groups, indicating that 
strategic monitoring was intact in this autism group. Interestingly, measures of cognitive 
flexibility and mentalising did show impairments in the autistic group, but only autistic 
mentalising was associated with TBPM performance. The results of this study again 
confirmed that EBPM success is possible even for autistic children if PM cues are focal 
and salient; when external cues are absent, and strategic processes are necessary, as in 
TBPM tasks, performance may be impaired. 
The study by Williams et al. (2014) found very similar results in autistic adults, though 
this was achieved by using a more common computer-based paradigm. Specifically, 
participants had to remember to press a different key whenever a musical instrument 
appeared (EBPM) or every two minutes (TBPM), while judging whether the list 
presented on-screen was the same as the words previously presented one by one (OT). 
Again, participants could press a certain key at any moment to bring up a display of a 
digital clock. 
With regards to OT performance, no group or cue differences emerged. With regards to 
PM accuracy, overall TBPM performance was worse than EBPM. Further, as in the 
previously described study, EBPM performance between the two groups was similar, 
whereas autistic TBPM performance was worse than that of controls. Analysis of the 
response precision of TBPM (i.e. the temporal distance to the target time) and the 
reaction time of the EBPM revealed no overall differences between TBPM and EBPM 
performance. However, the analysis did reveal that autistic participants were less precise 
in the TBPM task, but no slower in the EBPM task. The monitoring of the time did not 
differ between groups, showing the expected linear increase as the target time approached. 
The final study to be summarised is that conducted by Sheppard et al. (2016), which 
investigated the relationship between autism symptom severity and PM performance. To 
accomplish this, the study included a group severely autistic children (as categorised by 
the Childhood Autism Rating Scale – CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis, & Daly, 
1980), and adapted the methods (e.g. participant matching, task design) in novel ways 
accordingly. Children were engaged in three simple games, played with a hand puppet, 
which measured their EBPM. Recalling the puppet’s name provided a measure of RM.
The inclusion of severely autistic children proved an important aspect, as, overall, only 
the severe, and not the mild autism group demonstrated poorer PM than the non-autistic 
controls. A group x task interaction revealed, however, that, remarkably, the severely 
autistic children performed as well as the non-autistic children on the task that involved 
picking up a spring toy when leaving the room. 
This study, therefore, suggests that variation in autistic symptoms, a common occurrence 
in a population well known for its heterogeneity ( Jeste & Geschwind, 2014), plays an 
important role PM performance. Furthermore, EBPM success is possible for severely 
autistic individuals if they are sufficiently motivated.
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2.3 LITERATURE SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
At first glance, it is clear that very few of the reviewed investigations employed common 
methodologies. If, for instance, studies employed comparable age groups and OTs, they 
varied on cue-types and control variables, and yielded contrasting OT results (Altgassen 
et al., 2009 vs Altgassen et al., 2010); if studies shared very similar paradigms, they varied 
on age group and yielded contrasting PM results (Kretschmer et al., 2014 vs Henry et al., 
2014). The current literature could, therefore, be considered inconsistent and unreliable 
and, to an extent, this is true. Thus, to provide clarity and reliability, future research 
must endeavour to consistently replicate findings. Importantly, the recent meta-analysis 
and review by Landsiedel et al. (2017) came to a similar conclusion as the current paper, 
finding a reliable TBPM impairment, and a small (although less reliable), EBPM 
impairment. With this in mind, the apparent methodological inconsistency could also be 
viewed as a strength in that, across a broad range of ages and methodologies, patterns 
have emerged that provide important insight into PM in autism. 
Firstly, of the 19 experiments conducted across the 13 studies, which included participants 
ranging in age from 8-41, 14 (73.7%) revealed a PM deficit, compared to controls. More 
specifically, all seven TBPM experiments, and six of the 12 EBPM experiments, were 
suggestive of PM impairment. Considering the consistent TBPM results, it seems clear 
that when autistic individuals cannot depend on any external cue, but must instead rely 
on internal signals and self-generated and initiated strategies, such as regularly switching 
attention and inhibiting action without prompt, PM tasks are particularly difficult. 
This notion is further supported by those studies (e.g., Brandimonte et al., 2011) that did 
not find any cost to the OT of adding the PM task, suggesting that attention was not 
successfully diverted from the OT in order to monitor for and execute the PM task. 
Difficulty with strategically allocating attentional resources would also explain the 
poorer performance found in half of the EBPM studies; when cues were low in salience 
(e.g., Kretschmer et al., 2014) or non-focal (e.g., Yi et al., 2014), or the attention 
competing OT was high in cognitive demand (e.g., Altgassen et al., 2012; Altgassen et 
al., 2017), then autistic performance suffered, compared to non-autistic controls. In 
contrast, however, when these factors were reversed, and so dependence on self-initiated 
strategy was reduced, and automatic retrieval facilitated, then PM performance was 
spared. This pattern of results thus supports the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000).  
When looking at the different phases of prospective remembering and keeping in mind 
the well documented deficits of people with autism in attention, executive functioning, 
retrospective memory and episodic future thinking, we expect to find reduced 
performance in virtually all phases of prospective remembering (namely, intention 
formation, intention retention, intention initiation and execution). So far, only one study 
on PM in autism has included a measure of intention formation (i.e., planning; Altgassen 
et al., 2012), and reported reduced autistic performance, and only one study tried to 
manipulate intention formation (i.e., implementation intentions; Kretschmer et al., 
2014). All other studies have focussed on the phases of intention initiation and execution 
(as has the vast majority of PM research in general), and have found the discussed mixed 
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results (e.g., Henry et al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 2017)  that are generally in line with the 
multiprocess framework. Intention retention has not been directly investigated, but first 
evidence points to retrospective memory load affecting PM in autism. Specifically, 
Kretschmer et al.’s study reported reduced autistic deficits with regular PM tasks that 
put less demands on retrospective memory as compared to irregular tasks. Similarly, 
Henry and colleagues (2014) found larger autistic PM deficits for irregular TBPM tasks. 
However, an important limitation of the reviewed PM studies is that all but one 
(Sheppard et al., 2016) include only mildly to moderately autistic participants, of average 
to above average IQ. The PM evidence does not therefore fully represent the autistic 
population, a population known for its heterogeneity (Masi, DeMayo, Glozier, & 
Guastella, 2017), which is, indeed, an issue across the autism literature. The study by 
Sheppard et al. (2017) does highlight the importance of considering symptomatic 
variation in autism and how it relates to PM performance, revealing a difference in PM 
performance between ‘severely’ and ‘mildly’ autistic children.
However, in this case, severity classification was made on the basis of a composite CARS 
score (Schopler et al., 1980), disguising the variation of behaviours that contributed to 
the total score. Thus, whilst the Sheppard et al. (2017) paper was an important step in 
the (PM) autism literature, much more needs to be done to more accurately represent the 
population. Therefore, whilst symptom severity and other aspects of the heterogeneous 
condition may have contributed to the PM performances seen in the literature, caution 
is needed when generalising the conclusions to the entire autism population. 
Taken together, despite the heterogeneous methodology of the conducted studies, and the 
relative homogeneity of the participants, a pattern emerges that suggests autistic individuals 
will likely find PM tasks that demand a high level of attentional control and strategic 
processing, such as those involving multiple sub-tasks and/or cues of low salience, very 
difficult. These findings are in line with the everyday difficulties of people with autism 
with planning ahead, and the organization and coordination of (complex) activities. 
In terms of improving PM performance and reducing everyday difficulties, reducing the 
cognitive/strategic demand of PM tasks by increasing the automaticity of retrieval 
processes, would almost certainly be of benefit to autistic individuals, indeed, to all 
populations. However, all PM and autism studies conducted so far, with exception of the 
Dresden Breakfast Task, employed typical laboratory-based tasks that provide high 
experimental control, but low ecological validity, and which may not be able to ref lect 
the complexity of real life tasks. 
2.4 THE DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PM
In reality, daily tasks are significantly more complex than the scenarios presented in 
typical laboratory-based dual-task PM paradigms. For instance, some tasks will only 
involve a short delay, with few competing tasks and no social interaction, such as 
remembering to check out with an electronic travel card when alighting the bus after a 
short journey. In contrast, others will involve long delays and human interaction, in the 
face of several other tasks and social and cultural expectations, such as passing on a 
message to a friend at the end of a busy academic conference. Importantly, therefore, 
PM is a variable, multitask process which demands the f luid and dynamic control of 
attentional control resources to facilitate the integration and execution of all 
aforementioned PM-critical cognitive mechanisms, the exact calibration of which 
depends heavily on context. This between- and within-PM task variability is to some 
extent recognised by the recent dynamic multiprocess framework proposed by Scullin, 
McDaniel, and Shelton (2013), which argues for the need for dynamic utilisation of 
automatic and strategic retrieval processes over time, given the temporal variability of 
PM demands. Therefore, in practice, whilst investigating discrete cognitive mechanisms, 
such as executive function (e.g., reducing switching and inhibition demands by increasing 
cue salience) provides some indication as to the role of that specific mechanism, it 
ignores the interrelated, systemic and social characteristics of the PM process. One 
further critical factor in the dynamic PM process is individual difference, that is, how 
individuals are variably equipped to function in such a complex environment, a factor 
particularly important to consider for the autistic population who are known for their 
cognitive and behavioural heterogeneity (Georgiades, Szatmari, & Boyle, 2013; Jeste & 
Geschwind, 2014).
Thus, to properly understand PM, and so devise the most effective interventions, it is 
important to consider any processes that may be fundamental to the development of the 
cognitive and behavioural  functions needed for prospective remembering and their 
dynamic integration and utilisation, whilst also recognising the dynamic and contextual 
requirements of PM as demanded from an ever changing physical and social environment. 
With this in mind, the following section will brief ly examine the potentially fundamental 
role of predictive coding in the PM process. Furthermore, via the predictive coding 
account of account by Van de Cruys et al. (2014), we will show how these predictive 
coding deficits that may be primary to autism, would result in the cognitive and PM 
deficits seen in the literature.
In recognition of the dynamic agent-environment interactions inherent to PM, we 
extend the role of predictive coding in PM, and the account of autism, to not just include 
perception, but also movement and affect, as is the case in predictive models formulated 
under active inference (Clark, 2015; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Kiverstein & Miller, 2015; 
Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Friston, 2015). In this way, the notions put forward in the current 
paper will shed light not only on processes fundamental to PM, but also on the underlying 
causes of autism. In addition, by better understanding fundamental atypicalities in 
perception, action and movement, the development of better targeted interventions is 
supported that not only improve daily PM performance, but also inform clinical practice 
and help target specific learning to improve autistic individuals’ lives as a whole.
2.5 A UNIFYING PREDICTIVE CODING ACCOUNT OF AUTISM
Simply described, predictive coding is an account of perception in which the main 
task of the perceptual system is to minimize the prediction-error between predicted 
and actual sensory input (Clark, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Under this account, the 
brain continuously generates predictions about future incoming sensory information 
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(top-down), based on the current context and associated prior experiences, which are 
subsequently compared with input received (bottom-up). While predictions serve to 
minimize prediction-error, a resulting prediction-error can be used to optimize the 
prediction, which in turn minimizes prediction-error, a process that cycles in perpetuity. 
Through prediction errors and their minimization, the brain gradually comes to learn 
the statistical structure of the environment, i.e. how distal structures in the environment 
give rise to proximal sensory input (for more detailed introductory accounts to predictive 
coding, see Clark, 2013, 2015; Hohwy, 2013).
However, as Van de Cruys et al. (2014) note, due to the “f luctuating nature of regularities 
in the world, and the stochastic and noisy biological system through which we experience 
it […]” (p.1) there is a limit to what can be predicted and hence there will always be some 
residual prediction-error. Therefore, a critical ability is to learn which prediction-errors 
are behaviourally relevant, and so should be attended to and used to update predictions, 
and which can be ignored. 
For instance, upon entering a café, one may be surprised by the weight of the door when 
opening. This is a useful prediction error, and should update the future prediction of 
that particular door. Once inside, one would expect, and so predict, to hear the sound of 
the milk steaming machine. If a familiar café, one would even be able to predict well the 
location of the sound, and have some idea of the sound’s particular characteristics. 
However, it would be practically impossible to predict the exact time, and the exact 
volume and clarity as experienced by the perceiver (inf luenced, for example, by talking, 
head cold, a particularly loud/busy moment).
Therefore, the sound of the steam machine would almost always generate an error. 
However, this error could never be reduced and should thus receive minimal attention, 
and should not update the model of what to expect in a café; that is, nothing further 
could be learnt from this experience (irreducible uncertainty, Van de Cruys et al. (2014), 
so the error should be assigned low confidence (precision) that it is attention worthy. 
Thus, within an optimal prediction model of a steam machine in a café, the occurrence 
of the sound at any given moment will essentially be surprising, but not unexpected. 
Clearly, then, being able to f lexibly and context-sensitively vary the precision of 
prediction-errors is critical for optimal learning and attention allocation (Feldman & 
Friston, 2010). An understanding of the errors that still offer reducible uncertainty 
facilitates the efficient direction of attention towards errors that can be further reduced, 
i.e. real learning opportunities. Conversely, assigning equal and high weight to each and 
every error would result in attention being drawn to errors which will always occur and 
cannot be reduced, thus depleting valuable and limited cognitive processing power, and 
needlessly updating prediction models. Precision, therefore, is seen as the fundamental 
mechanism of learning and attention (Van de Cruys et al., 2014) and has a clear and 
important role in PM.
If, as posited by the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) the allocation 
of attentional resources is central to the PM process, then an optimum precision 
weighting mechanism is essential to successful PM performance. Selectively attending 
to relevant information and ignoring the high volume of other information would 
facilitate time monitoring, or the monitoring for and identification of PM cues 
(particularly for those of low salience and non-focality), or the switching of attention 
from one task to another. Furthermore, attenuating the relentless barrage of irrelevant 
sensory information is important for the development and application of other, higher-
level cognitive processes critical to PM, such as planning, retrospective memory, 
episodic future thinking and critical thinking and reasoning (regarding, say, the context 
and environment within which the PM is likely to be situated). 
Using the previous example of a café, it is easy to see the importance of precision to PM. 
One would rely on the high-level concept of a café to form a ‘café-prediction’, from 
which one would expect, and thus assign low precision to, the tumultuous stream of 
relatively lower-level errors (e.g. sudden bursts of laughter, or cups being dropped to the 
f loor) allowing them to be ignored within (and thus not update) my ‘café-prediction’ 
model. This would free up attentional resources, which would be particularly important 
for demanding PM tasks within the café, such as monitoring the time in order to call 
your boss at a certain time, or to monitor for a cue indicating your coffee is ready, after 
which you might stop your conversation (OT) and pick up the coffee which has been 
placed at the end of the counter.
Pertinently for the current review, Van de Cruys et al. (2014), in their unifying account 
of autism, put forward the selective and contextual weighting of precision, a mechanism 
essential to attentional control and so to PM, as the core deficit of the condition. 
Specifically, they situate the core deficit in the High, Inf lexible Precision of Prediction 
Errors in Autism (HIPPEA). This means that impaired precision allocation results in 
attention often being drawn to what is effectively noise, thus demanding valuable and 
limited cognitive resources, drawing attention away from real and important learning 
opportunities, and needlessly updating prediction models. The authors posit that this 
uniformly high precision, irrespective of context, accounts for the characteristic 
impairments and difficulties commonly seen in autism, such as atypical sensory 
processing (Ashburner et al., 2008; Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Robertson & Baron-Cohen, 
2017; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007), social communication difficulties, and insistence on 
sameness and repetitive behaviours, as efforts to reduce confusing and unpleasant 
environmental uncertainty (APA, 2013). Specifically, high sensory precision may result 
in a constant barrage of seemingly unfamiliar, attention grabbing signals, each of which 
would arguably be at best surprising and distracting; at worst, shocking and frightening. 
Importantly, prediction itself is not impaired in autism, as is evidenced by superior 
performance in situations with high consistency and predictability, for example in 
structured visual search tasks (O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001). 
Assuming the validity of the Van de Cruys et al. (2014) account, the deficit of HIPPEA 
leads directly to the PM impairments seen in the population. It would explain, for 
example, poor PM performance, relative to non-autistic participants, when PM cues 
were low in salience (e.g., high precision attributed to each and every error would result 
in all sensory input being ‘salient’ and deserving of attention). This would load heavily 
on limited cognitive resources, and would also diffuse the relevance and contextual 
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salience of the PM cue, making it much harder to discern. Thus, the predictive coding 
account of Van de Cruys arguably contributes much to the understanding of autism, and 
to PM. An important potential criticism of the account, however, may be that, so far, 
much of the literature has been mainly theoretical and conceptual in nature, dealing with 
autism using the tools and concepts derived from predictive coding and provides 
therefore nothing more than stories (Bowers & Davis, 2012). Although the unification of 
a disparate range of impairments under one theory is progress in its own right, we agree 
that much further work is needed. In particular, the development of quantitative 
computational models that are able to make predictions about updating, learning, and 
the adjustment of precision on a trial-by-trial basis (Van de Cruys et al., 2017), would 
greatly advance the field. For example, the aim of the rapidly emerging field of 
computational psychiatry is to infer the hidden causes (such as the structure of the 
parameters of an internal model) of measurable quantities (such as actions, reaction 
times and symptoms; (Friston, Stephan, Montague, & Dolan, 2014; Schwartenbeck & 
Friston, 2016; Stephan & Mathys, 2014). Furthermore, in their recent paper, Van de 
Cruys et al. (2017) put forward substantial empirical data in support of their account.
So far, we have only focused on the perceptual aspect of prediction-error minimization. 
However, PM does not simply involve the perception and processing of external sensory 
signals. Rather, it is a complex process that depends critically on perception and action. 
Specifically, it requires the effective coordination of the mind (perception, desires, 
intentions), the body (bodily sensations, action) and the environment (PM cues and/or 
target times; social or occupational expectations; competing sensory and social demands 
for attention) to ensure successful action at the appropriate moment. Consequently, 
to fully relate predictive coding to PM and to autism, we need to extend HIPPEA to 
more embodied predictive coding models derived from active inference (Bruineberg, 
Kiverstein, & Rietveld, 2016; Pezzulo et al., 2015; Seth, 2013).
According to active inference, action, as well as perception, is integral to the predictive 
coding and error minimisation process. That is, agents do not only try to predict the 
current state of the environment, but also cause their environment to be in an optimal 
state (i.e. a state of physical, social and cultural well-being/safety) through action. For 
example, according to active inference, `intending to post an important letter in a post 
box’ works like `determining the need of posting a letter, expecting oneself (with high 
precision) to post the letter and then selecting an action (reaching into a bag, grasping 
the letter, then posting it through the slit in the post box) that fulfils that expectation’. 
Only if an agent has the right predictions (both about what will be an optimal state, and 
about how it can reach that state), it can cause the environment to confirm to those 
expectations and consequently lead to an actually optimal state beneficial to the agent 
(Bruineberg et al., 2016). 
Put in more concrete terms, for individuals to f lourish in their environment, they must 
understand their needs in terms of their physical and mental well-being (expected states), 
and meet them by perceiving and acting upon the environment in an as efficient and 
beneficial way as possible. This includes among others the congruency of the sensory 
weighting of prediction-error (precision) with the volatility of the environment and the 
trade-off between action and perception (Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 2017). Therefore, 
the role of prediction error minimisation, and the impact of any impairment such as 
HIPPEA, becomes much more significant, as it mediates all interactions between the 
brain, the body and the environment within and between all hierarchical levels (i.e. low-
level stimulus to high level concepts/abstractions), facilitating understanding of the self 
and the world in which it is situated. Active inference and error minimisation is therefore 
deeply interwoven into everyday processes, not least the PM process.
Given then, the essential role of prediction and error precision in mediating the 
relationships between the brain, the body and the environment, the adverse consequence 
of HIPPEA, the precision-weighting deficit put forward as core to autism (Van de Cruys 
et al., 2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2017) already deemed significant to PM, becomes much 
more problematic.
It means that autism is not solely a problem of perceptual evidence accumulation, but 
involves deficits in the interactions between all levels and modalities (e.g. between 
simple, sensory signals and higher level conceptual/constructed beliefs), between the 
brain and body, and the ways they coordinate to respond and act upon the environment. 
Thus, HIPPEA makes a whole range of other autism phenomena intelligible such as 
their difficulties with understanding internal states, evidenced by a high prevalence of 
alexithymia (Milosavljevic et al., 2016), difficulties with interoception (Shah, Hall, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2016), differences in rhythm and timing (Isenhower et al., 2012; 
Sheridan & McAuley, 1997), movement and associated social difficulties (Cook, 2016; 
Cook, Blakemore, & Press, 2013), and diminished sense of agency (Grynszpan et al., 
2012; Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2014; Zalla, Miele, Leboyer, & Metcalfe, 2015), 
linked to deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thinking (Lind, 2010). We 
think that extending the unifying account of autism of Van de Cruys et al. (2014) in such 
an embodied way, brings the account closer to more embodied unifying accounts of 
autism such as the one offered by De Jaegher (2015) which places differences in 
movement, rhythm and coordination, between the self, others and environment as 
responsible for the emergence of autism. Thus, the embodied HIPPEA and enactive 
accounts of autism both describe systematic differences in movement and perception 
that ultimately blend with a different conceptual and social understanding of the 
environment; indeed, a different way of making sense of the world. We feel that together, 
both accounts offer a more encompassing account of autism. Furthermore, the 
difficulties caused by such as account would greatly impact upon PM performance.
PM tasks ref lect one aspect of the fundamental real-world demand of navigating a 
complex physical, social and cultural environment, and so require the efficient 
coordination of the brain, body and environment to remain in a state of well-being.  For 
example, the environment will create PM demands (work supervisor asks you to pass on 
important information to a work colleague), generating intentions within the individual 
(pass message on to colleague). This intention is internalised in terms of relative value 
(need to please supervisor; consequence for colleague of not receiving message; likely 
personal emotional state – personal, physical and social consequences of success/failure) 
which would interact with chances of success (beliefs about own ability to successfully 
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Seeing PM as ref lecting this fundamental life processes means that interventions aimed 
at addressing issues that may be affecting such life processes (e.g., HIPPEA in embodied 
predictive coding) would also benefit PM performance. 
2.6 CLINICAL APPLICATION
According to HIPPEA (Van de Cruys et al., 2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2017), autism 
emerges primarily from an impaired prediction error precision weighting process, 
resulting in and manifesting as sub-optimal learning and attentional mechanisms. When 
considered in the context of active inference and the brain-body-environment system, 
HIPPEA would disrupt the critical continuous and reciprocal learning between all three 
states of the system, resulting in impaired communication and understanding between 
the brain and the body, and their perception and action in and with the environment. 
Given these assumptions, autistic individuals would benefit from holistic and embodied 
interventions that would support them in attending to and engaging with themselves 
and the world, which would in turn support their PM performance. 
As posited by the above assumptions, autistic people experience difficulty in perceiving 
and acting in the often irreducibly uncertain world. One obvious way in which to support 
such a difficulty is to reduce the irreducible uncertainty as much as possible, and provide 
predictable clear expectations and a safe physical, social and cultural environment. This 
provision of clear, consistent structure and expectation in the environment is the core 
principal of the Treatment and Education of Autistic and related Communication-
handicapped Children approach (TEACCH; Mesibov, Shea, & Schopler, 2004) which is 
widely implemented within charities and schools and has good levels of reported 
effectiveness (Mesibov & Shea, 2010; Panerai, Ferrante, & Zingale, 2002). According to 
TEACCH, schools/environments should provide autistic individuals with as predictable 
and ‘low arousal’ physical environments as possible, for example, low sensory input and 
similar classroom configuration across all classes (e.g. same furniture, consistently 
arranged and decorated display boards, neutral colours). Reducing the uncertainty in the 
environment would not only reduce anxiety but would provide a safe, predictable 
platform from which to learn. These TEACCH principles could also be directly applied 
to the PM environment: reducing the physical and social uncertainty in the environment 
parallels the reduction in cognitive load inferred to be beneficial in empirical PM work 
(e.g., use of salient cues, simple OT). Providing clear PM instructions that are additionally 
supported by visual cues, could enhance encoding and increase the physical/perceptual 
salience of the cue, thus decreasing executive control demands by increasing automaticity 
of intention retrieval. 
To increase effectiveness, this approach could easily be incorporated into a person’s 
existing communication strategy. For instance, an autistic child’s tailored Picture 
Exchange Communication System (PECS; Bondy & Frost, 1994) could be employed to 
provide need-appropriate verbal and visual task instructions when supporting them in 
bringing their sports kit to school the following day. The relevant symbols could be 
placed on the appropriate day on the child’s daily visual timetable, with copies taken 
home on the day to act as salient PM cues.
Furthermore, if autism is indeed associated with sub-optimal attentional processes, 
which may result in difficulties attending to relevant and important cues (internal and 
external), autistic individuals may benefit from interventions that focus on practicing 
and training attention.  For example, the program Attention Autism (Dawson et al., 
2004), originally developed to support the development of joint attention, has been 
found to improve attention by providing engaging sensory objects. This intervention 
would thus support the general development of the understanding to engage with 
relevant cues in the environment, cues which afford personal and social benefits. The 
benefit to PM of improving attention by way of interventions such as Attention Autism 
(Dawson et al., 2004) is thus clear: the ability to identify, and allocate attention towards, 
execute task, given likely future context in which task/cue is situated, and predicted 
ability to employ appropriate action within it; see Fig. 2). These states are accompanied 
by physiological responses (increased heart rate, adrenaline/cortisol) and associated 
affective responses (arousal, worry, stress) that would need to be understood in the 
context of their situatedness in a socio-cultural setting. In addition, successfully realizing 
the PM task requires understanding how attentional resources are employed to perceive 
relevant cues (recalling my supervisor’s request upon seeing my colleague). What is 
crucial then, is for the agent to be selectively perturbed by aspects of the environment 
(change your behaviour when seeing your colleague, but try to not get distracted by your 
phone) in a way that is in line with longer-term plans and goals and the demands of the 
situation (such as your supervisor’s request). Such selective openness to aspects of the 
environment (or ‘affordances’) and coordinating with them in an adequate way represents 
a process fundamental to life and mind (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014).
Figure 2.
Diagram depicting the role of predictive processing in mediating between the brain, body and environment throughout the 
prospective memory process. Illustrates importance of attending to relevant cues (solid arrows), via effective precision-
weighting, against a barrage of competing, often task-irrelevant, information (dashed arrows). 
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appropriate event-based cues in a complex environment would be developed, facilitating 
more frequent automatic retrieval. 
A further method of improving self and internal understanding and the relationship 
with the environment – or the brain-body-environment system – would be to facilitate 
impaired learning through interventions that involve the use and coordination of all 
three of these states. Moving, acting and perceiving to achieve internal (fun, pleasure) 
and external (social interaction, PM tasks) goals, and post-action perception and 
ref lection on the internal (emotions, feelings, bodily responses) and external (effective 
communication, understanding others’ behaviour, successfully executing a PM task) 
physical and social results, would support the understanding of one’s own function in 
one’s physical and social environment, and improve PM performance at every phase. 
One would slowly become more attuned to one’s own body and its responses and actions 
within its environment. Examples for such embodied/enactive approaches are movement 
(for a review, see Lee, Lambert, Wittich, Kehayia, & Park, 2016), drama (Corbett et al., 
2011), music (Whipple, 2004), and art therapies (Koch, Mehl, Sobanski, Sieber, & Fuchs, 
2014) that are currently already employed to support autistic people.
The approaches described above can be incorporated to generate more concrete, PM-
specific support and learning strategies. One approach would be to augment the largely 
non-conscious, impaired embodied predictive coding and error weighting processes that 
are involved at every PM phase, with explicit, metacognitive processes. Metacognition 
has been shown to be important in PM, suggesting, for example, that attention-allocation 
strategies depend somewhat on metacognitive expectations of the PM task demands 
(Rummel & Meiser, 2013), and an awareness of one’s cognitive difficulties may encourage 
the use of reminders to make sure one does not forget the implementation of the delayed 
intention (Gilbert, 2015; Phillips, Henry, & Martin, 2008). Although, interestingly, a 
recent study by Cherkaoui and Gilbert (2017) found that autistic participants gave good 
metacognitive judgements of their (poorer) PM abilities and predictions of performance, 
but did not compensate with an increased use of reminders. It may be that the autistic 
participants differed only in their metacognitive control, but not awareness, in line with 
the, albeit scarce, literature pointing to difficulties autism in metacognitive control, and 
to deficits in using monitoring processes to inf luence cognitive control (for similar 
results see Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016; Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 
2010; but see Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011 for contrasting findings). 
Given the benefit of metacognitive strategies to the learning of those who experience 
learning difficulties (Chevalier, Parrila, Ritchie, & Deacon, 2017) it may be that autistic 
individuals, indeed any individuals that experience PM difficulties, would benefit from 
training and support in the use of direct PM metacognitive strategies. Such training 
could be designed by drawing on the principles of TEACCH (Mesibov et al., 2004) to 
provide a highly structured, cyclical PM predict-perform-evaluate processes, scaffolded 
appropriately according to individual cognitive and communication needs (for example, 
the use of PECS symbols as mentioned above). Figure 3 provides an example of how this 
could be implemented in, for example, schools, to be completed by children with an 
appropriate level of adult support. Through this sheet, children would be encouraged to 
consciously consider a particular PM task, such as remembering their swimming kit, and 
why it is important to them. Children would also predict the likely environment in which 
the intention will be executed, how difficult it will be, what reminders or cues they will 
use and, ultimately, their likely chances of success. The children could then evaluate 
their predictions and performance, once the task was over, comparing them with what 
was experienced, informing future strategy and predictions for the same or similar tasks 
in the future. This cyclical process would augment the predictive processing problems 
we posit to adversely affect PM in autism, whilst also developing PM-specific, and more 
general, metacognitive ability. It would also have the added benefit of directly supporting 
the factors posited by the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) to 
inf luence attention allocation and intention retrieval during the PM process (such as 
intention encoding, cue association, cue salience and task importance).
Figure 3.
PM metacognition worksheet to support individuals with specific PM tasks. Metacognitive awareness and control would be 
developed by encouraging individuals to regularly predict and evaluate their PM performance, based on their understanding 
of self- PM ability, task importance, past performance, self-chosen reminders/cues, and the likely environment in which it 
will occur. Levels of support, formatting, could be adapted to an individual need-appropriate level, e.g.,  full adult support, 
the use of symbols in place of words.
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To summarize, the findings of the PM and autism literature shows that making small 
changes to the PM environment, such as clearly demonstrating the value of completing 
the task may improve PM performance. Such a demonstration might increase motivation, 
offset an impaired understanding of self and may improve PM performance by supporting 
intention encoding, shielding of the intention from PM-irrelevant stimuli, encouraging 
monitoring for the PM cue and enabling switching to the intended action. Furthermore, 
the salience of the cue, both in terms of the sensory distinctiveness as historically 
described by the PM literature, and in terms of its relevance to the task, may inf luence 
the extent to which retrieval of the intention relies on automatic versus strategic, 
executive control processes.  
2.7 CONCLUSION
The evidence from studies conducted to date strongly suggest that autistic individuals 
experience difficulty with PM. However, the few studies in which autistic PM performance 
was spared, even for severely autistic children, demonstrated that PM success is possible 
under very structured conditions, with simple OTs, highly salient, focal PM cues and 
motivating rewards. According to the multiprocess framework these conditions more 
automatically encourage the allocation of attention toward PM cues, supporting intention 
retrieval and execution, and rely less on cognitive functions that are impaired in autism 
(e.g., executive functions, retrospective memory, episodic future thinking).
According to our proposed account of autism, the commonly found cognitive, social 
and motor deficits in autism are deeply underpinned by an impaired prediction error 
weighting ability. This impairment disrupts the development and understanding of the 
brain-body-environment relationships and interactions, culminating in differences in 
the way that autistic people perceive, move and make sense of the world. Thus, these 
differences fundamental to autism may lead to their problems with functioning 
successfully in the world, a critical aspect of which is successfully performing the 
frequent and challenging PM tasks. Therefore, whilst treating the ‘symptoms’ of poor 
PM performance by increasing, for example, cue salience and focality, is easily 
implemented and almost certain to result in better performance, we propose to directly 
address problems of prediction and action through embodied autism and PM research 
paradigms and interventions.
Footnotes
1We have used identity-first, rather than person-first, language throughout the paper in line with the preferences 
of the autism community (Kenny et al., 2015; Sinclair, 2013).
2The current paper will focus on the multiprocess framework as it is the theory most used by the reviewed studies.
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ABSTRACT
This study is the first to specifically compare event-based Prospective Memory (PM) in 
children with severe Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) to children with mild ASD and 
typically developing children. Fifty four children participated: 28 children aged 5 and 13 
years with either severe or mild ASD were matched for educational attainment with 26 
typically developing children aged 5 to 6 years. Three PM tasks and a retrospective 
memory task were administered. Results showed that children with severe ASD performed 
less well than typically developing children on two PM tasks but the children with mild 
ASD did not differ from either group. The findings suggest naturalistic tasks and 
motivation are particularly important factors in the success of children with severe ASD. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Prospective memory (PM) is distinguished from remembering past information or 
retrospective memory, and refers to the ability to carry out a planned action in the future 
without any explicit prompts, for example, remembering to take a medication, post a 
letter or pay bills on time (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; 2005). Intact PM is crucially 
important for the management of everyday activities not only in adults but in children 
as well. Indeed, children are routinely expected to remember to deliver messages, to put 
books away at the end of reading time, or to do homework and take it to school by the 
deadline (Altgassen, Schmitz-Hubsch & Kliegel, 2010; Kvavilashvili, Messer & Ebdon, 
2001). Autistic children1 are commonly reported to have difficulties in organizing and 
coordinating everyday activities and have a general impairment in the ability to plan 
ahead (Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). These difficulties have been related to deficits in PM 
(Altgassen, Koban & Kliegel, 2012; Mackinlay, Charman & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006) and 
suggest that autistic children may be impaired in everyday PM tasks as well. However, 
there is a notable absence of studies on PM in autistic children. For example, in a recent 
comprehensive review of retrospective memory in autistic children, PM is not mentioned 
(Boucher, Mayes & Bigham, 2012). Interestingly, this review demonstrated a varied 
pattern of impairments in autistic children, with performance on some retrospective 
memory tasks (e.g., digit span, free recall of unrelated items and most notably cued 
recall) remaining intact when compared to controls. The review also emphasized the 
necessity of including children with more severe autistic symptoms in studies 
investigating memory.
Unlike retrospective memory, there are currently only a handful of studies on PM in 
autistic children and none have included a severely autistic group (Altgassen et al., 2010; 
Altgassen, Williams, Bölte & Kliegel, 2009; Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia, Altgassen 
& Kliegel, 2011; Henry et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2011; Williams, Boucher, Lind & Jarrold, 
2013). These studies employed tasks based on the standard laboratory paradigm used in 
research with adults, i.e., based on Einstein and McDaniel (1990) and included autistic 
children and those with Asperger’s syndrome, who were able to sit, and perform well in 
standard IQ tests. In the standard PM paradigm, participants are busily engaged in an 
ongoing cognitive task (often on a computer), which they have to interrupt on several 
occasions in order to carry out a PM task (e.g., pressing a key) either in response to a 
particular target event (e.g., a word) or at a particular time, which measure event- and 
time-based PM, respectively. The lack of severely autistic samples in these studies is 
therefore not surprising given: a) that performance on standard IQ tests was employed 
as an exclusion measure, which may not be suitable or valid for those with severe autism 
(Burack, Larocci, Flanagan & Bowler, 2004) and b) the challenges that such tasks may 
pose for these children. The importance of choosing tasks which are engaging, suitable 
and appropriate for the age of children in PM research was noted by Kvavilashvili, Kyle 
and Messer (2008), and this is particularly pertinent for severely autistic children for 
whom even simple everyday activities can be challenging. Therefore, in this study, we 
investigated performance on several simple and engaging event-based PM tasks in mildly 
and severely autistic children to add to the little that is currently known about this 
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population, both theoretically and to inform therapy. In comparing mild and severe 
autism groups to non-autistic controls, knowledge of PM in typically developing children 
would also be broadened. Below, we will brief ly review the available literature on PM in 
mildly autistic children, discuss issues concerning appropriate matching when including 
into a study a group with severe autism, and outline aims and hypotheses of the study. 
One of the first studies to investigate processes related to PM in autistic children was 
conducted by Mackinlay et al. (2006). Fourteen high functioning autistic children, 
including those with Asperger’s syndrome, (mean age, 12 years) were given a test of 
multitasking (Battersea Multitask Paradigm) and were found to have deficits in the 
prospective organization of activities compared to younger, typically developing 
children with a mean age of 11 years. The few subsequent studies that followed this 
initial investigation have used mostly the standard Einstein and McDaniel, (1990) 
laboratory paradigm to study event- and time-based PM in autistic children. 
In one such study, Altgassen et al. (2009) examined time-based PM in 11 children with 
high functioning autism and Asperger Syndrome (aged 7 – 15) and 11 typically developing 
children (aged 7 – 16) who had to remember to press a specific key on the keyboard once 
in every two minutes during the computer-based visuospatial working memory test (the 
ongoing task). Results showed that autistic children checked the time less frequently and 
produced significantly less correct PM responses than controls. In another study, using 
the same computer-based ongoing task, Altgassen et al. (2010) investigated event-based 
PM in 19 high functioning autistic children, including those with Asperger’s syndrome, 
with a mean age of 10.5 years.
The event-based PM task involved interrupting the ongoing visuospatial working 
memory task by pressing a key when the background changed to a certain color. 
Compared to the neurotypical control group, matched for age, gender and cognitive 
ability, no differences between groups were found. It was concluded that event-based 
PM may be preserved in autistic children, in contrast to impairments in time-based PM, 
demonstrated by Altgassen et al. (2009), indicating that autistic children may have 
problems with self-initiated time checking rather than responding to target events.
This initial pattern was replicated by Williams et al. (2013) in one study using both an 
event-based and time-based tasks. Twenty one high functioning autistic children, 
including those with Asperger’s syndrome, with good social response ratings and a mean 
age of 10.6 years were compared to 21 age and IQ matched neurotypical children. The 
ongoing task was modified to a more game-like context where coins were collected for 
points as a car was to be driven down a road on screen. The PM tasks involved pressing 
a key when a lorry appeared (event-based) and remembering to refuel the car every 60-80 
seconds (time-based). Results showed that autistic children demonstrated impaired 
performance compared to controls only on time-based task, suggesting that event-based 
PM may be preserved in autistic children.
However, Brandimonte et al. (2011) found that 30 mildly to moderately autistic children, 
based on a mean Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) score of 35.46 (Schopler, 
Reichler, DeVellis & Daly, 1980; Shopler, Reichler & Renner, 1988), performed less well 
than their age and IQ matched non-autistic peers (n = 30) on event-based PM. In this 
study, the computer-based ongoing task presented line drawings of objects including food 
and animals (80 trials in total), and children had to press a red key when they saw an 
animal and a green key when they saw an image of food. The PM task was to press a yellow 
key on presentation of the two target items (one from food and one from animal category), 
which occurred four times each. The discrepant findings of Brandimonte et al. (2011) may 
be explained by differences in memory and attentional demands of the tasks (i.e., two PM 
targets instead of one, the length of trials and motivation to do the task), or due to the 
slightly younger age of the children (some as young as 6 years). It may also be due to the 
differences in the symptomology of the autistic children as, in this study, none of the 
children had Asperger’s syndrome and some had moderate symptomology. 
Apart from Brandimonte et al. (2011) the only other study to test children with a range of 
autism diagnoses, including some children with more severe symptomology, was 
conducted by Jones et al. (2011). They investigated everyday memory including PM tasks 
in 94 autistic children with a mean age of 15.6 years. This group included 49 children 
with a diagnosis of childhood autism and 45 with other autism. They used four tasks from 
the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson, Cockburn & Baddeley, 1985) 
to measure PM and retrospective memory, which were suggested to be more generalizable 
to everyday memory and better suited to the varied attentional and motivational abilities 
of the autistic group than standard computer-based tasks. Thus, retrospective memory 
was measured by showing a photo of a man and telling the child the man’s name (i.e., 
John Smith) and after a delay the children were asked to recall the name of the man. The 
PM tasks included the child observing the hiding of a pen and having to remind the 
experimenter of its location, and to collect it, upon hearing the words ‘we have finished 
the testing’. The second PM task required the child to ask ‘What is the time?’ when an 
alarm sounded during the session. In the final task the children had to follow a route 
demonstrated by the researcher around the room and to pick up an envelope.
Results showed that autistic children and controls did not differ in the retrospective 
name recall task, which supports some previous findings with other simple retrospective 
recall tasks (Frith, 1970a, 1970b; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970). However, in line with 
Brandimonte et al. (2011), autistic children were found to be impaired in event-based 
PM, specifically in remembering to remind the researcher about the location of the pen 
and in asking what the time was when the alarm sounded. It is also interesting that Jones 
et al. (2011) reported a negative association between the severity of autistic social and 
communication behaviors and event-based PM performance. However, one important 
confound in this study, as pointed out by Williams et al. (2013), was that Jones et al. 
(2011) did not exclude from the analysis children who could not remember the PM tasks 
after being prompted, which indicates that these children forgot due to a retrospective 
memory failure to retain PM instructions. When Williams et al. (2013) excluded these 
children from the analyses reported by Jones et al. (2011), the group differences on 
event-based PM tasks disappeared. 
Finally, Henry et al. (2014) investigated cognitive variables such as IQ, executive control 
and self-direction in relation to PM functioning using time-based and event-based tasks. 
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High functioning autistic children, including those with Asperger’s syndrome, were 
compared to typically developing peers and differed only on time-based PM tasks (not 
event-based PM). The results showed that of the cognitive variables, only IQ correlated 
with PM performance and only with time-based PM tasks. Findings also suggested that 
retrospective memory did not explain the PM performance of autistic children.
In summary, the available literature shows that time-based PM is impaired in high 
functioning autistic children as demonstrated by Altgassen et al. (2009) and Williams et 
al. (2013), who used very different ongoing and time-based tasks but obtained similar 
results. The significant impairments in time-based PM have been also obtained in a 
sample of adults with ASD (Altgassen et al., 2012; Williams, Jarrold, Grainger & Lind, 
2014), which further supports the idea that time-based PM is impaired in mildly autistic 
individuals, irrespective of their age. In contrast, findings concerning event-based PM 
are mixed. Altgassen et al. (2010) and Williams et al. (2013) did not find any impairment 
in event-based PM in mildly autistic children. Similarly, in the a more naturalistic study 
of Jones et al. (2011), no group differences emerged between ASD and control children 
after participants who could not remember PM instructions were excluded (see Williams 
et al., 2013). However, a significant impairment in event-based PM was obtained by 
Brandimonte et al. (2011). Similarly, in two studies with adults, event-based deficits were 
found in autistic participants, compared to matched controls (Altgassen et al., 2012; 
Kretschmer, Altgassen, Rendell & Bölte, 2014).
Therefore, it is currently unclear whether event-based PM is impaired in mild autism. 
Indeed, deficits reported by Brandimonte et al. (2011) could be due to reliance on 
demanding computerized tasks, such as having two PM target events (instead of one) 
and a fairly long and demanding ongoing categorization task (80 trials), which could 
have been disproportionately difficult for autistic children. In addition, the PM tasks 
did not seem to have any personal relevance and/or interest to children, even when more 
naturalistic non-computer based tasks were used by Jones et al. (2011) and Altgassen et 
al. (2012) (e.g., why would children want to ask ‘what is the time’ in response to a bell 
ringing, or to repeat the words ‘red pen’ upon hearing them during the session?). 
On the other hand, it is possible that event-based PM is impaired in severely autistic, but 
not mildly autistic children. Indeed, Brandimonte et al., (2011) is the only study that did 
not include children with Asperger’s Syndrome, and tested children whose mean 
Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) score of 35.46 fell into moderately autistic 
range. It is therefore possible that impairments in event-based PM reported in this study 
were not due to task difficulty as mentioned above, but the fact that this study used a 
group of more severely autistic children.
Therefore, to answer the question whether event-based PM is impaired or not in autism, 
we conducted a study that included, for the first time, a group of severely autistic 
children in addition to mildly autistic children and typically developing children. 
However, including severely autistic children in a study poses several challenges, which 
perhaps explain why this group has rarely been studied within autism research. Severely 
autistic children can experience impaired communication and social skills, alongside 
impaired attentional capabilities, complex sensory needs (i.e. may have an over sensitivity 
to light, noise, touch etc.), repetitive self-stimulatory behaviors (head banging, hair 
pulling etc.) and high levels of anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Therefore, the selection of experimental tasks that they are able to complete becomes of 
paramount importance to ensure that they have the necessary understanding and 
motivation to complete these tasks and that they are not disproportionately disadvantaged 
in comparison to typically developing children.
The second and even more challenging problem concerns matching the severely autistic 
children with controls. Although there are debates about matching autistic children and 
typically developing children, it is a standard practice to match on gender and mental 
age (IQ and in some cases verbal ability) to ensure that any differences obtained between 
the groups is due to autism status rather than age and/or mental abilities ( Jarrold & 
Brock, 2004; Mottron, 2004). However, the demands of standard IQ tests such as WASI 
(Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999) or even BPVS (British 
Picture Vocabulary Test; Dunn & Dunn, 2009) make this type of matching unsuitable 
for severely autistic children due to their communication, attentional and motivational 
deficits (see Hoekstra, Happé, Baron-Cohen & Ronald, 2009 for a discussion of issues 
and clinical ascertainment bias). 
Potentially because of these issues, investigations have so far primarily focused on 
mildly autistic, and/or cognitively high functioning children and we know almost 
nothing about the performance of severely autistic children. This has not gone unnoticed 
in the literature and Burack et al. (2004) argue that rather than circumventing research 
in severely autistic children, there is a need to creatively adopt matching criteria 
guided by specific research goals which would enable more severely autistic groups to 
be included.  
Thus, to include our group of severely autistic children, the majority of whom were 
unable to complete standard IQ tests, we measured children’s cognitive abilities via 
their educational attainment on National Curriculum (NC) assessments. These are 
routinely conducted in UK schools by teachers with the advantage of continuous 
observation and assessment in the familiar school-environment (Kasari, Brady, Lord & 
Tager - Flusberg, 2013). Instead of a single measure of vocabulary or IQ, these tests 
provide scores on numerous cognitive and language abilities which correlate strongly 
with the cognitive aptitude test (intelligence measure) previously used in schools and 
equally predict academic achievement and other outcomes, thus providing a reliable and 
valid measure of cognitive abilities (Schagen, 2007). 
It is inevitable that in matching the developmentally delayed severely autistic children 
with the typically developing children on cognitive functioning as specified above, the 
mean chronological age of the typically developing children will be lower than the 
autistic children. Bearing in mind that the choice of tasks should be suitable for all the 
children (including the ongoing tasks), matching by chronological age would be 
inappropriate as typically developing children would perform at ceiling and meaningful 
statistical analysis could not be performed. 
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In this study, the purpose was to compare the performance of children clinically 
diagnosed with autism with severe autistic symptoms/behaviors, to those with mild 
autistic behaviors as measured by the CARS, as well as to typically developing controls. 
The tasks in this study were therefore purposefully simplified and made to be naturalistic 
to ensure that the task demands were suited to the varied attentional and motivational 
abilities of all the children, including the autistic groups, so that all the children had 
every chance of succeeding in the tasks. For example, the Rivermead appointment task 
was modified so that rather than hearing an alarm bell and remembering to say ‘what is 
the time’ to the researcher, a more familiar clapping to music game was employed. This 
task included music as the cue for the children to clap along with a hand puppet. The 
reward task was also motivational across all groups, providing participants with a 
desirable toy, which they had to remember to collect. In addition, a PM task based on 
Kvavilashvili et al. (2001) used a puppet to provide a purpose for the task and the children 
were required to feed the puppet. These games were interspersed with the distractor 
game which included the hand puppet and provided visual, auditory and kinesthetic 
sensory stimulation in-between the PM tasks.  
On the basis of using these naturalistic PM tasks, we expected that the typically developing 
children and mildly autistic children would perform similarly and that the severely 
autistic children would perform less well, given that studies that included some moderately 
autistic participants (Brandimonte et al., 2011) found differences in event-based PM. 
Furthermore, in line with Jones et al. (2011), we expected all groups to perform similarly 
on the retrospective memory task. Finally, we explored whether severity of autism 
symptoms correlates with performance on PM tasks in autistic children. 
3.2 METHOD
3.2.1 Participants
Twenty-eight autistic children (27 males) participated in the study, ranging in age from 
five to thirteen years (M = 9.97, SD = 2.06). All the participants had received a formal 
clinical diagnosis (DSM IV) for autism. This diagnosis was supported by teacher 
assessment using the CARS (Shopler et al., 1988), which has been shown to identify 
autistic children from other populations and reliably distinguish mild to moderate from 
severe autism. The CARS is a standardised test developed over 15 years on the basis of 
1,500 autistic children and measures development in the areas of social, language and 
communication, playing and imitation, emotion, and auditory, visual and haptic 
responses. Specifically, CARS measures core deficit behaviors in the relationship to 
people, imitation, emotional response, body use, object use, adaptation to change, visual 
response, listening response, taste-smell-touch response and use, fear and nervousness, 
verbal communication, non-verbal communication, activity level, level and consistency 
of intellectual response and general impressions.  The measure quantifies the severity of 
behaviors (symptoms) associated with autism with each item/behavior rated on a scale 
from 1 (age-appropriate behavior) to 4 (severely autistic behavior) in 0.5 increments. 
The scores range from 15-60 and the lower end (mild autism symptoms) cut-off score of 
25 is said to be appropriate and commonly used clinically for younger children 
(Chlebowski, Green, Barton & Fein, 2010), whereas for adolescents the cut-off score is 
suggested to be 27 (Mesibov, Schopler, Schaffer & Michal, 1989).  The cut-off score for 
severe autism symptomology is above 36. Based on the total composite CARS score, the 
autistic children were allocated to one of two groups: Mild symptom severity (Mild Aut; 
n = 14) with a mean score of 30.29 (range 24 to 34) and severe symptom severity (Severe 
Aut; n = 14) with a mean score of 42.25 (range 36-55) 2.
All participants were recruited either through an autism family support group, or 
through schools. The severely autistic children had the characteristic deficits of severe 
verbal and nonverbal social communication, highly restricted and repetitive behaviors 
and extreme (hyper/hypo) sensitivity to sensory input. They had minimal verbal ability, 
used single words, signs or symbols in a solely functional capacity, and regularly failed 
to engage in social interactions. They had a need for routine and predictability, and 
found change highly distressing. Their complex sensory deficits included being over 
sensitive to light, noise, touch etc. Distress and anxiety often resulted in repetitive self 
stimulatory behaviors (head banging, hand f lapping etc).  These characteristics were 
evident in the high CARS scores, which were most frequent for the categories of 
emotional response, fear and nervousness, adaptation to change, listening response and 
general impression. The children with severe autism were able to understand simple 
instruction, supported in some cases by key signs and effective scaffolding (e.g. “Can 
you remember his name? His name is………..?”). Comprehension was determined by the 
ability to successfully repeat a requested action after demonstration.
There were 26 typically developing children (16 males and 10 females), aged 5 to 6 years 
(M = 5.50, SD = 0.27).  The typically developing children had no diagnosis or history of 
learning or psychological impairment and their typical development was supported by 
teacher report.  
The autistic children and the typically developing children were matched using a measure 
of children’s cognitive and educational abilities from their teacher-assessed NC 
assessments3 and corresponding point scores to facilitate analysis (Pott, 2011). The NC 
assessments we selected are categorized as reading, writing and number, measuring 
abilities such as receptive and expressive vocabulary, language comprehension and 
production, number skills and problem solving. For reading, the skills include vocabulary 
understanding and use of simple language, reading for meaning and understanding main 
events, ideas and characters. Writing skills include the use of simple words and phrases 
to convey meaning, joining ideas together, using and talking about ideas for writing. 
Number skills include mental problem-solving and explaining the answers, visuo-spatial 
problem solving, pattern repetition, measuring, estimating and the understanding of 2D 
and 3D shapes. A one-way ANOVA confirmed there were no significant differences 
between groups on measures of educational attainment, including reading, writing, and 
number skills ( p = .41, p = .15, p = .19 respectively, all Fs < 1.93).).
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Table 1. 
Participant characteristics and national curriculum point scoresa. 
Table 1.
Participant characteristics and national curriculum point scoresa
Group
Sex
F   M
Mean age (SD) 
Range
Reading score
Mean (SD)
Writing score
Mean (SD)
Number score
Mean (SD)
Severe Aut.
N = 14
1  13 9.30 (1.95)
6;0 - 14;5 9.21 (5.67) 7.36 (4.50) 9.43 (5.89)
Mild Aut.
N = 14
0  14 10.05 (2.55)
5;5 - 15;5 11.42 (6.43) 9.28 (4.56) 12.50 (7.06)
Typically
Developing
N = 26
10  16 5.05 (0.27)
5;10 - 6;5 9.85 (1.78) 9.54 (1.73) 10.12 (1.40)
a TD (typically developing children) were at norm.
3.2.2 Materials and Procedure
A distractor task was employed several times throughout the testing session, for which 
the game ‘Wac-a-mole’ was used; this included a small square-shaped base from which 
moles would pop up, and two toy hammers, colored either green or red, with which to 
hit them. For the ‘Feeding’ PM task, ten plastic food items were used; for the practice 
trial, two extra food items were used as well as the target item (grapes), which were 
reused for the subsequent trials.  The wide variety of different food groups (including 
fruit, vegetables, pastries and fast food) and food colors and dimensions (which ranged 
in length from approximately 7cm (strawberry) to 12cm (the ice cream) reduced the 
distinctiveness of the target item. Each food item was concealed within a 31cm x 20.5cm 
x 12.5cm shoe box, which were stacked in two towers of five boxes each. A small opening 
in the front of each shoe box, through which food could be reached but not easily seen, 
was 15cm x 7cm. A small plastic bin was provided in which the target item was to be 
placed. The music used for the Clapping PM task was a well-known pop song by a 
popular band, played on a small CD player which was placed out of sight of the children. 
Finally, a toy spring was the gift offered in the Reward PM task, which was placed in a 
small green, semi-opaque tub, measuring 17.5cm x 9.5cm x 8cm.
Children were tested individually in a small room containing a table in the centre and 
some chairs. All autistic children were accompanied by an adult familiar to them but 
who remained silent and uninvolved throughout the testing. The session involved several 
memory tasks and a distractor task, all disguised as games with a hand puppet (played 
throughout by the researcher) to engage the autistic children and controls equally. 
Table 2 shows the timings and the sequence of these tasks during the session.
Introductions and retrospective memory task (encoding a name) 
Upon arrival, the experimenter introduced himself and asked for the child’s name to 
confirm the necessary comprehension and communication ability. The child was then 
introduced to the hand puppet, ‘Wally’ the wolf (played by the researcher), and was asked 
to repeat his name immediately to confirm understanding: “His name is Wally – can you 
say ‘Wally’?”.  Other than when asked to recall his name for the later memory tasks, the 
name ‘Wally’ was never again repeated. The children were then asked if they would like to 
play some games with him. Upon confirmation, the procedure commenced. For all tasks, 
described below, a score of 1 was given for unprompted and prompted remembering and a 
score of 0 was recorded where the child did not remember. 
Instructions for PM Clapping task 
It was explained to the children that Wally loved dancing and clapping to music and were 
told that if they clapped when they heard music it would make Wally very happy.  The 
children demonstrated their willingness and understanding by way of a ‘practice’ when the 
music was surreptitiously turned on and their reaction observed. When they successfully 
clapped, Wally briefly ‘danced and clapped’ along with them, which he did during both 
subsequent trials. Once the children had shown they knew to clap upon hearing the music, 
the distractor task was introduced.
Distractor game
The distractor task involved playing the electronic ‘Wac-A- Mole’ game, whereby the 
children were challenged to hit more moles than Wally with the hammer. The game lasted 
for approximately one minute, including the celebration of who won, during which the 
children were asked to count the number of moles they hit in either multiples of one, ten, 
or five, depending on curriculum level, to maximize cognitive load. This task was later 
repeated to distract the children between the different memory tasks. To avoid causing 
frustration and distress, particularly for those with severe autism, all children ‘beat’ Wally, 
on all occasions, and were congratulated on their performance.
Remembering PM Clapping task - trial 1
Once the game was over, the experimenter surreptitiously pressed ‘play’ on the hidden CD 
player, starting the music, and awaited the children’s reaction, by slowly tidying up or 
preparing the next task.  The children were awarded one point if they independently began 
clapping. If, after approximately ten seconds, the children failed to react to the music they 
were prompted with the statement, “Can you hear the music?”. If they then began clapping 
and/or dancing they were awarded one point. If the children did not clap after this prompt, 
the experimenter surreptitiously turned off the music and continued with the next task. 
Retrospective memory task – recalling the name - trial 1
Once the music had been turned off, then children were asked to recall the wolf’s name: 
“Can you remember his name?  His name is…?”. If the children remembered the wolf’s 
name they scored one point, if they did not remember no reminder was given and they 
moved on to the next task. 
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Instructions for PM Feeding task
The children were told that Wally was a “greedy wolf” who very much enjoyed eating 
and would be happy if they fed him lots of delicious toy food. It was explained that Wally 
could not eat grapes (PM target item) as grapes would make him sick, so the children 
were to remember to put any grapes into the bin, out of Wally’s sight. A brief practice 
session with three food items, including the grapes, followed to ensure the participants 
understood the instructions. The wolf ‘ate’ toy food items from the participants’ hands, 
making happy, snuff ling and growling sounds (made by the researcher) which the 
children enjoyed; the eaten items were then hidden from view. All the children 
remembered to put aside the grapes in the practice task. 
Distractor game
All the participants then played a distractor Wac-a-mole game, which lasted for one 
minute as before.
Remembering PM Feeding task - trial 1
The children were then told that Wally was hungry, and that it was time to feed him. The 
children sat on the f loor with the experimenter and the wolf, in front of the two towers 
of five shoe boxes, in which there was one food item per box (making a total of ten food 
items). They had to reach into the box at the top of the left tower to see what food item 
lay inside which they could feed to Wally, who greedily ate the item from their hand. 
They were asked to work their way down each box in the tower, and repeat for the right 
tower. The task was counter-balanced in that half of the children first encountered the 
target item in the fourth box for trial one and in the eighth box for trial two; the converse 
was true of the other half of children (i.e., eighth box and fourth box for trials one and 
two, respectively). The bin, into which the target items were to be deposited if recognized, 
was placed out of sight (but within reach) to the left of the children. They were awarded 
one point for placing the grapes in the bin unprompted. 
Remembering PM Clapping task - trial 2 
On completion of the feeding task (approximately three minutes duration) the children 
were required to sit back at the table. The experimenter surreptitiously switched on the 
music and scored their performance, first without a prompt and then with the prompt 
“Can you hear the music?”, if they did not clap spontaneously.
Retrospective memory task – recalling the name - trial 2 
Again, as before, they were then tested on the ‘Name?’ task.
Distractor game
The participants played Wac-a-Mole game.
Instructions for PM Reward task
At this point, the children were told that Wally had had so much fun that he wanted to 
give them a present (the toy spring). They were shown the reward and watched as it was 
put ‘in a safe place’; they were told that, upon hearing “The games are now finished, 
time to go back to class” they should collect the reward and return to class. The ‘safe 
place’ was the small, l idded green box, placed out of sight although it was reachable from 
their path out of the room.  
Remembering PM Feeding task - trial 2 
The children then played the Feeding game and the experimenter noted whether the 
children remembered to hide away the grapes.
Remembering PM Reward task 
At the end of the Feeding trial the participant was told “The games are now finished, 
time to go back to class.”  The participant was awarded one point if they remembered to 
collect their reward. If they did not remember, a prompt was given “Have you forgotten 
anything?”. All children received the reward irrespective whether they remembered or 
not, and returned to class. 
Table 2. 
Sequencing of tasks and approximate timings.
Table 2.
Sequencing of tasks and approximate timings.
Task Timings (seconds)
Introductions, informed of Wally’s name 60
Instructions for PM task 1 Clapping 60
Distractor game (Wac-A-Mole) 60
Remembering PM Clapping task - trial 1 30
Retrospective memory task – recalling the name - trial 1 30
Instructions and practice for PM task 2 Feeding 30
Distractor game (Wac-A-Mole) 60
Remembering PM Feeding task - trial 1 180
Remembering PM Clapping task - trial 2 30
Retrospective Memory task – recalling the name - trial 2 30
Distractor game (Wac-A-Mole) 60
Instructions for PM task 3 Reward 30
Remembering PM Feeding task - trial 2 180
Remembering PM Reward task 30
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3.3 RESULTS
Severely autistic children, mildly autistic children and typically developing children were 
compared across one retrospective and three PM tasks. Results will be presented 
separately for the three PM tasks (Tables 3, 4, and 5) and the retrospective task (Table 6). 
In the research to date, gender effects have not been reported, however, to ensure that 
the gender was not a confounder all the analyses reported below were re-run with all 
female participants removed (10 in the typically developing group and 1 in the severely 
autistic group), resulting in 13, 14 and 16 children in the severely autistic, mildly autistic 
and typically developing groups, respectively. One way between groups ANOVAs on the 
mean National Curriculum point scores for reading, writing and number did not result in 
significant main effects of group (reading p = .57, writing p = .43, number p = .34, 
all Fs <1.58) nor were there group differences on the composite scores (F(2, 42) = .68, 
p = .51, η²p = .03). The mean ages of the groups remained virtually the same (Mild Aut M 
= 10.0 (SD = 2.55), Severe Aut M = 9.38 (SD = 1.99), TD M = 6.0 SD = .26). As the 
results with the female participants removed were identical, the analyses with full samples 
are reported. 
3.3.1 Total PM score 
Initially, we analyzed children’s total PM scores by calculating the proportion of 
unprompted responses out of five trials (two trials for clapping and feeding tasks and 
one trial for the reward task). The mean proportion of correct responses were .50 (SD 
.27), .67 (SD .38), and .83 (SD .20) in the severely autistic, mildly autistic and typically 
developing children, respectively. A one way between groups ANOVA found a main 
effect of groups (F(2,51) = 6.73, p = .03, η²p = .26). Games Howell post hoc tests revealed 
a significant difference between the typically developing children and the severely 
autistic group ( p = .002). However, there were no differences between the typically 
developing children and the mildly autistic group ( p = .26) or the severely autistic and 
the mildly autistic groups ( p = .31)4. To see if this pattern was present in each of the PM 
tasks completed, the results for each task are reported below.  
3.3.2 PM Clapping task
In this task, after playing the distractor game, the children had to clap in response to 
hearing the music. We calculated mean proportions of correct responses (unprompted) 
across two trials (see Table 3) and entered these into a one way ANOVA. The main effect 
of groups was significant, F(2,53) = 3.90, p = .027, η²p = .13).  Games Howell post hoc 
comparisons revealed a significant difference between the severely autistic children and 
typically developing children ( p = .03), while the difference between severely and mildly 
autistic children, and the latter and the typically developing children, were not significant 
( p = .65 and p = .37, respectively).  
Table 3 also shows that on the first trial, 50 % of severely autistic children, 64% of 
mildly autistic children and 69% of typically developing children remembered to clap. 
There was no difference between the groups  ( p = .49). Almost all of the children who 
did not clap unprompted on trial 1, remembered to clap after hearing the prompt ‘can 
you hear the music?’, demonstrating that they had retrospective memory of the task (see 
Table 3). In the second trial, more typically developing children remembered to clap 
unprompted (trial one 69% and trial two 96%) compared to the autistic children (see 
Table 3) and the difference between groups on trial 2 was significant ( χ2 (2) = 12.0, p = 
.002). The typically developing children, after having being prompted in trial 1, 
significantly improved their performance on trial 2 (W (26) = 28.00, Z = 2.64, p = .01), 
but no such improvement was found in the autistic children as the percentages of 
children who remembered across two trials was almost identical in both autism groups. 
Table 3. 
Proportion of correct unprompted and prompted answers in trial 1 and trial 2 of the clapping task by group and proportion 
of correct unprompted and prompted responses averaged across two trials.
Table 3.
Proportion of correct unprompted and prompted answers in trial 1 and trial 2 of the clapping task by 
group a d proportion of correct unprompted and prompted responses averaged across two trials.
Group Unprompted 
Trial 1
Prompted 
Trial 1
Unprompted 
Trial 2
Prompted 
Trial 2
Proportion 
correct 
unprompted
Proportion 
correct 
prompted
Severe Aut.
(N = 14) .50 1.00 .50 1.00 .50 1.00
Mild Aut
(N = 14) .64 .93 .64 .79 .64 .86
Typically 
Developing
(N = 26)
.69 1.00 .96 1.00 .83 1.00
3.3.3 PM Feeding task
This task required the children to feed the puppet and remember to put aside grapes. 
A one way ANOVA on the mean proportions of correct responses across two trials 
revealed a significant main effect of group, F(2,51) = 4.28, p = .02, η²p  = .14 (see Table 4). Post 
hoc (Games Howell) comparisons revealed the difference was between the typically 
developing children and the severely autistic children ( p = .02), but not between severely 
and mildly autistic children ( p = .56), or mildly autistic and typically developing children 
( p = .32). This pattern was present on both trial 1 ( χ2 = 7.15, p = .02) and trial 2 ( χ2 = 
6.22 p = .045). Table 4 also shows that in each group proportion of children who 
remembered across two trials was fairly similar.   
Table 4. 
Proportion of children who remembered the feeding task in trial 1 and 2 by group.
Table 4.
Proportion of children who remembered the feeding task in trial 1 and 2 by group 
Group Trial 1 Trial 2
Severe Aut.
(N = 14)
.43 .43
Mild Aut.
(N = 14)
.64 .57
Typically Developing 
(N = 26)
.85 .81
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3.3.4 PM reward task
In the final reward task (see Table 5), the proportion of children remembering the reward 
unprompted was not significantly different across the three groups (χ2(2) = 2.69 p = .26). 
The majority of the children who had not remembered unprompted, did remember after 
the prompt, suggesting intact retrospective memory. When prompted, group differences 
approached significance but two of the groups were at ceiling (χ2(2) = 5.18 p = .054, 
Cramer’s V = .25). 
Table 5. 
Proportion of children who remembered the reward task unprompted and prompted by group. 
Table 5.
Proportion of children who remembered the reward task unprompted and prompted by group 
Group Unprompted Prompted
Severe Aut.
(N = 14)
.60 .80
Mild Aut.
(N =14)
.86 1.00
Typically Developing
(N = 26)
.83 1.00
3.3.5 Retrospective memory
This incidental recall task required children to remember the name of the puppet on two 
occasions. All groups performed well on both trials (above 70% remembered the name) 
and the between group comparisons revealed no significant differences on either the 
first or second trials (both χ2 < 1). There were also no group differences on mean 
proportions across two trials F(2,51) = .80, p = .45, η²p = .03 (see Table 6). 
Table 6
Proportion correct on the retrospective memory task by group.
Table 6.
Proportion correct on the retrospective memo y task by group.
across both trials
Group Recall Name Trial 1 Recall Name Trial 2 Proportion correct 
Severe Aut
(N = 14)
.79 .86 .82.
Mild Aut.
(N = 14)
.93 .86 .89
Typically Developing 
(N = 26)
.73 .77 .75
3.3.6 Correlational analyses
Finally, we conducted an exploratory correlation analyses between total unprompted PM 
scores (all the PM tasks combined) and the severity of autistic symptoms as measured by 
the total CARS scores. The correlation between the total PM scores and the total CARS 
scores approached significance (rs (28) = -.34, p = .07). In line with Jones et al. (2011), 
we also examined whether the total PM scores were associated with any of the CARS 
five subscale scores (Social Communication, Emotional Reactivity, Social Orienting, 
Cognitive and Behavioral Consistency, and Odd Sensory Exploration) (Stella, Mundy & 
Tuchman, 1999). No correlations were found (rs (28), all p’s >.08). 
3.4 DISCUSSION
The present study is the first to examine event-based PM in severely autistic children, 
comparing their performance to mildly autistic children and to typically developing 
children; it was also the first to employ a range of naturalistic tasks, designed to ensure 
the motivation and engagement of severely autistic children, including the distractor 
task. In addition, all the children performed a simple retrospective memory task 
(remembering the puppet’s name). In line with previous research on retrospective 
memory (Frith, 1970a, 1970b; Fyffe & Prior, 1978; Hermelin & O’Connor, 1970; Jones et 
al., 2011), no group differences were found in this name recall task. In relation to PM 
tasks, we expected that while mildly autistic children would perform similarly to the 
typically developing children, severely autistic children would perform worse than the 
other two groups. 
Several important findings emerged. First, for the unprompted PM performance on the 
clapping task and for the feeding task, significant group differences only emerged 
between the typically developing children and the severely autistic children, while the 
mildly autistic children were no different from either of these groups. Second, these 
group differences in the unprompted responses in the clapping task, emerged only on 
trial two (there were no group differences in trial one). The third important finding was 
that there were no group differences on the reward task. Importantly, results also showed 
that autistic children benefitted from indirect cues (prompts) in the clapping task. 
Finally, bearing in mind the sample size, we explored whether there was a correlation 
between the total PM scores and the CARS scores. Though the correlation approached 
significance, no correlations between the total PM scores and any of the CARS subscales 
were found. Taken together, the results show that although event-based PM is impaired 
in the severely autistic children, this impairment can be diminished with highly 
motivating and developmentally appropriate tasks. 
The first finding concerning no significant differences between the mildly autistic 
children and typically developing children replicates findings of Williams et al. (2013), 
Altgassen et al. (2010) and Henry et al. (2014), but contradicts those obtained by 
Brandimonte et al. (2011). We believe that one of the potentially important variables 
which explains the differences we found, compared to Brandimonte et al. (2011), are the 
tasks used to measure performance. Brandimonte et al. (2011) used a computer-based 
abstract task which would be more demanding for autistic children, especially those 
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with more moderate symptoms. The tasks in this study were modified to suit the severely 
autistic children and to be meaningful in the context of such simple tasks as feeding 
food to the puppet and clapping to music. The verbal demands were also reduced, as the 
children were not required to verbalize (i.e., to say ‘what is the time’ on hearing an 
alarm) or say anything when they saw the grapes. Furthermore, in the reward task, the 
target object was an attractive toy spring, which the children were allowed to take back 
to class. 
In relation to this point, and perhaps most surprisingly, the results showed no group 
differences for the reward task, where even severely autistic children were able to 
remember to collect the reward at the end of the session (60% of the severely autistic 
group remembered to collect the toy, as did 86% of the mildly autistic children). This 
finding is in line with several developmental studies that have shown beneficial effects 
of motivation with highly desirable tasks over relatively short delay periods even with 
very young children. For example, Causey and Bjorklund (2014) found that 2- to 4-year-
olds were more successful in remembering to get a sticker for themselves at the end of 
the session than to remember to turn a sign over. In a study by Ślusarczyk and 
Niedźwieńska (2013), 30% of 2-year old children remembered to retrieve a sticker (high 
motivation condition) in comparison to 9% children who remembered to put pencils 
aside (low motivation condition) (for similar findings, see Kliegel, Brandenberger & 
Aberle, 2010; Sommerville, Wellman & Cultice,  1983). 
Another important finding was that in the clapping task, the significant improvement of 
the typically developing children from trial one to trial two (69% to 96%) was not seen 
in the autistic children. The typically developing children who remembered on trial one 
after being prompted, were then able to carry this forward to trial two. Although the 
autistic children remembered on trial one after being prompted (can you hear the 
music?), this did not carry forward to the second trial. In trial two, most of the typically 
developing children responded correctly, but this was not the case with the autistic 
children. This finding mirrors results from studies of language and reading 
comprehension where autistic children are consistently reported to be impaired in 
connecting or integrating meaning from one sentence/paragraph to another in discourse 
(Bishop, 1989; Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006). Explanations generally suggest 
that autistic children have an impaired ability to create organizational structure to 
facilitate memory and to connect information across tasks (focusing instead on the 
detail of the task in hand). Others (e.g., Happé & Frith, 2006) suggest that global 
understanding is made difficult in autism due to differences in the use of executive 
functions focusing on detail rather than the global picture (weak central coherence 
theory).  Therefore, autistic children may be less likely to improve PM performance 
across trials. 
Even though the autistic children did not benefit from the prompt across trials one and 
two, it is interesting that they correctly interpreted the prompt despite it being subtle 
and communicatively indirect. Autistic children are widely reported to be over-literal in 
their interpretation of language, particularly when the expression is indirect (Bishop, 
1989). For example, when asked ‘can you pass the salt’ they typically interpret this 
literally, replying ‘yes’. Yet in this task, the autistic children did not interpret the prompt 
literally, but as a cue to the PM task, as did the typically developing children. It is also 
interesting that both the feeding task and the clapping task were social in their nature 
(i.e., clapping for Wally and feeding him) and less motivating than the reward task, but 
performance was not at f loor in autistic children. This suggests that autistic children can 
succeed in everyday PM tasks, which are often social in nature, but have strong focal cues.
Taken together, the pattern of results obtained in the present study, can be explained by 
Einstein and McDaniel (2005) multi-process model which suggests that PM can be sub-
served by both controlled strategic as well as more spontaneous processes depending on 
the type of task, cue events, ongoing activities, motivation and context. We deliberately 
used easy and engaging event-based tasks with fairly strong and focal cue events that 
would encourage more spontaneous retrieval processes. This was the case in both the 
clapping task and the feeding task where the music and the toy grapes had to be processed 
as part of the ongoing activity. Although the target for the reward task was somewhat 
less salient (i.e., finishing the session) it was highly motivating to children. However, 
this does not mean that no strategic processes were used by the children. For example, 
in relation to the reward task the informal observation of the researcher was that during 
the feeding task, which lasted 3 minutes, some of the children, including severely autistic 
children, were occasionally looking in the direction of the box where the toy was hidden, 
which indicates the involvement of some strategic processing (see Leigh & Marcovitch, 
2014). Further research is needed to investigate strategic monitoring with highly 
motivating PM tasks in autistic children.  
The relative preservation of event-based PM abilities in mildly and severely autistic 
children is somewhat reminiscent of their preserved performance in tasks of cued recall 
and paired associate learning (for review see Boucher et al., 2012) The potential 
similarities between event-based PM tasks and cued recall have been emphasized in the 
literature by Einstein and McDaniel (2005) (see also McDaniel & Einstein, 2007) who 
point out that as in cued recall, event-based PM tasks involve forming mental associations 
between the PM target event and the to-be-performed action and encountering the cue 
may activate the associated action. Despite this similarity, the relationship between 
event-based PM and cued recall has not been directly investigated. The present findings 
indicate that this might be an interesting avenue for future research.   
It is possible that group differences will emerge with event-based tasks that have less 
distinctive cues and less motivating tasks as was the case with Brandimonte et al. (2011) 
and Jones et al. (2011). In addition, delay intervals between PM instructions and 
opportunities to carry our PM tasks were short. Future research should investigate 
effects of autism on performance on different types of tasks on varying dimensions and 
longer time delays. What is important at this point is that we provide strong evidence 
that if the task parameters are favorable, even severely autistic children can pass the 
tasks. This has several implications for practice. Teachers can use reward as motivation 
in the classroom to improve PM in autistic children in the everyday setting. The use of 
reward to motivate autistic children has been recognized in approaches aiming to modify 
challenging behaviors in a meaningful way in children and adults (e.g., applied behavioral 
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analysis). It is also widely reported in retrospective memory research that autistic 
children appear to have a particular skill for remembering when motivated, whilst at the 
same time being unable to memorize other facts (and in particular, personal experiences) 
(Hoekstra et al., 2009).
It is customary in PM studies to probe those participants who fail to pass the PM task to 
check whether they have preserved retrospective knowledge for receiving PM instructions 
(e.g., Williams et al., 2013). In the present study, certain proportions of children did 
forget some of the PM tasks. However, in the clapping task, almost 100% of these 
children remembered in response to the indirect cue “can you hear the music?” (see 
Table 3). Similarly, in the reward task, the vast majority of these children remembered in 
response to the more direct cue “have you forgotten anything?” (see Table 5), which 
indicates that even severely autistic children did not forget due to retrospective memory 
failure. This is further corroborated by no group differences in the retrospective name 
recall task.  In the feeding task, in which prompting was not used, six severely autistic 
children, five mildly autistic children and four typically developing children failed both 
trials. This raises the possibility that they failed the PM task because of retrospective 
memory failure (i.e., could not remember PM task instructions). Although we cannot 
completely exclude this possibility, we carefully examined how these children performed 
on the other two PM tasks (clapping and reward tasks). The rationale was that if their 
retrospective memory was at fault, these children would have also shown retrospective 
memory impairment for the other two tasks. The analysis showed that out of the six 
severely autistic children who forgot the feeding on both trials, all showed intact 
retrospective memory for the clapping task; however two children could not remember 
the reward task even after prompting, indicating a failure of retrospective memory. Out 
of five mildly autistic children who forgot the feeding task on both trials, all showed 
intact retrospective memory on the reward and only one child could not remember the 
clapping task after a prompt on both trials. All four typically developing children 
demonstrated intact retrospective memory for both clapping and reward tasks. Therefore, 
there were three children (two severely autistic children and one mildly autistic child) 
who could have potentially failed the feeding task due to retrospective memory 
impairment.  When these three children were excluded from the analysis the findings 
remained the same. It is worth noting that a recent study by Henry et al., (2014) 
investigated the role of retrospective memory as a confounder in PM performance and 
found that it was not the major cause of autism-related impairment in time-based or 
event-based PM. 
In summary, the inclusion of severely autistic children highlights the need to consider 
the heterogeneity of autism and the severity of specific traits in relation to performance 
on event-based PM tasks. The results of the present study replicate and extend previous 
findings by showing that autistic children, including those with more severe symptoms, 
are able to succeed on some of the event-based PM tasks (i.e., with a distinctive target 
event and high motivation). However, unlike the typically developing children, the 
autistic children did not appear to carry forward successful performance after receiving 
the prompt in trial 1 to trial 2. However, the autistic children were able to benefit from 
fairly indirect cues (prompts to remember) and two out of the three PM tasks were social 
in nature which suggests that some rudimentary social abilities may be preserved in 
autistic children in the context of the event-based PM tasks. This opens up interesting 
avenues for future research in terms of interventions and educational support. 
Footnotes
1 The ‘disability-first’ terminolog y used here (i.e., ‘autistic children), and throughout the paper, reflects the 
preferences of autistic people, and their family and friends, reported recently in a large survey by Kenny et al. 
(2015). 
2  Two participants were just outside the cut-off scores for the mild and the severely autistic groups (with CARS 
scores of 24 and 36, respectively).  However, when the data of these two participants were removed from the 
analysis, the overall pattern of findings did not change, hence they were retained in the sample.
3 These assessments are regularly subjected to rigorous evaluation by the Office for Standards in Education 
(OFSTED), to ensure they are assessed in a standardized and systematic manner against detailed attainment 
criteria (see Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), 2000/2009, for an overview of educational 
attainment level criteria).
4 Age did not correlate with performance on any of the three PM tasks (all rs < .10). However, given that groups 
were matched on cognitive/educational ability and the autistic children ranged from 5;5 to 13 years, an additional 
analysis of variance was conducted with age as a covariate. The results did not change, there was a significant effect 
of group (severe, mild and typically developing ) on overall PM performance (F (2, 50) = 4.56, p = .02, η²p = .15). 
Post hoc tests again revealed a significant difference only between the typically developing children and the severely 
autistic group (p = .005).
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CHAPTER 
DO IMPORTANCE INSTRUCTIONS IMPROVE TIME-BASED 
PROSPECTIVE REMEMBERING IN AUTISM SPECTRUM CONDITIONS?
This chapter is based on:
Altgassen, M., Sheppard, D. P., Hendriks, M. P. H. (manuscript submitted). Do importance 
instruction improve time-based prospective remembering in autism spectrum conditions?
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ABSTRACT
Background: This study explored the impact of motivation on the memory for delayed 
intentions (so-called, prospective memory, PM) in autistic individuals. Specifically, we 
were interested in the effects of personal (i.e., receiving a reward) as compared to 
prosocial motivation (i.e., performing a favour for someone). Given the well-established 
theory of mind deficits in autism, we expected autistic individuals to benefit more 
strongly from personal than prosocial importance manipulations, while the opposite 
pattern was predicted for controls.  
Method: Sixty-one adolescents with autism and 61 typically developing adolescents 
participated, with each group distributed equally to one of the three motivation 
conditions of standard, prosocial and personal import. Participants worked on a 2-back 
picture-based ongoing task in which a time-based PM task was embedded. 
Results: A mixed 2 (Group) x 3 (Motivation condition) analysis of variance indicated a 
main effect of group, with controls outperforming the autism group, and a main effect 
of condition, with overall better performance in the personal than the prosocial and 
standard motivation condition. There was no significant interaction. 
Conclusions: In line with previous evidence, autistic individuals showed reduced PM 
performance. Controls performed significantly best when a personal reward was 
promised, while there were no significant differences between the motivation conditions 
for autistic individuals. Findings are discussed in terms of underlying processes.  
4.1 INTRODUCTION
For most people, successful daily life depends critically on remembering to complete a 
large number of tasks at the right moment in the future, such as remembering to finalize 
your daughter’s costume for her carnival party at school the next day, or filing your tax 
report on time, or taking out the garbage on Monday evening. Such tasks are common 
examples of so-called prospective memory (PM) tasks. PM refers to the execution of 
delayed intentions at a certain point in time (time-based PM tasks), upon appearance of 
an external cue (event-based PM tasks) or right after having completed an activity 
(activity-based PM tasks, Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996). PM tasks are 
ubiquitous in everyday life. Frequent failures in prospective remembering can lead to 
negative social, occupational or health-related consequences (Kliegel, Jäger, Altgassen, 
& Shum, 2008). PM tasks are dual tasks, thus, while the individual is busily engaged in 
an ongoing activity, he/she has to remember to perform the delayed intention at the 
appropriate moment (Ellis, 1996). This means that both tasks compete for individuals’ 
limited cognitive resources which is especially relevant for populations with reduced 
cognitive resources (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). Prospective remembering comprises 
multiple phases: intention formation (e.g., planning of the intended action); storing the 
intention in memory during intention retention, and; initiating and executing the 
intention at the appropriate moment. In terms of underlying processes, PM performance 
is mainly supported by executive functions (e.g., planning, monitoring for the target cue 
that indicates the appropriate moment for intention initiation, inhibition of ongoing 
activities to switch to the PM task) and retrospective memory (remembering when and 
what one intends to do, Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2002). 
As postulated by the inf luential multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), 
the extent to which strategic, executive control resources are involved in the retrieval of 
delayed intentions depends on the task itself (e.g., type of PM cue, difficulty of the 
ongoing task, importance of the PM task) and on characteristics of the individual (e.g., 
cognitive resources, personality traits). For example, cues that are more salient may 
rather automatically attract attention and prompt retrieval of the intended action, 
whereas less salient cues may require more monitoring to be detected and more inhibitory 
resources to interrupt the ongoing task and switch to the PM task. On the other hand, 
ongoing tasks that are rather difficult may absorb more cognitive resources than easier 
tasks, thus leaving less resources available to support the PM task and, for instance, to 
monitor for the PM target cue. Recently, Kliegel, Altgassen, Hering, and Rose (2011) 
postulated that (potential) deficits in PM in clinical or developing populations with 
reduced cognitive resources are mediated by a mismatch between PM task-specific 
requirements of cognitive resources (e.g., a PM task may require more or less switching 
during intention initiation and execution) and condition-specific impairments in those 
resources (e.g., a condition such as autism may lead to less available switching resources). 
It is only when the available resources are insufficient for the specific PM task at hand, 
that an impairment is expected (i.e., even though individuals may have reduced switching 
resources, these may still be sufficient for a low switching-intensive PM task). 
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Importantly, non-cognitive factors, such as motivation, may also affect individual’s 
employment of cognitive resources. Motivational biases (e.g., being more motivated by 
important intentions) may lead to individuals strategically focusing their available 
cognitive resources on task relevant aspects. For example, if I do not want to be late for 
a job interview, I may monitor the time more frequently than when meeting a friend in 
a café. So far, PM research on the role of motivation or importance of the PM task has 
typically been investigated by promising a reward for correct PM responses (Meacham 
& Singer, 1977; Sheppard, Kretschmer, Knispel, Vollert, & Altgassen, 2015) or by 
varying task-attractiveness (e.g., having to remember to tell the caretaker to get candy 
versus the laundry, Somerville, Wellman, & Cultice, 1983; Causey & Bjorklund, 2014) as 
well as by manipulating importance of the PM task as compared to the ongoing task 
(e.g., Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & 
Einstein, 2004) or providing social reasons to do well in the PM task (e.g., Altgassen, 
Kliegel, Brandimonte, & Filippello, 2010; Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2008; Brandimonte, 
Ferrante, Bianco, & Villani, 2010). These studies have largely shown that increasing 
participants’ motivation for the task improves their PM performance. From a conceptual 
perspective, it has been argued that importance effects should only occur when PM 
tasks rely on strategic, attention-demanding processes, but not when automatic processes 
suffices (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). In effortful PM tasks, additional monitoring 
should benefit PM performance, while ongoing task performance should decrease (so-
called costs to the ongoing task) due to the then fewer available monitoring resources 
(Kliegel et al., 2001, 2004). Consistently, Kliegel and colleagues (2001) found a positive 
effect of task importance in younger adults in a time-based PM task, where strategic 
processing is necessary and in contrast, no importance effect in an event-based task 
which supported automatic processing. Similarly, importance positively affected 
performance in an event-based task, if this task required the strategic allocation of 
attentional resources, but not if it encouraged automatic processing (Kliegel et al., 2004). 
These results imply that stressing the importance of a PM task during intention formation 
may indeed enhance participants’ performance. It could be then, that importance 
instructions would compensate for reduced PM functioning by re-directing attentional 
resources during the retrieval phase, something which would particularly benefit 
individuals with reduced executive control abilities. In line with these predictions, 
Altgassen, Zöllig, Kopp, Mackinlay, and Kliegel (2007) reported spared time-based PM 
performance in individuals with Parkinson’s disease, who suffer from reduced executive 
functioning (Uekermann et al., 2004; Weintraub et al., 2005), when they were told to 
focus on the PM task. In contrast, they showed reduced performance as compared to 
healthy controls in the same task when asked to concentrate on the ongoing task. 
As indicated above, individuals not only show better PM performance when promised a 
reward or asked to prioritize the PM task, but also when social motives for doing well are 
provided. For example, participants in a study by Kvavilashvili (1987) were more likely 
to remember to hang up a telephone receiver when told the experimenter was waiting for 
an important phone call, then when not told (for similiar results, see Cicogna & Nigro, 
1998). Altgassen et al. (2010) compared younger and older adults’ PM performance in a 
time-based PM task. Half of the participants were given standard PM instructions, while 
to the other half the PM task was introduced as doing a favour for the experimenter. 
Overall, younger adults outperformed older adults. However, an age group by importance 
manipulation interaction indicated that older adults’ PM performance improved when a 
social motive was provided, whereas younger adults’ performance was unaffected by the 
importance manipulation.  Following a similar approach, Brandimonte and Ferrante 
(2008) manipulated importance of an activity-based PM task (i.e., remembering to sign a 
form after having completed a verb verification task) by either providing a social motive 
(i.e., if you do not remember to sign the form, important information will be missed and 
the experiment will be invalid), a personal reward (i.e., course credit for performing the 
PM task) or by giving standard instructions. Participants showed more correct PM 
responses in the social motive condition than the other two conditions. In 2010, 
Brandimonte, Ferrante, Bianco, and Villani replicated their findings of best PM 
performance in a social importance condition (as opposed to a standard condition, 
reward condition or a combination of social importance with reward; in the latter 
participants performed poorest) using a comparable ongoing and PM task (social 
importance condition: if they will remember to sign the form, the experimenter will 
collect important data for her thesis; reward condition: gain course credit). Taken 
together, these studies indicate that social motives may improve PM performance as 
compared to standard or even personal importance (at least of some populations). 
Notably, social importance manipulations will only be effective if the recipient is able to 
decipher the social motive and to perceive it as relevant. Populations that experience 
difficulties in taking the perspective of other people and in understanding their beliefs 
or emotions (i.e. reduced theory of mind or empathy), may perceive social motives as less 
important and be more motivated by the prospect of a personal reward for good 
performance. Thus, to accurately predict individuals’ PM performance it may not be 
sufficient to consider their potential mismatch of task demands and cognitive resources, 
but to also take individuals’ social-cognitive skills into account when exploring social 
importance effects. To test this assumption, the present study set out to compare the 
effects of different types of motivation manipulations in a population with reduced 
theory of mind, namely individuals with autism spectrum condition (ASC), with those of 
neurotypical controls. 
ASCs are associated with impairments in social interaction, communication and 
imagination as well as restricted interests and activities and atypical reactivity to sensory 
input (APA, 2013). In addition, they show reduced organization abilities such as 
difficulties with prioritizing, coordinating and sequencing activities (Mackinlay, 
Charman, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004), which have been related to 
deficits in PM (Mackinlay et al., 2006). So far, eleven studies on PM in ASC have been 
published. Deficits in prospective remembering have not only been observed in standard 
lab-based tasks, but also in more naturalistic tasks that mimic everyday PM requirements 
(e.g., Dresden Breakfast task, Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012; Virtual Week, Henry 
et al., 2014; Kretschmer, Altgassen, Rendell, & Bölte, 2014). In line with the well-
documented deficits in executive control functions in autistic individuals (Hill, 2004; 
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Sanders, Johnson, Garavan, Gill, & Gallagher, 2008), reduced PM performance has 
been most consistently found in time-based tasks (Altgassen et al., 2012; Altgassen, 
Williams, Bölte, & Kliegel, 2009; Kretschmer et al., 2014; Williams, Boucher, Lind, & 
Jarrold, 2013), whereas results for event-based tasks are somewhat mixed and seem to 
depend on the specific task characteristics and demands (Altgassen, Schmitz-Hubsch, & 
Kliegel, 2010; Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia, Altgassen, & Kliegel, 2011; Yi et al., 
2014). Overall, time-based tasks put higher demands on executive control processes 
than event-based tasks, as there is no external cue that can prompt retrieval of the 
intention; instead the individual has to keep track of the elapsing time in order not to 
miss the target time. Given that autistic individuals have difficulties with prioritizing 
tasks or activities (which may underlie or contribute to their organization difficulties 
and their PM deficits) and show reduced executive control resources, importance 
instructions that highlight the value of the PM task may support the strategic employment 
of their cognitive resources, and in turn, support their PM performance. In fact, there is 
first evidence by Sheppard, Kvavilashvili, and Ryder (2016) for the potential importance 
of intrinsic motivation in autism. Comparing severely autistic, mildly autistic and non-
autistic control children, the severely autistic group performed worse than the non-
autistic controls in two standard PM tasks, but showed spared performance when the 
PM task involved a reward for success (i.e., remembering to collect a toy spring when 
leaving the classroom); mildly autistic children did not differ from either group in any of 
the PM measures. 
Therefore, this study set out to explore the impact of motivation on time-based PM 
performance in autistic individuals. Specifically, we were interested in the effects of 
personal (i.e., receiving a reward) as compared to social motivation (i.e., performing a 
favour for someone). To maximise importance effects, we not only used a time-based 
PM task that, in general, puts high demands on self-initiated processing and executive 
functions, but also employed an ongoing task that is cognitively highly demanding (a 
2-back working memory task). Given the well-established theory of mind deficits in 
autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Frith & Happé, 1994), we expected autistic individuals to benefit 
more strongly from personal than social importance manipulations, as they might be 
less responsive towards social cues and perceive such tasks as less important. In contrast, 
we predicted the opposite pattern for controls in line with Brandimonte and colleagues’ 
studies (2008; 2010). In terms of group effects, we expected autistic individuals to show 
less correct PM responses than controls (e.g., Altgassen et al., 2009; Williams et al., 
2013).  Moreover, based on the previously found beneficial effects of rewards or social 
motives on the PM of neurotypical children or adults (Altgassen, Kliegel, et al., 2010; 
Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2008; Sheppard et al., 2015), and autistic children (Sheppard 
et al., 2016), posited to arise by inf luencing the allocation of attentional resources, we 
expected to see an overall positive effect of highlighting the importance of the PM task.
4.2 METHOD
4.2.1 Participants
Sixty-one autistic adolescents and 61 non-autistic adolescents participated in the study, 
with each group distributed randomly, stratified only to control for age and ability, to 
one of the three motivation conditions of standard, social and personal motivation. The 
full factorial design can be taken from Table 1. Groups were parallel for gender, age and 
non-verbal IQ, but not for verbal IQ (here, the autistic group scored higher than 
controls). Conditions were parallel for gender and verbal ability, but not for age and non-
verbal ability; on average, participants of the Reward condition were older and showed 
a higher non-verbal ability than those of the other two conditions.
 Standard Condition Social motivation Personal Reward    
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N=21 
Controls 
N=19 
ASC 
N=19 
Controls 
N=21 
ASC 
N=21 
Controls 
N=21 
   
 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
 
M (SD) 
group 
F(1,116) 
condition 
F(2,116) 
interaction 
F(2,116) 
age 15.7 (1.0) 15.7 (1.1) 15.9 (1.1) 15.9 (1.0) 16.9 (1.7) 16.0 (1.1) 2.33 4.2 * 1.8 
gender 21m 19m 16m, 3f 21m 20m, 1f 21m    
verbal 
ability 
12.2 (2.2) 10.7 (2.4) 14.2 (2.0) 10.9 (2.0) 12.9 (2.6) 11.6 (2.0) 24.5*** 2.3 2.8 
non-verbal 
ability 
57.8 (6.8) 56.4 (9.1) 56.5 (9.3) 58.5 (8.9) 62.4 (6.6) 60.5 (7.6) .08 3.7* .7 
Note. ASC = Autism Spectrum Condition 
*p <.05; *** p < .001 
Autistic participants were recruited from a Dutch school for special education and from Dutch 
clinics for autistic children and their families. All autistic participants had received a formal 
diagnosis of Autistic Disorder (13), Asperger syndrome (21) or PDD-NOS (27) following 
DSM-IV-TR criteria (APA, 2000). All of these diagnoses are now collapsed under Autism 
Spectrum Disorder  under the DSM-5 (APA, 2013). All autistic participants were high-
functioning (IQ > 85). Verbal ability was assessed with the vocabulary subtest of the Dutch 
version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, Kort et al., 2005), or for 
those over the age of 16, the vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS-IV-NL, Wechsler, 2012). As a measurement of non-verbal ability, the matrices subtest 
of the Wechsler Non-Verbal Scale of Ability (WNV, Wechsler & Naglieri, 2008) was conducted. 
All adolescents, and their parents, provided written informed consent. The study was approved 
by the Ethics Committee Faculty of Social Sciences, Radboud University, Nijmegen, and the 
study was conducted in line with the Helsinki declaration.
Table 1. 
Individual differences across groups and motivation conditions.
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4.2.2 Materials and procedure
4.2.2.1 PM task
For the ongoing task participants worked on a picture-based 2-back working memory 
task, using coloured versions of Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) picture set (Rossion 
& Pourtois, 2004). Participants were required to indicate, via key press as quickly and as 
accurately as possible, whether the coloured picture on screen was the same as that 
presented two pictures previously (green key “Z” for “yes”; orange key “B” for “no”). 
Each picture was presented for 1500ms, with a 500ms interstimulus interval. Participants 
first demonstrated their understanding of the task by way of a paper version, followed 
by a 10-trial practice block on the computer. All participants demonstrated sufficient 
understanding at this stage, and so no participants repeated the practice. The practice 
was then followed by a 20-trial block (single-task block). Upon completion of the single-
task block, participants were told they would soon be taking a short break, after which 
they would complete the task again, only this time there would be an additional task to 
consider (PM task). Specifically, they were asked to press a pink key (“P”) whenever one 
minute had passed. To see how much time had already elapsed, they could press a white 
key (“spacebar”) upon which a digital clock was displayed for 1500ms. Depending on to 
which motivation condition participants were allocated, the rationale of task instructions 
varied. Participants were only assigned to one motivation condition to prevent carry-over 
effects from one condition to the other, and to reduce the likelihood of practice effects. 
For the neutral (standard) condition, participants were simply told the additional task 
involved pressing the pink key as closely as possible to each minute, from the 1st to the 
6th minute. To encourage an adequate encoding of the task, the experimenter, followed 
by the participant, read out the rule, “The rule is: I will press the pink key after every 
minute” (for a similar approach, see Altgassen et al., 2009). Following Altgassen et al.’s 
study (2010), for the social motivation condition the PM task was introduced as the 
participant performing a favour for the experimenter. Specifically, participants were 
told that, for another research project, the experimenter wanted to know how many 
ongoing task trials could be completed in 1 minute, and so it would help the experimenter 
greatly if the participant could press the pink key every minute. For the personal reward 
motivation condition, participants were promised a reward for doing well on the PM 
task. Specifically, they were told that if they remembered to press the pink key at least 4 
out of the 6 times, they would receive €5. The PM instructions were followed by an 
approximate 10 minute filled delay, during which participants completed the vocabulary 
sub-test (Kort et al., 2005; Wechsler, 2012). Subsequently, participants were engaged in 
the dual-task block comprising 80 ongoing task trials (25% 2-back working memory 
hits, 75% non-targets), without any reminder of the additional PM task. PM dependent 
measures were number of successful PM responses (max 6;. ± 2s around the target times: 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 minutes). Time monitoring (number of white button presses) was also 
measured (total number; mean monitoring behavior collapsed across the four 
15s-intervals preceding the six targeted times).  Unfortunately, due to experimenter 
error the responses to the n-back hits of the control group were not recorded. Therefore, 
dependent variables for the ongoing task were proportion of correct (non-target) 
responses and reaction times. Once the dual-task block was completed, participants 
were asked if there was anything else, other than the ongoing task, they were meant to 
do. All participants remembered that they had to press the pink key every minute. 
Thereafter, participants completed the rest of the vocabulary test (if they had not 
f inished it before) and worked on the matrices subtest of the WNV (Wechsler & 
Naglieri, 2008). All received €5 for taking part in the study, regardless of condition or 
actual performance.
4.3 RESULTS
4.3.1 Correct PM responses
A 2 (group) x 3 (motivation condition) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
compare correct PM responses across groups and conditions (Table 2). There were 
significant main effects of group, and condition, whereas, the interaction was not 
significant. Overall, the ASC group (M = 3.85, SD = 1.97) performed less well than 
controls (M = 4.70, SD = 1.71). Furthermore, participants in the Personal motivation 
condition (M = 4.90, SD = 1.56) outperformed those in the Standard (M = 3.79, SD = 
1.96) and Social conditions (M = 4.08, SD = 1.98), although the performance of the 
latter two conditions was no different. Planned comparisons revealed that controls only 
outperformed the ASC group in the Personal condition ( p = .004), which drove the 
group effect (standard p = .12; social motivation p = .92). Furthermore, whilst the 
performance of the ASC group did not differ between conditions (all p > .20), the 
performance of the controls ref lected that of the main effect of condition; namely, 
significantly better performance in the Personal condition, compared to both the 
Standard ( p = .013) and Social conditions ( p = .003), whilst performance in the latter 
two conditions was the same ( p = .69). 
 1 
 Standard Condition Social motivation Personal Reward 
 ASC Controls ASC Controls ASC Controls 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
correct PM 
responses  
3.4 (2.1) 4.3 (1.7) 4.1 (1.9) 4.1 (2.0) 4.1 (1.8) 5.7 (.6) 
single-task OT 
accuracy 
92.6 (7.7)  86.7 (14.7)  94.0 (5.8)  94.6 (6.2)  91.6 (12.5)  96.5 (6.2)  
dual-task OT 
accuracy  
92.8 (5.5) 90.4 (7.5)  94.0 (4.1)  91.9 (5.8)  91.7 (8.2)  91.4 (8.4)  
single-task OT 
response times   
 727 (153)   807 (168)  727 (132)   812 (157)   753 (178)   770 (162)   
dual-task OT 
response times  
 819 (95)  821 (90)   771 (107)   823 (93)   737 (88)   811 (94)   
Note. OT refers to ongoing taskNote. OT refers to ongoing task
Table 2. 
Prospective memory and ongoing task performance.  
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4.3.2 Time monitoring
A mixed 2 (group) x 3 (motivation condition) x 4 (interval) ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the last factor, was carried out with time monitoring as dependent variable. 
There was a main effect of interval F(3,345) = 105.17, p < .001, η²p = .478, but not of 
group F(1,115) = .796, p =.374, η²p = .007 or condition F(2,115) = 1.171, p =.314, η²p = .02. 
There was, however, a significant interval by group interaction, F(3,345 ) = 5.27, 
p =.001, η²p = .044, and a significant interval by condition interaction F(3,345 ) = 2.446, 
p =.025, η²p = .041. All other interactions were not significant (all Fs < 1.2). Overall, 
participants increased the average number of clock checks each 15s interval as the target 
time approached (see Figure 1); with clocks checks in each interval being significantly 
higher than the previous interval (all p < .001). Further analysis of the significant 
interactions revealed that, whilst clock checks in the first three intervals was the same 
for both groups (all p >.37), controls (M = 2.47, SD = 2.10) checked the clock more 
frequently than the autistic participants (M = 1.82, SD = 1.51) in the 4th interval, with 
the mean difference approaching significance ( p = .068). Furthermore, clock checks 
only differed significantly between the Standard (M = 1.71, SD = 1.43) and Personal 
condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.50) in the 4th interval ( p < .04); while across all other 
intervals clock checks were the same for all motivation conditions ( p > .16). 
4.3.3 Ongoing task
A mixed 2 (group) x 3 (motivation condition) x 2 (task block) ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the last factor and proportion of correct ongoing task responses as 
dependent variable was conducted (Table 2). There were no main effects of group, 
condition, or task block, and no significant interactions. Thus, both groups performed 
similarly, achieving a similar proportion of correct non-N-back responses (ASC: M = 
92.80, SD = 6.68; controls: M = 91.91, SD = 6.66). Moreover, no significant differences 
were found between any of the three motivation conditions (Standard: M = 90.63, SD = 
7.49; social: M = 93.64, SD = 4.58; personal: M = 92.79, SD = 7.40) or between the single 
(M = 92.87, SD = 9.58) and the dual-task block (M = 92.05, SD =6.72).
In terms of ongoing task response times, a mixed 2 (group) x 3 (motivation condition) x 
2 (task block) ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of group and task block, but 
no effect of condition, and no interactions. Thus, the ASC group responded faster to the 
2-back non-target stimuli than the control group, and overall, participants’ speed of 
response in the single task block (M = 766, SD = 157) was significantly quicker than 
that of the dual-task block (M = 797, SD = 98). Performance did not vary across the 
motivation conditions.
3.3.4 Correlations
Separately for groups and motivation conditions (Table 3), correlational analyses were 
conducted between correct PM responses and clock checks during the fourth interval, 
single and dual ongoing task performance (accuracy, response times), age as well as 
verbal and non-verbal ability. For autistic individuals and all three motivation conditions, 
PM performance positively correlated with clock checks during the last interval before 
the target time. Thus, more correct PM responses were associated with more clock 
checks. In the Standard condition, age negatively correlated with PM performance, thus 
younger age was associated with more correct PM responses. There were no other 
significant correlations for the ASC group. In contrast, for controls no significant 
correlation between PM performance and clock checks was observed in the Personal 
condition, while the other two conditions showed positive correlations indicating a link 
between better PM performance with more clock checks. Similarly, only in the Personal 
condition (dual-task) ongoing task performance correlated positively, and ongoing task 
response times correlated negatively with PM performance. Thus, more correct and 
faster ongoing task responses were associated with better PM performance. There were 
no other significant correlations for controls.
Table 3. 
Correlations of correct prospective memory responses.
Table 3.
o ti ns of correct prospectiv  memory responses 
Standard Condition Social motivation Personal Reward
clock checks interval 4 ASC .71*** .79*** .48*
Controls .73*** .46* .27
single-task OT accuracy ASC .17 -.39 -.09
Controls .05 -.14 -.01
single-task OT RT ASC .41 .11 .12
Controls -.20 .24 -.34
dual-task OT accuracy ASC .09 .05 .03
Controls .04 -.09 .62**
dual-task OT RT ASC -.05 .21 .22
Controls .00 .11 -.51*
age ASC -.51* .36 -.16
Controls .36 .31 .32
verbal ability ASC -.04 .20 .04
Controls .02 .05 -.10
non-verbal ability ASC -.18 .09 .15
Controls .14 .36 .03
Note. *p <.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; 
ASC = Autism Spectrum Condition; OT = ongoing task; RT = response timesNote. *p <.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; 
ASC = Autism Spectrum Condition; OT = ongoing task; RT = response times 
4.4 DISCUSSION
This study set out to explore the impact of motivation on time-based PM performance 
in autistic individuals. Specifically, we were interested in the effects of personal (i.e., 
receiving a reward) as compared to social motivation (i.e., performing a favour for 
someone). With this, we aimed to test the assumption that to accurately predict 
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individuals’ PM performance under varying motivation conditions, it may not be 
sufficient to consider their potential mismatch of task demands and cognitive resources, 
but to also take their social-cognitive skills into account; given that they are needed to 
adequately perceive and assess social motives when exploring social importance effects. 
As expected, controls outperformed autistic individuals in the time-based PM task 
(Altgassen et al., 2012; Altgassen et al., 2009; Henry et al., 2014) and achieved, overall, 
more correct PM responses. However, planned comparisons revealed that controls only 
performed better than autistic individuals in the Personal condition (in which controls 
performed best), while group effects tended towards significance in the standard 
condition and were non-existent in the social motivation condition. Moreover, based on 
the previously found beneficial effects of rewards or social motives on the PM of 
neurotypical children or adults (Altgassen, Kliegel, et al., 2010; Brandimonte et al., 
2010; Sheppard et al., 2015), and severely autistic children (Sheppard et al., 2016) we 
expected to see an overall positive effect of highlighting the importance of the PM task.
However, while there was indeed a significant main effect of condition, this effect was 
(again mainly) driven by the increased performance of (control) participants in the 
Personal motivation condition as compared to both the standard and the social 
motivation condition. This finding contrasts with Brandimonte and colleagues’ (2008; 
2010) studies who reported improved performance in a prosocial, but not in a personal 
reward condition as compared to a standard condition (for more evidence on the 
beneficial effects of prosocial goals on PM performance, see D’Angelo, Bosco, Bianco, 
& Brandimonte, 2012). 
In terms of differential effects of motivation manipulations across groups, given the 
known theory of mind deficits in autism, which may make them less responsive towards 
social cues and lead to them perceiving such social tasks as less important, we expected 
autistic individuals to benefit more strongly from personal than social importance 
manipulations. For controls, we predicted the opposite pattern in line with Brandimonte 
and Ferrante’s (2008) study. In contrast to our predictions, the ASC group performed 
comparably across all three motivation conditions, while controls performed significantly 
best in the Personal condition, compared to both the Standard and Social conditions. It 
is somewhat surprising that autistic individuals seem to not be affected by importance 
manipulations. Possibly, the importance manipulation was too subtle or indirect for the 
autistic individuals. For both the Social and the Personal condition, the higher 
importance of the PM task, relative to the ongoing task, had to be inferred (e.g., help the 
experimenter or receive 5EUR) as there was no explicit statement highlighting that the 
PM task was more important and that they should focus on it. Autistic individuals have 
difficulties with understanding nonliteral or figurative speech (e.g., sarcasm, joking, 
and metaphors) which has been linked to reduced theory of mind (Happe, 1995; Happé, 
1993; Tager-Flusberg, 1996) and a local processing bias (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999).
These difficulties may have prevented the autistic participants from fully understanding 
the implications of the importance instructions and, therefore, the personal and social 
value of succeeding in the PM task. Future studies should test whether explicitly 
instructing autistic participants on which task is important, and on which they should 
focus, improves their PM performance. 
While our findings on controls’ performance contrast with Brandimonte and colleagues’ 
(2008) studies that reported better performance of younger adults in socially important 
tasks than those associated with a personal reward, they are consistent with one of our 
previous studies that found beneficial effects of social importance in older adults, but 
not in younger adults (Altgassen, Kliegel, et al., 2010). Possibly, adolescents (the age 
group of the present study), similarly to younger adults, are less responsive to social 
motives and thus perceive social tasks as less important.
Another possibility is that importance manipulations are sensitive to methodological 
differences, such as differences in the phrasing of the social importance condition and 
the promised reward. While the current study (similarly to Altgassen, Kliegel, et al., 
2010) introduced the PM task in the social importance condition as the participant 
performing a favour for the experimenter, Brandimonte and colleagues (2008) 
emphasized the prospect of failing to implement the delayed intention (i.e., if you do not 
remember to sign the form, important information will be lost) which may have made 
the (negative) social consequences of forgetting to perform the task more salient and the 
PM task more important.
On the other hand, in their 2010 study Brandimonte and colleagues applied a similar 
phrasing of the social importance manipulation as the present study, and still observed 
the best performance in this condition. Possibly, Brandimonte and colleagues’ PM task 
may have also been more meaningful than the one used in the current study (i.e., signing 
a form to ensure data is not lost has clear and critical relevance to the experiment in 
which the person is participating). In contrast, the relevance of pressing a specific key 
to indicate how many ongoing task trials could be completed in 1 minute, and potential 
consequences of failure, may have been less clear. Differences in the pattern of results 
between the present and Brandimonte and colleagues’ studies may also result from the 
different populations included. Brandimonte’s studies only tested psychology students 
that may be well aware of the importance of storing data, while this may have been less 
clear for the adolescents of the present study that all still attended school. 
Similarly, the prospect of getting €5 may have been very appealing and thus highly 
motivating for adolescents, while getting course credit (the reward in both Brandimonte 
studies) may have been less attractive or not even convincing in the sense that psychology 
students may not believe that they could not get course credit for poorly performing in an 
experiment. It is also possible that pleasing an adult (i.e., the experimenter in the Social 
motivation condition) was a prospect that held little intrinsic value for the adolescent 
participants of the present study. It may be that manipulating social issues more directly 
relevant to teenage life, such as peer group membership (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013) 
would have a greater effect. Future research could thus investigate, for example, whether 
performing a PM task to help one’s ‘team’ (e.g., one’s class/school) win a competition against 
another team would result in better PM performance, as compared to control conditions.
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Unfortunately, we did not assess participants’ subjective perception of the relative 
importance of the PM and ongoing task, or their motivation to do well across the 
different motivation conditions. Future studies should include measures of subjective 
importance assessments. A further explanation for the different findings across studies 
may be the differences in the characteristics of the applied PM and ongoing tasks. 
Overall, the methodology of the present study resembles Altgassen et al.’s (2010) more 
closely than Brandimonte’s study. The first two applied a similar manipulation of social 
motivation, both employed a rather (executive control resources) demanding ongoing 
task and used a time-based PM task, whereas Brandimonte and colleagues used activity-
based PM tasks that are supposed to require less executive functions given that no 
activity has to be interrupted and no monitoring for the PM cue is needed. 
One potential limitation of the present study is that age, verbal and non-verbal ability 
were not fully parallel across groups and conditions. The finding of superior verbal 
ability of the ASC group as compared to controls was rather surprising, given that verbal 
ability is sometimes considered a weakness in ASC (Akbar, Loomis, & Paul, 2013; Frith, 
1989); possibly, then, the present sample comprised a highly selective group. However, 
differences in these variables did not explain PM performance. Neither verbal nor non-
verbal ability were significantly related to PM performance. Age was only significantly 
(negatively) associated with PM performance for the ASC group in the Standard 
condition, with younger participants showing better PM performance. Nevertheless, 
future studies need to make sure to better match groups in terms of age, verbal and non-
verbal ability.  Another potential limitation is the fact that we did not screen for 
additional psychiatric disorders using a standardized screening test such as the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders (First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2016) or the 
Composite International Diagnostic Interview (Kessler et al., 2004). Additional 
psychiatric disorders may have also affected individuals’ performance and their response 
to the experimental manipulation. 
Overall, the ongoing task was equally difficult for both groups, and participants 
performed comparably well across all task conditions; both in the single- and dual-task 
block. Surprisingly, autistic individuals responded faster to ongoing task items than 
controls. Overall, participants showed lower response times in the single than the dual-
task block which is likely due to practice effects given that the single task was always 
performed before the dual-task. Importantly, this also implies that there were no costs 
to the ongoing task of monitoring for the PM target time, once the PM task was added. 
Similarly, the different motivation conditions did not differ in terms of participants’ 
response times to ongoing task items. Moreover, the only significant correlations to 
emerge between PM and (dual) ongoing task performance was observed for controls in 
the Personal condition – the condition in which they performed best. In contrast to 
previous studies (Loft & Yeo, 2007; Smith & Hunt, 2014) that reported increased costs 
to the ongoing task when the PM task was emphasized, in this study, better PM 
performance was associated with better ongoing task performance and faster response 
times. However, this is not the first study to find no ongoing task costs despite improved 
time-based PM performance (Altgassen, Kliegel, et al., 2010; Altgassen et al., 2007). 
With regards to time monitoring behaviour, overall, participants increased the average 
number of clock checks each 15s interval as the target time approached. Whilst clock 
checks in the first three intervals was comparable for both groups, controls checked the 
time more frequently than the autistic participants in the 4th interval. This may indicate 
less strategic monitoring behaviour in the ASC group which is consistent with previous 
findings (e.g., Altgassen et al., 2009). Interestingly, clock checks during the last interval 
correlated with correct PM responses (separately) for both groups and all conditions, 
except for controls in the Personal condition. The latter result was somewhat surprising 
given that this was the condition that controls performed best in and typically time 
monitoring in the last interval before the target time is strongly associated with 
individuals’ PM performance (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). However, this observation 
is in line with previous research (Altgassen, Kliegel, et al., 2010; Altgassen et al., 2007) 
that also did not report more frequent clock checks or a steeper increase of time 
monitoring in the presence of improved PM performance when highlighting the PM 
task. Given that increased PM performance of controls in the Personal condition came 
at no cost to the ongoing task and no increased monitoring behaviour, our findings 
support assumptions that intentions are encoded with higher activation than other to be 
remembered information (so-called intention superiority effect, Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
see also, Cohen & Gollwitzer, 2008; Gollwitzer & Cohen, 2008).
In this conceptual framework, beneficial effects of importance manipulations could be 
explained by importance instructions leading to especially high activation of the 
prospective cues at the time of encoding. This would facilitate retrieval of intended 
action in the performance phase through increased mental accessibility of the intention 
without needing to affect ongoing task performance or monitoring behaviour. Similarly, 
Walter and Meier (2014) suggest that stressing the importance of the PM task may affect 
participants’ performance similarly to meta-cognitive strategies (e.g., implementation 
intentions, Gollwitzer, 1999) by increasing associations between the PM task and the 
context in which it is later performed which may strengthen memory traces, decrease the 
need for strategic monitoring, and facilitate rather automatic retrieval of the intention 
(see Altgassen, Kretschmer, & Schnitzspahn, 2017, for a similiar discussion of the 
effects of episodic future thinking).
This does not imply that importance manipulations may never work due to changes in 
resource allocation as suggested by the multiprocess framework (e.g., increased 
monitoring for more important tasks), but that increased PM performance can also 
follow rather automatic retrieval and execution of the intended action. So far, most 
research on PM has focussed on the phases of intention initiation and execution and has 
investigated how differences in task characteristics and cognitive resources may affect 
individuals’ performance, and has rather neglected the phases of intention formation 
and retention. In light of the present findings that do not support assumptions of the 
multiprocess framework in terms of increased monitoring or a focus on the PM task at 
the expense of the ongoing task as mechanisms underlying beneficial effects of 
importance, further research is clearly needed to investigate the impact of task 
importance on intention formation (e.g., by people spontaneously imagining performing 
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the intended action in the future, thus engaging in episodic future thinking) or intention 
retention (e.g., by rehearsing the intention and its target time). 
Taken together, in line with all published evidence on time-based PM in ASC, at first 
glance this study replicated reduced PM performance in autistic individuals. However, 
further analyses indicated that groups actually only differed in their number of correct 
PM responses in the Personal condition, which was driven by controls’ increased 
performance. In terms of significant motivation effects, only controls benefitted from 
(Personal) importance instructions. Critically, controls’ improvement in the Personal 
Condition led neither to costs in the ongoing task nor to increased time monitoring 
behaviour, implying that beneficial effects of importance manipulations may not only 
work via changes in resource allocation but may also be the result of increased mental 
accessibility of intentions and enhanced automaticity of retrieval processes. Both groups 
demonstrated strategic time monitoring behaviour, with the number of clock checks 
increasing in each of the four 15 second intervals leading up to the target time. However, 
control participants did check the time in the final interval more often than the autistic 
participants, thereby possibly demonstrating greater strategic behaviour. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
Prospective memory (PM) tasks are tasks in which planned intentions must be executed 
in the future (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990) either upon the occurrence of an event 
(event-based PM) or at a certain time (time-based PM). These tasks are critical to 
everyday life, with failure possibly resulting in serious personal and social consequences 
(e.g. missing medication or forgetting to pass on an important message to a supervisor) 
and for children this is no different (e.g. forgetting to bring homework and/or equipment 
to school, missing a school trip). Indeed, for young children starting school, there is 
arguably a sudden increase in PM demands, and an expectation by adults to behave 
increasingly independently (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). As it has been shown that 
children who develop poor PM abilities are likely to experience difficulties in interacting 
with parents, teachers, and peers (McCauley & Levin, 2004; Meacham & Leiman, 1982) 
it is clear that those starting school are at a critical stage in their development, and it is 
thus important to investigate PM in this age group. The purpose of the current study, 
therefore, was to further elucidate upon the development of PM in young children and 
the possible underlying cognitive mechanisms. This could lead to a better understanding 
of the conditions under which successful PM can be achieved, even at a young age. 
That PM ability develops and improves with age is now well-established (Ford, Driscoll, 
Shum, & Macaulay, 2012; Kliegel & Jäger, 2007; Kliegel et al., 2013; Kvavilashvili, 
Messer, & Ebdon, 2001; Mahy & Moses, 2011; Sommerville, 1983; Walsh, Martin, & 
Courage, 2014). However, the mechanisms driving this development, and the conditions 
under which the age effects are most pronounced, are still unclear. In their recent 
review, Mahy, Moses, and Kliegel (2014) put forward their executive model of PM 
development, positing that executive functions (EF) are the most important mechanisms 
underlying PM development. EF comprises abilities such as set-shifting, inhibition and 
working memory. The authors argue that the well-established and protracted development 
of EF abilities, which improve from early childhood (Carlson, 2005; Lee, Bull, & Ho, 
2013; Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012) through to adulthood (see (Best & Miller, 
2010) for a review), are instrumental in the developing ability to execute an intention at 
the appropriate time/event in the face of a distracting ongoing task (OT). This view is 
complimented by the inf luential Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) 
which states that PM tasks vary in the type of retrieval processes required and can rely 
either on rather automatic (low EF demand) or strategic (high EF demand) processes. 
For instance, some tasks will automatically ‘pop into mind’ on presentation of a PM cue 
(e.g., if the cue is distinctive/salient, or if it is strongly associated with the intention, 
such as a red letter box prompting memory of the intention to post a letter) whilst others 
will necessitate a strategic monitoring of the environment for the PM cue (e.g., if the cue 
is not presented in the immediate environment, such as looking out for a pharmacy 
whilst driving home). Furthermore, those tasks which demand a higher degree of 
strategic monitoring will leave less available resources for the OT, resulting in costs to 
OT performance (Scullin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2010). This Multiprocess Framework 
is supported by evidence from studies with young children employing dual-task 
paradigms (i.e. participants completing an OT with an embedded PM task) which 
ABSTRACT
The current study examined, for the first time, the effect of cue-intention association, 
as well as the effects of promised extrinsic  rewards, on prospective memory  in young 
children, aged 5-years-old (n=39) and 7-years-old (n=40). Children were asked to name 
pictures for a toy mole, whilst also having to remember to respond differently to certain 
target pictures (prospective memory task). The level to which the target picture was 
associated with the intention was manipulated across two conditions (low- or high-
association) for all participants, whilst half of the participants were promised a reward 
for good prospective memory performance. Results showed a main effect of age, with 
the 7-year-olds outperforming the 5-year-olds. Furthermore, there was a main effect of 
reward, with those promised a reward performing better than those who were not. No 
effect was found for cue-association, with the participants of both age groups performing 
equally well in both association conditions. No significant interactions were found 
between any of the variables. The potentially important role of reward in young children’s 
everyday prospective memory tasks, and possible reasons for the lack of a ref lexive-
associative effect, are discussed.
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attempt to directly manipulate the need for automatic or strategic processes, and better 
understand the role of executive functioning at this age (Ford et al., 2012; Kliegel, 
Mackinlay, & Jäger, 2008; Kliegel et al., 2013; Kvavilashvili et al., 2001; Mahy, Moses, & 
Kliegel, 2014; Mahy & Moses, 2011). For instance, in a series of computer-based 
experiments, Kliegel et al. (2013) found that, when the need for strategic and executive 
processes was reduced by increasing the PM cue saliency (or distinctiveness), cue 
centrality (i.e. cue inside, rather than outside the centre of attention) and reducing OT 
absorption, PM performance was improved in 6- to 10-year-olds. Furthermore, they 
found that when cue centrality was increased, the younger children performed as well as 
the older children, a result which implies the age difference in performance was due to 
the additional strategic requirements of monitoring when the cue was outside the focus 
of attention. Mahy et al. (2014) also found that 5-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds, 
and that performance for both age groups was worse when cues were less salient and the 
OT more difficult. Further, the authors reported that the EF ability, inhibition, 
measured via performance on the Simon Says task (Carlson, 2005) accounted for a 
significant level of variance for non-salient cues, and individual differences in inhibition 
fully mediated  the effect of age on PM performance. In another study, Kvavilashvili et 
al. (2001) found that increasing inhibition demands adversely affected PM task 
performance. Specifically, the authors found that requiring the children to interrupt the 
OT, in order to execute the PM task, resulted in worse performance than when the PM 
task was at the end of the OT. This result was further supported by similar findings 
from Kliegel et al. (2008) who found the effects of interrupting the task to be greater 
for children of an average age of 7- and 10-years, and for older adults of around 67-years-
old, than for younger adults 25-years of age, indicative of less developed EF in children, 
and reduced EF in older adults. Further supporting evidence for the role of EF for PM 
performance stems from studies using a correlational approach (Kerns, 2000; Mahy & 
Moses, 2011; Ward, Shum, McKinlay, Baker-Tweney, & Wallace, 2005). For instance, 
Mahy and Moses (2011) showed that working memory significantly predicted PM (even 
after controlling for age and inhibition) in 4 to 6-year-old children. 
In sum, according to the Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) and 
Mahy et al.’s Executive Framework (Mahy et al., 2014) and supporting evidence, younger 
children, whose EF resources are less developed, will find PM tasks that are high in EF 
demand more difficult. However, they can perform well on tasks which depend more on 
automatic, ref lexive processes and hence are lower in EF demand or if the task 
encourages the allocation of their limited EF resources. It is important, then, to further 
investigate the role of EF in PM in children to better understand the conditions under 
which automatic processes, or resource allocation, can be encouraged and thus better 
support children in everyday life. 
Two factors that have been put forward by the Multiprocess Framework to impact on 
PM performance are motivation and cue-intention association. To date only one study 
has investigated the effect of extrinsic incentives in PM in young children (Guajardo & 
Best, 2000) and none have examined cue-intention association (McDaniel, Guynn, 
Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004) in a younger age group, two factors which will be discussed, 
respectively, henceforth.
The benefit of motivation in PM in young children, particularly with regard to the use 
of incentives, is an area that has received very little attention in the literature. However, 
despite young children’s limited EF resources (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & 
Wearing, 2004; Schneider & Bjorklund, 1992; Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 2008; Zelazo 
et al., 2003) some studies suggest that successful PM performance is possible for very 
young children if they are highly motivated (Causey & Bjorklund, 2014; Kliegel, 
Brandenberger, & Aberle, 2010; Ślusarczyk & Niedźwieńska, 2013; Somerville, Wellman, 
& Cultice, 1983). Ślusarczyk and Niedźwieńska (2013) for example, found that tasks 
which they considered to contain a high level of intrinsic motivation, such as reminding 
the experimenter to give them a candy at the end of session, as opposed to remembering 
to put pencils on the shelf, resulted in higher PM performance for all participating 
young children, ranging in age from 2- to 6-years-old. Causey and Bjorklund (2014) also 
found that 2- to 4-year-olds were more successful in collecting a sticker at the end of the 
session, than they were at turning over a sign. Arguably, these results are in line with the 
Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) and the Executive Framework 
(Mahy et al., 2014) as highly motivating tasks demand less in terms of inhibition, and 
encourage the allocation of limited resources to the PM task. This notion is further 
supported by the goal-based motivational model posited by Penningroth and Scott 
(2007) which suggests that PM performance will be improved when the intention has 
high personal relevance. It seems plausible then, that if motivation was achieved via 
more extrinsic motivators, such as incentives, then the same positive motivation effects 
could be expected. Indeed, positive effects of monetary incentives have recently been 
found in healthy adults (Cook, Rummel, & Dummel, 2015) and adolescents with 
traumatic brain injury (McCauley, McDaniel, Pedroza, Chapman, & Levin, 2009; 
McCauley et al., 2011). However, only one study to date has investigated the effect of 
incentives, rather than the use of more intrinsically motivating tasks, on PM performance 
in young children (Guajardo & Best, 2000) and they did not find a positive effect. 
However, in Guajardo and Best’s (Guajardo & Best, 2000) computer-based task, 3- and 
5-year-olds were shown a series of 6 blocks of 10 pictures, with each picture shown 
individually for 5s, and a 1s between-picture interval, and were told they would be asked 
to recall as many pictures as possible after each block (OT). For the additional PM task, 
they were told to press the space bar every time they saw a target picture (one in each 
block). It could be argued that this is a difficult task for such young children as it loads 
heavily on working memory and demands prolonged attention, which could have had a 
negative impact on PM performance and the effect of the reward manipulation. 
Furthermore, children were provided with common food and toy items (e.g., pennies, 
fruit chews) each time they correctly pressed a key on presentation of a PM target 
picture, which may not have been very motivating. Therefore, it is the intention of the 
present study to reduce the executive demands of the OT and to provide a more 
motivating incentive.
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A further factor yet to be studied in young children is that of the strength of cue-
intention association. It is, however, a manipulation that McDaniel et al. (2004) found 
to be effective in healthy adults, informing their ‘ref lexive-associative hypothesis’, with 
the pertinent result being that PM was better when PM cues were highly associated with 
the intention (e.g. writing the word thread on presentation of the word needle) than 
when there was a low cue-intention association (e.g. spaghetti-thread). The authors 
argue that this finding is in line with the Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000), in that the low-association condition required strategic monitoring processes, 
whilst performance in the high cue-intention association condition ref lected automatic, 
ref lexive-associative retrieval. The positive effect of high cue-intention association has 
also been found in other studies, for example, in older adults (McDaniel et al., 2004; 
Pereira, Ellis, & Freeman, 2012; Pereira, Ellis, & Freeman, 2012) and clinical populations 
(Woods, Dawson, Weber, Grant, & Group, 2010). Woods et al. (2010) for instance, 
found that the PM performance of HIV patients, a clinical group found to be particularly 
susceptible to age-related executive functioning and attentional impairment (Cherner et 
al., 2004; Sacktor et al., 2007), was better when cues and intentions were semantically 
related (e.g., “When I hand you a postcard, self-address it”) then when they were 
unrelated (e.g., “When I show you a picture of a cow, snap your fingers“). Following this 
line of reasoning, it could be expected that cue-intention association might play an 
important role in children’s PM performance; however, no study to date has examined 
this aspect in children, and is thus of interest to the current study.
The primary aim of the current study, therefore, was to investigate the role of cue-
intention association and motivation in the PM ability of 5- and 7-year-old children, 
hence examining PM in age-groups at, or around, the age of starting school, who are 
thus experiencing increasing everyday PM demands. Children performed a simple card-
naming OT, with the embedded PM task including both a high- and low-association 
condition. Further, half of the children were provided the incentive of a promised 
surprise gift for good PM performance. Based on the literature, main effects of age in 
PM were expected, as 7-year-olds should outperform the 5-year-olds (Ford et al., 2012; 
Kvavilashvili et al., 2001; Mahy et al., 2014). Furthermore, according to the ‘ref lexive-
associative’ hypothesis (McDaniel et al., 2004) high cue-intention association was 
supposed to result in enhanced PM performance, for both groups. It was further 
expected that the promise of a ‘surprise’ reward would lead to high motivation, and 
therefore result in better PM performance, compared to those in the no reward condition 
(Causey & Bjorklund, 2014). In light of previous research, demonstrating that younger 
children benefit more from task conditions that reduce executive demand and/or 
encourage allocation of executive resources to a PM task (Kliegel et al., 2013), both age 
x reward and age x cue-intention association interactions were predicted; specifically, 
that the younger children were expected to benefit more than the older children from 
both a promised reward and cues associated with the intention. 
5.2 METHOD
5.2.1 Participants
Seventy-nine children were recruited from local German kindergarten and primary 
schools to participate in the study. Two age groups were formed: a younger age group 
consisting of thirty-nine 5-year-olds (22 boys; Mage= 5.06, SD= .03) and an older age 
group consisting of forty 7-year-olds (14 boys; Mage = 7.06, SD=.03); gender distribution 
did not differ significantly between groups, χ2(1) = 3.65, p > .051. All children were 
native German speakers, were in good health and had no psychiatric, neurological or 
development disorders. Groups were parallel for verbal ability, measured by means of 
age-appropriate assessments, i.e., the verbal subtest from the German version of the 
Wechsler preschool and primary scale of intelligence (HAWIVA-III; (Ricken, Fritz, 
Schuck, & Preuß, 2007)) for 5-year-olds (M= 11.18, SD= 2.34) and the German version 
of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (HAWIK-IV; (Petermann & Petermann, 
2010)) for 7-year-olds (M=11.43, SD= 2.28), with no significant differences on normed 
scores emerging between groups,  F< 1. The study was approved by ethics committee of 
the medical faculty of the Technische Universitaet Dresden (the Ethikkommission der 
Medizinischen Fakultät), and children only participated after parents had provided 
written consent.
A 2 X 2 X 2 mixed factorial design was employed, in which cue-association (non-
associated vs. associated) was varied within-subjects, and age (5-year-olds vs. 7-year-
olds) and motivation (no-reward vs. reward) were varied between-subjects. Children 
were all tested individually.
5.2.2 Materials and procedure
The procedure of the session was similar to that of Kvavilashvili et al. (2001) in that 
children were asked to name picture cards (derived from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart 
(1980) picture set) for a hand puppet named Morris the Mole but asked to respond 
differently to given target pictures. Children were first introduced to the experimenter 
and asked if they would like to stay and play some games. Upon confirmation, children 
were then engaged in a short conversation to ensure they felt at ease. They were then 
introduced to ‘Morris the Mole’ and informed that he was only young and so was excited 
to learn about the world. To do this he would very much like to learn what the pictures 
were on the cards but he needed the children to name them for him as he had poor 
eyesight (OT). All children were happy to help Morris and, after practicing with 2 cards, 
they proceeded to name the remaining 10 cards of the single task block, providing a 
measure of baseline OT ability.
Children were then given the PM instruction, and were introduced first to either the low 
cue-intention association condition (Lo-Assn), or the high cue-intention association 
condition (Hi-Assn). They were told that they would name some more cards for Morris 
again soon (30 cards for 5-year-olds; 40 cards for 7-year-olds2), only next time it was 
going to be more difficult. Next time, if they were to see a picture of a certain category 
(an animal in the Lo-Assn block; a fruit in the Hi-Assn block) they were to name the 
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card as usual, but then to also say ‘juice’. There were a total of 6 PM target pictures per 
condition (fruits: apple, banana, lemon, orange, pear and grapes; animals: dog, cat, 
giraffe, horse, rabbit and elephant). To ensure that all children knew the target pictures 
were indeed part of the relevant category, before instructing the PM task a short 
conversation ensued whereby children were asked to name different fruits or animals. If 
not all of the target pictures had been named, the experimenter prompted with questions, 
such as “how about a strawberry, is that a fruit?” Once the children had shown they 
knew the target pictures to be part of the relevant category, a practice block was 
conducted, whereby children named three cards, with the third being a target item. All 
children demonstrated understanding by successfully first naming the card, and then 
saying ‘juice’ on presentation of the target item. 
Around half of the children (reward condition: 19 5-year-olds, 19 7-year-olds) were then 
told that, if they did very well in remembering to say ‘juice’ at the right moment then, 
before they went back to their friends, they would get to choose a prize from the exciting 
‘surprise box’ in which there were many exciting items. To introduce a delay between 
PM task instruction and execution (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000) the children were told 
they would first play another game in which they would explain the meaning of different 
words to Morris (HAWIVA-III and HAWIK-IV). After approximately three minutes 
the children were told they had done very well but it was now time to play the game they 
discussed earlier, and the experimental dual-task block commenced (the children were 
not reminded of the PM task at this point). This procedure was then repeated for the 
second block. Presentation of the Lo-Assn and Hi-Assn task blocks was counter-
balanced.  Once both blocks were completed, any remaining ability tasks were finished, 
after which all children were congratulated on an excellent performance and told that 
Morris was very grateful for their help, and that they could choose something from the 
surprise box (irrespective of reward condition).
Children’s PM performance was measured as the number of correct responses (max. 6 
for each association condition) that they remembered to say ‘juice’ after presentation of 
the correct picture cue. Dependent variables for OT performance were percentages of 
correctly named picture cards (for the baseline and dual taskblocks, respectively).
5.3 RESULTS
5.3.1 PM performance
Table 1 shows the mean percentage of successful PM hits by age, reward and cue-intention 
association. A 2 (age: 5- vs. 7-year-olds) by 2 (reward: no reward vs. reward) by 2 (cue-
intention association: Lo-Assn vs. Hi-Assn) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on the last factor revealed a significant main effect of age. The 7-year-
olds (M=74.17, SD=37.02) performed better than the 5-year-olds (M=48.29, SD=38.67) 
on the PM task, F(1, 75) = 9.70, p < .01 η²p  = .11. Further, there was a main effect of reward, 
with those in the reward condition (M=71.27, SD=34.37) performing better than those in 
the no reward condition (M=52.24 SD=42.62) on the PM task F(1, 75) = 5.46, p = .02, 
η²p  = .07. However, the level of cue-intention association did not affect performance, (F < 1) 
and there were no significant interactions between any of the three factors (all Fs < 1.02).
Table 1. 
Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of successful PM hits by task block and condition.
Table 1.
Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of successful PM hits by task block and condition
No Reward Reward
Lo-Assn
(non-
associated)
Hi-Assn
(associated)
Lo-Assn
(non-
associated)
Hi-Assn
(associated)
5-year-olds 39.17 (41.63) 32.50 (43.08) 59.65 (46.25) 63.16 (44.99)
7-year-olds 63.49 (47.03) 72.22 (42.27) 78.07 (36.45) 84.21 (30.16)
Total 51.63 (45.61) 52.85 (46.68) 68.86 (42.12) 73.68 (39.26)
5.3.2 OT performance
Table 2 shows the mean percentage of successful OT hits by age, reward and cue-
intention association. A 2 (age: 5- vs. 7-year-olds) by 2 (reward: no reward vs. reward) by 3 
(block: baseline vs. Lo-Assn vs. Hi-Assn) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last 
factor, revealed significant main effects of age F(1, 75) = 134.699, p < .001, η²p  = .642, 
block F(1.65, 124.01) = 615.960, p < .001, η²p  = .89 and reward F(1, 75) = 8.555, p < .01, 
η²p  = .102. No significant interaction was found between all three factors, but a significant 
interaction was found between age and block, F(1.65, 124.01) = 17.458, p < .001, 
η²p  =.189; pairwise comparisons showed that both 5yr- and 7yr-olds achieved a higher 
percentage of correctly named cards in baseline block than both other blocks (all 
ps<.001)  but only 5yr-olds performed better in the Hi-Assn block than the Lo-Assn 
block ( p<.05) . A further interaction was found between age and reward, F(1, 75) = 6.55, 
p < .05, η²p  = .08. Pairwise comparisons revealed 5yr-olds, but not 7yr-olds ( p>.05), 
achieved a higher percentage of correctly named cards in the reward condition, compared 
to the no reward condition ( p<.001). Finally, a significant interaction was found between 
block and reward, F(1.65, 124.01) = 3.696, p < .05, η²p= .047. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, whilst both the reward group and the no reward group performed better 
in baseline performance than in both subsequent assn-trial blocks (all ps<.05) those in 
the reward condition named a higher percentage of cards in the baseline block than 
those in the no reward condition ( p<.01;  mean difference = 3.34%). However, both 
groups performed equally well in the subsequent Assn-trial blocks (all ps>.05)3.
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Table 2. 
Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of successful OT naming trials by task block and condition of reward.
Table 2.
Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of successful OT naming trials by task block and condition 
of reward
No Reward Reward
Baseline Lo-Assn 
(non-
associated)
Hi-Assn 
(associated)
Baseline Lo-Assn 
(non-
associated)
Hi-Assn 
(associated)
5-year-
olds
93.50
(6.71)
73.17 (5.24) 75.33 (3.65) 98.42
(5.02)
76.14 (3.73) 76.67 (3.14)
7-year-
olds
97.62
(5.39)
83.93 (1.69) 84.29 (1.16) 99.47
(2.29)
83.42 (1.90) 83.55 (1.92)
Total 95.61
(6.34)
78.68 (6.64) 79.92 (5.25) 98.95
(3.88)
79.78 (4.70) 80.11 (4.33)
5.4 DISCUSSION
The current study is the first to examine the effects of age and cue-intention association 
on PM in 5- and 7-year-old children, whilst being only the second to investigate the 
effects of providing an extrinsic incentive in this age group. Based on the literature, 
primarily the Executive Framework (Mahy et al., 2014) and Multiprocess Framework 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), it was expected that 7-year-old children would outperform 
5-year-old children in the PM task, across both conditions. Further, it was anticipated 
that both the promise of reward, in the form of a gift incentive, and high cue-intention 
association would positively affect PM performance, and that these effects would 
possibly more benefit the younger children, as reward would encourage the allocation of 
EF resources to the task, and high cue-intention association would promote ref lexive-
associative (i.e. more automatic) processes, reducing EF demand. 
Firstly, as expected, significant age effects were found, with the 7-year-olds outperforming 
5-year-olds in the PM task, across both conditions. Also in line with predictions and 
previous evidence of positive effects of motivation on PM in children (Causey & 
Bjorklund, 2014; Kliegel et al., 2010; Somerville et al., 1983) those who were promised a 
reward performed better than those who were not, an effect found across age groups. 
This result is in contrast to the only other study to specifically investigate the effects of 
extrinsic incentives on PM in young children (Guajardo & Best, 2000). It seems possible 
that by reducing the working memory demands of the OT in the current study, compared 
to those of Guajardo and Best’s study (Guajardo & Best, 2000) (naming, rather than 
remembering, cards) potentially confounding EF factors were reduced; and by providing 
a more motivating incentive (a ‘surprise box’ rather than common food and toy items) 
increased motivation was achieved.  It is therefore argued that the current results extend 
literature on the positive effects of motivation on PM found in tasks that were more 
intrinsically motivating (Causey & Bjorklund, 2014; Kliegel et al., 2010; Somerville et 
al., 1983), demonstrating that extrinsic rewards may also be beneficial to PM performance. 
At first glance, these results may indicate that children focused more on the PM task 
when offered a reward. However, the apparent lack of additional OT costs in the reward 
condition does not support this notion. In fact, for 5-year-olds, OT performance was 
actually better in the reward condition. This is perhaps surprising as the Multiprocess 
Framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) posits that perceived task importance 
inf luences the allocation of attentional resources between the OT and PM task, thus 
benefitting the ‘more important’ task at a cost to the other task, an effect which has been 
shown in previous studies (Hering, Phillips, & Kliegel, 2014; Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, 
& Einstein, 2004; Kliegel, Martin, & Moor, 2003; Woods et al., 2014). Therefore, if the 
reward increased motivation due to the perceived importance of the PM task, one might 
have expected to see an increased cost to the OT. However, we contend that, even if 
attention was drawn to the more important PM task, it is unlikely that the deliberately 
simple card-naming nature of the OT would be adversely affected. Indeed, most OT 
errors were simple misnaming errors, for example, calling an orange an apple. It is 
possible, however, that the children were slower to name the cards, and so future studies 
should employ more sensitive measures (e.g., reaction times) which may reveal an OT 
cost. This is an important future direction, which could elucidate upon the effect of 
additional PM tasks and their importance relative to the OT, and the impact they may 
have on the different phases of the PM process (e.g. Mahy et al., 2014). For example, 
other recent studies which also did not find a cost to OT, despite a positive ‘importance’ 
effect on the PM task in Parkinson’s patients, or positive effects of monetary incentives 
in healthy populations (Altgassen, Zöllig, Kopp, Mackinlay, & Kliegel, 2007 respectively; 
Cook et al., 2015) posited it is possible that increased personal importance of the 
intention resulted in a stronger encoding of the PM cues at the time of instruction, thus 
facilitating PM cue retrieval without requiring further attentional resources, a notion 
further supported by the motivational-cognitive model of Penningroth and Scott (2007). 
It would be interesting to investigate this further by increasing the demand/difficulty of 
the OT, and observe how this interacts with rewards.
This finding has important implications for the home and school environment of young 
children, where incentives (and motivation) could be employed as a strategy for 
remembering important everyday prospective tasks, such as remembering to give a letter 
to a parent, or bringing a swimming kit in on the appropriate day. This could also apply 
to remembering to execute appropriate social behaviours at the right time, such as 
saying ‘please’ and ‘thank-you’, or putting a hand up before giving an answer; in fact, 
encouraging good social behaviour through proactive strategies (e.g., increasing 
motivation through rewards such as praise and stickers) have been argued to be the most 
common, and effective, good-behaviour strategies in schools (Arthur-Kelly, Gordon, & 
Butterfield, 2003; Clunies-Ross, Little, & Kienhuis, 2008). However, with such paucity 
of PM research in this area, it is important for future research to further investigate 
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motivation and incentives. Indeed, this may be particularly important for populations 
with social impairments, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (APA, 2013) who 
may be less socially motivated to successfully perform a PM task (e.g. to remember to 
perform an action in the future in such a way as to consider the well-being of others, 
such as closing a door quietly if a classmate has a headache) and thus benefit more from 
an incentive conferring motivation on a personal level. 
Perhaps the most surprising result was found in the cue-intention association condition, 
where participants of both ages did not, as predicted, perform significantly better in the 
high-association condition, compared to the low-association condition. This prediction 
was derived from the previous positive cue-intention association effects found in both 
healthy adults (McDaniel et al., 2004; Pereira et al., 2012; Pereira et al., 2012) and clinical 
groups (Woods et al., 2010) which suggested that high-association enables more 
ref lexive/automatic processes (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), reduces EF demands and 
thus improves the PM performance, particularly for those with less-developed EF 
resources, e.g., younger children (Mahy et al., 2014). However, the present finding of no 
effects of association on PM performance is in line with other previous evidence 
(Bartsch, 2013). Another possibility is that the current result could be explained by the 
‘delay-execute’ effect (Einstein, McDaniel, Manzi, Cochran, & Baker, 2000; Rendell, 
Vella, Kliegel, & Terrett, 2009); previous research has found that requiring participants 
to delay executing an intention once it is retrieved negatively affects PM performance 
(Einstein et al., 2000; Rendell et al., 2009). This effect is theorized to arise due to 
increased demands on working memory, task switching and inhibition when prospective 
intentions cannot be performed immediately upon appearance of the target cue 
(Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan, & Dismukes, 2003; Kliegel & Jaeger, 2006; 
McDaniel, Einstein, Graham, & Rall, 2004; McDaniel, Einstein, Stout, & Morgan, 
2003). Children in the current study were instructed, on presentation of the target item, 
to first continue with the OT of naming the card, and then to execute the PM task of 
saying ‘juice’. However, it is possible that including this in the design of the study 
inadvertently introduced a delay-execute effect, which neutralized the positive effect of 
high cue-intention association. In other words, increasing the cue-intention association 
in the high association condition may have induced a stronger ref lexive retrieval 
response, but requiring its initial inhibition upon cue presentation may have placed a 
proportionately higher demand on inhibition and working memory as compared to the 
low association condition. More specifically, the strong ref lexive response of saying 
juice when seeing the strongly associated cue of a fruit, may have been neutralized by 
the ‘delay-execute’ effect of inhibiting the intention and holding it in mind whilst first 
naming the card. This notion has important everyday implications, as young children 
arguably must often wait to execute an intention once it has been retrieved e.g., waiting 
for adult to finish talking/teaching before passing on a message (Rendell et al., 2009). 
Inhibiting an intention in this way could, for example, put a strain on working memory 
and induce a fear of failing the intention, which could, in turn cause anxiety, as well as 
significant cost to the ongoing-activity, such as sitting in lesson. This example should 
be considered cautiously as it is highly speculative at this point but, given the potentially 
important implications, future research should further examine the delay-execute effect 
in young children, and the ways in which it may interact with factors thought to facilitate 
automatic retrieval.
Finally, both age groups saw a decrease in OT performance during both the dual-task 
blocks (Lo-Assn and Hi-Assn) compared to the Baseline-block; furthermore, the costs 
to the OT were greater in the Lo-Assn block, but only for the younger children. These 
results are thus in line with Mahy’s Executive Framework (Mahy et al., 2014) in that 
developing attentional resources/EF are important underlying mechanisms for the PM 
process in children, with those with less resources more adversely affected in their 
ongoing activity by the addition of an extra task. These results are also consistent with 
Scullin et al. (2010) which saw greater OT costs when strategic processes were needed to 
monitor for the PM cue, and less cost when automatic processes were sufficient. These 
data contribute further evidence for the development of PM (Kliegel et al., 2013; 
Kvavilashvili et al., 2001; Mahy & Moses, 2011) and are in line with both the Executive 
Framework (Mahy et al., 2014) and the Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000) in that developing attentional resources/EF are important underlying mechanisms 
for PM in children, with those with less resources more adversely affected by the addition 
of an extra task. 
In conclusion, the current study is the first to provide evidence for the benefits of 
incentives on PM in 5- and 7-year-old children, whilst also contributing further evidence 
in support of the important role that executive functioning plays in the PM process, as 
posited by the Executive Framework and the Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000). Furthermore, the results regarding the lack of cue-intention association 
introduced the possibility that ‘delay-execute’ effects can neutralize the benefits of 
automatic processes, which would have important implications for children’s everyday 
PM functioning, opening up important future directions for research.
Footnotes
1 To check whether gender influenced the between-group PM performance differences, gender was added as an 
additional factor in a 2 (Age: 5- vs. 7-year-olds) by 2 (Reward: No reward vs. Reward) by 2 (Gender: Boys vs. 
Girls) by 2 (Cue-intention association: Lo-Assn vs. Hi-Assn) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The results revealed persisting main effect of age (p<.01) and Reward (p<.05), but no main effect of Gender 
(p=.835). Further, no interactions between Gender x Group or Gender x Reward were found (all Fs < 1), 
implying that the between-group differences were not an artefact of gender.
2 Piloting had shown that increasing the number of cards for the older age group ensured a similar testing 
time. Further, piloting also confirmed that children of both age groups were able to name the majority of the 
different pictures.
3 To ensure that card-naming ability did not confound the effects found in the PM performance, we included the 
baseline performance as a covariate in the PM mixed ANOVA; both the PM Group effect (p=.002) and the PM 
Reward effect (p=.016) remained significant. We also conducted an independent samples t-test to ensure both 
reward groups were parallel for standardized verbal ability. Results revealed no significant differences between the 
groups, t(77) = -.631, p=.530.
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DID YOU HEAR? AUTISTIC CHILDREN BENEFIT MORE 
FROM AUDITORY PROSPECTIVE MEMORY CUES THAN 
NON-AUTISTIC CHILDREN.
This chapter is based on:
Sheppard, D. P., Terrett, G., Rendell, P., Altgassen, M. (manuscript submitted). 
Did you hear? Autistic children benefit more from auditory prospective memory cues 
than non-autistic children.
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ABSTRACT
The transition from primary to secondary school is particularly difficult for autistic 
children, a transition underpinned by an increase in prospective memory (PM) demands. 
To better understand PM in autistic children of the relevant age, and the factors which 
may be employed to support it, the current study investigated the impact of cue salience 
(distinctiveness) on prospective memory (PM) in autistic and non-autistic children of 
around 11 years-old. The study was also unique in manipulating the visual and auditory 
salience of PM cues. Results revealed both groups benefitted from an increase in visual 
and auditory salience, but only autistic participants were faster to react to auditory cues. 
Thus, whilst the PM performance of all children may benefit from increased visual cue 
salience, autistic children, many of whom experience atypical auditory sensitivity, may 
be particularly able to take advantage of increased auditory salience. The ways in which 
cue salience may be used to support children, particularly autistic children, in their 
transition to secondary school are discussed.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC; henceforth, autism) are characterised by social 
communication difficulties, repetitive behaviours and atypical sensory reactivity (APA, 
2013). It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that transitioning from primary school to the 
new social, academic and physical environment of secondary school is particularly 
difficult for autistic children (Makin, Hill, & Pellicano, 2017). It is of major concern that 
difficulties adapting to the transition to secondary school can result in anxiety, 
depression and poor self-esteem, as well as poorer academic performance (Ashton, 2008; 
West, Sweeting, & Young, 2010; Zeedyk et al., 2003), difficulties that may well be 
contributing to the high prevalence of mental health problems in autism (Salazar et al., 
2015; Simonoff et al., 2013; Simonoff et al., 2012). The identification of the issues 
potentially underlying the transition problems are thus important for ensuring the well-
being of autistic children, and in supporting them in realising their academic potential. 
One issue likely important to the transition is prospective memory (PM) ability.
The PM process involves the formation of intentions and executing them at the 
appropriate moment in the future, either at a certain time (time-based PM; TBPM), or 
when cued by a particular event (event-based PM; EBPM) (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). 
Examples of PM tasks in relation to the primary-to-secondary transition would include 
remembering to bring in the appropriate books and equipment for different lessons, and 
to complete homework and bring it in on time. Critically, it is the increased number of 
such PM tasks in secondary school that autistic children and their parents have reported 
as particularly difficult (Makin et al., 2017), suggestive of impaired PM ability. Whilst 
research on PM in autism is still relatively scarce, the well-known problems in autism 
with executive function and memory, such as switching f lexibly between tasks or foci of 
attention (Corbett & Constantine, 2006; Leung & Zakzanis, 2014), and impairments in 
free recall tasks (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice, & Saavalainen, 2000), processes upon which 
PM is posited to rely (Mahy, Moses, & Kliegel, 2014; Smith & Bayen, 2004; West, Scolaro, 
& Bailey, 2011), also point to a PM deficit. Indeed, of the few studies conducted so far, 
all experiments have revealed a TBPM deficit (Altgassen, Koban, & Kliegel, 2012; 
Altgassen, Williams, Bölte, & Kliegel, 2009; Henry et al., 2014; Kretschmer, Altgassen, 
Rendell, & Bölte, 2014; Williams, Boucher, Lind, & Jarrold, 2013; Williams, Jarrold, 
Grainger, & Lind, 2014), although the results of EBPM experiments are mixed, with an 
almost equal number of the studies reporting either intact EBPM (Altgassen & Koch, 
2014; Altgassen, Schmitz-Hubsch, & Kliegel, 2010; Henry et al., 2014; Sheppard, 
Kvavilashvili, & Ryder, 2016; Williams et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014), or impaired 
EBPM (Brandimonte, Filippello, Coluccia, Altgassen, & Kliegel, 2011; Kretschmer et 
al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2014). Importantly, most TBPM tasks can be 
converted into EBPM tasks by, for example, setting reminders on an iPad or a smartwatch; 
that is, the cognitive demand can be ‘off loaded’ (Gilbert, 2015). Better understanding 
EBPM in autism, and the potential this has for intervention, is, therefore, the focus of 
the current paper. All studies that have investigated event-based PM in autism will be 
discussed henceforth, followed by a closer examination of the sensory characteristic of 
EBPM cues pertinent to the current study, namely, cue salience, and how it may interact 
with the sensory processing differences in autism.
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In the first study demonstrating undiminished PM ability in autism, Altgassen and 
colleagues (2010) required participants to complete a computerised working memory 
task, but to respond differently when cued by the background colour turning a distinctive 
yellow (PM task). Results revealed that autistic participants were as accurate and quick to 
respond to the visual PM cues as matched controls. In contrast, Brandimonte et al. (2011), 
found autistic participants to perform less well than comparison groups when asked to 
respond to a picture cue, embedded within a picture categorisation task. However, the 
PM cues of both studies clearly differed in their distinctiveness, or salience: the picture 
cue employed by Brandimonte et al. (2011) did not differ visually to the items of the 
ongoing task, whereas the cue employed by Altgassen et al. (2010) was a distinctive bright 
yellow, covering much of the screen. The cues of the other studies demonstrating intact 
EBPM of autistic participants were also arguably of relatively high salience, such as 
distinctive blue words (Altgassen & Koch, 2014), and large, distinctive lorries in a 
computer game (Williams et al., 2013), whereas the small heart in the corner of a card (Yi 
et al., 2014) and the kettle changing colour (Altgassen et al., 2012), cues within studies 
that found impaired EBPM, were arguably less contextually distinctive. Differences in 
cue salience could therefore, according to the Multiprocess Framework (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000), contribute to the contrasting results of the EBPM and autism literature. 
This framework posits that the perceptual and semantic characteristics of the PM cue, 
such as its salience relative to the ongoing task, can inf luence the intention retrieval 
process by placing differential demands on cognitive resources; that is, cues low in 
salience require strategic monitoring processes (high executive demand), and cues high in 
salience allow for more automatic processes (low executive demand). Thus, a highly 
salient cue, such as that employed by Altgassen et al. (2010), may rather automatically 
prompt retrieval of the intention and demand less of executive function processes, 
supporting PM performance even in populations with reduced executive functioning.
Evidence in support of this hypothesis can been found in studies reporting positive 
effects of increased cue salience in, for example, the very young (Kliegel et al., 2013; 
Mahy, Moses, & Kliegel, 2014) and old (Altgassen, Phillips, Henry, Rendell, & Kliegel, 
2010). Kliegel et al. (2013) found that by increasing the number of PM cues on-screen, 
the performance of 5 year-olds, compared to 7 year-olds, was improved. Similarly, Mahy 
et al. (2014) found that surrounding targets with a red border improved the EBPM of 
pre-schoolers (for similar results in adults with Korsakoff ’s syndrome, and, respectively, 
undergraduate students, see Altgassen, Ariese, Wester, & Kessels, 2015; Hicks, Cook, & 
Marsh, 2005). 
Further support for the multiprocess framework  McDaniel and Einstein, (2000) can be 
found in the executive framework set out by Mahy et al. (2014) to explain prospective 
memory development in children. According to this framework, increased cue salience 
improves PM performance by reducing the need for the cognitively demanding executive 
processes required at the point of PM intention retrieval and execution, such as switching 
from the ongoing task to the PM task. Such evidence adds weight to the notion that 
increasing cue salience in a PM task will be particularly beneficial for autistic participants, 
who have consistently demonstrated an impairment in executive functions such as 
inhibition and task-switching (Hughes, 2001; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994; 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991). 
In addition to executive function, it is also important to consider the way in which cue 
salience is related to sensory processing. Reported levels of atypical sensory reactivity in 
autism are as high as 80% (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009), most commonly in the tactile and 
auditory modalities (Ashburner, Ziviani, & Rodger, 2008; Robertson & Baron-Cohen, 
2017; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007) and atypical sensory processing is now a core diagnostic 
criteria of autism (APA, 2013). Clearly, the way in which the PM cue is processed 
perceptually is critically important when considering the degree of its salience. Those 
with increased sensory sensitivity may, for example, perceive a greater level of salience 
in the PM cue, and may therefore show a greater benefit in terms of their subsequent PM 
performance compared to those with lower sensory sensitivity. In this way, sensory 
hypersensitivity, which is often seen as an autistic impairment, would confer an 
advantage in relation to PM performance. 
To date, however, all studies of PM that have manipulated PM cue salience have not 
included autistic participants. Moreover, whilst some studies have included auditory 
cues (e.g. (Altgassen et al., 2012; Altgassen, Kretschmer, & Kliegel, 2012; Sheppard et 
al., 2016) none have explicitly manipulated auditory cue salience; instead, all previous 
cue salience manipulations have been visual in nature (e.g. red border around target cue 
(Mahy et al., 2014); increased number of f lowers on-screen (Kliegel et al., 2013); letter 
strings in red rather than the white letter strings of the ongoing task (Smith, Hunt, 
McVay, & McConnell, 2007)). This is perhaps surprising, given that many of the PM 
cues in everyday life are of an auditory nature, such as timer alarms, or a combination of 
both auditory and visual, e.g., appointment notifications via a calendar application. 
Therefore, the consideration of auditory cues is critical to further the ecological validity 
of the current PM literature. Arguably, this is particularly important for understanding 
everyday PM in autism, given the high prevalence of atypical auditory processing in the 
population (Ashburner et al., 2008; Tomchek & Dunn, 2007).
The overall aim of better understanding EBPM in autistic children, of primary-to-
secondary school age (≈11-years-old), was divided into two sub-aims: 1) to ascertain 
whether increased visual cue salience is as beneficial to PM performance in autism as has 
been found in other populations, and; 2) to further the understanding and everyday 
relevance of cue salience in PM for all populations by investigating the as yet ignored 
role of auditory cues. This was achieved by exploring whether increased auditory cue 
salience confers benefits comparable to those of visual cues, and whether this pattern is 
the same for autistic and non-autistic individuals. Children were engaged in a classic 
dual task PM paradigm in which a PM task was embedded within a simple ongoing 
categorisation task. Thus, whilst children were indicating, via key press, whether the two 
on-screen pictures belonged to the same category or not, they had to remember to press 
a different key, as quickly and as accurately as possible, upon presentation of a PM target 
cue. The salience of the PM target cue was manipulated across three conditions: a low 
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salience condition, with the target picture presented in the same format as the ongoing 
task pictures; a high visual salience condition, whereby salience was increased by way of 
a red border surrounding the target; and a high auditory salience condition, whereby 
salience was increased by way of an auditory beep in a third condition. 
Based on the inconsistent findings in the literature, we had no clear expectations 
regarding a possible group effect, or lack thereof. We did expect a main effect of salience, 
as participants were predicted to achieve more correct PM responses in both high 
salience conditions than in the low salience condition. As previously found EBPM 
deficits in autism were potentially due to the low salience of the cues used (e.g., 
Brandimonte et al., 2011), and spared performance due to highly salient cues (e.g., 
Altgassen et al., 2010), we expected a significant group x salience interaction, with 
controls performing better than autistic children in the low salience, but not the high 
salience conditions. Furthermore, given that increased cue salience should facilitate 
inhibition and task-switching at the critical PM execution phase (Mahy et al., 2014), and 
that improvements in such abilities are often seen by shorter response times (Draheim, 
Hicks, & Engle, 2016; Kiesel et al., 2010), we expected a similar pattern of results for 
reaction time data of correct PM responses; namely, that increased salience would result 
in faster overall response times. A lack of previous research again yielded the possibility 
of a main effect of group uncertain; however, given the robust findings of task-switching 
impairment in autistic individuals (Hughes, 2001; Hughes et al., 1994; Ozonoff et al., 
1991), we predicted a group x salience interaction, with controls responding faster than 
autistic children in the more demanding, low-salience condition, but not in the high 
salience conditions. 
6.2 METHOD
6.2.1 Participants
Twenty-four autistic children and 23 non-autistic children participated in the study. 
Groups were parallel for age and verbal IQ, but not for non-verbal IQ, or for gender (see 
Table 1). However, as non-verbal IQ did not correlate significantly with any PM measures, 
it was not included as a covariate (all ps > .09). Autistic participants were recruited from 
a Dutch school for autistic children and from Dutch clinics for autistic children and 
their families. All autistic children had received a formal diagnosis of autism, or 
Asperger’s syndrome (APA, 2000). In addition, 22 and 19 parents or teachers (of autistic 
and control participants, respectively) completed the Dutch version of the Social 
Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Roeyers & Thys, 2010) as well as the ‘auditory filtering’ and 
‘visual/auditory sensitivity’ sub-scales of the Dutch version of the Short Sensory Profile 
(SSP; Dunn, 2013). As expected, autistic participants showed significantly higher levels 
of autistic traits and more atypical levels of sensory reactivity and sensitivity than 
controls (all controls were at norm) (see Table 1). All children, and their parents, provided 
written informed consent. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee Faculty of 
Social Sciences (ECSS), Radboud University, Nijmegen, under the ethical approval 
number C 2014-1003-207a, and all methods were performed in accordance with the 
relevant guidelines and regulations.
6.2.2 Materials and procedure
The experimenter introduced themselves and engaged the children in a brief interaction 
to ensure they were comfortable and happy to participate. The order of the session was 
then outlined, and reinforced by way of a simple visual timetable, which was referred to 
at each step throughout the session to indicate progress, encourage motivation and 
reduce anxiety. An illustration of the procedure can be seen in Figure 1, whilst each step 
is described in detail below.
1) Ongoing task, practice block and baseline block
Children were introduced to the categorization ongoing task (similar to that of Altgassen 
et al., 2015) in which they were required to indicate, as quickly and as accurately as 
possible via keypress, whether the two coloured pictures on the computer screen were of 
the same category (green key) or not (orange key). Pictures were presented for a maximum 
of 4 seconds, or until a response had been made, with a 1-second inter-stimulus interval. 
Participants were not able to make a response within 500ms in order to prevent continual 
pressing. The pictures were coloured versions of Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) 
picture set (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004), and included the following six categories: body 
parts; toys; instruments; food items; furniture, clothes. Children first performed a 
practice block of 10 trials, and then a baseline block of 20 trials. 
2) Salience condition PM instructions and picture encoding
It was then explained to the children that they would be performing the task again in 
about 10 minutes, only next time it would be more difficult; they would be deciding on 
Table 1. 
Means (S.D.) and group differences in participant characteristics and symptoms.
Table 1: Means (S.D.) and group differences in participant characteristics and symptoms
ASC
(N = 24)
Controls 
(N = 23)
t
(χ2)
p de
Age (years) 11.25 (1.26) 11.09 (.60) 0.57 .576 0.15
Gender M (F) 24 (0) 7 (16) (25.31) <.001 -
Verbal IQa 11.67 (2.93) 10.35 (2.08) 1.77 .083 0.53
Non Verbal IQb 61.58 (10.31) 53.78 (9.82) 2.66 .011 0.79
SRS total T-scorec 72.86 (13.00) 43.95 (5.29) 9.03 <.001 2.93
SSP – Auditory filteringd 14.29 (4.03) 25.35 (3.96) 11.06 <.001 2.84
SSP Visual/Auditory sensitivityd 18.19 (3.93) 23.85 (1.84) 5.66 <.001 1.88
a normed vocabulary score on sub-test of WISC-III-NL (10 is norm)
b T-score on matrices sub-test of WNV-NL (50 is norm)
c SRS: social responsiveness scale; high scores indicative of atypical/autistic social responsiveness 
d SSP: short sensory profile; low scores indicative of atypical sensory responsiveness 
e Cohen's d effect sizes of  0.2 as small, 0.5 as medium, and 0.8 as large(Cohen 1988)
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more pictures (70 trials) and performing an extra task (PM task). They were then shown 
a screen with 4 pictures on it, and told, next time they did the categorisation task and 
they saw any of these four pictures they had to press the pink key (rather than the green 
or orange key), as accurately and quickly as possible. The children named the pictures on 
the screen, and upon learning them were asked to say them out loud and then write down 
names of the depicted objects to further ensure the pictures were well memorised. The 
salience of the target pictures varied by condition: 1) low salience condition - 4 target 
pictures were presented in an identical format to the ongoing task pictures; 2) high 
visual salience condition – 4 target pictures were surrounded by a red border; and 3) 
high auditory salience condition – 4 target pictures were accompanied by an auditory 
tone. However, piloting revealed that simultaneous presentation of an auditory beep and 
the PM cue was confusing for the children, and resulted in very poor performance. The 
auditory beep was thus presented 500ms prior to presentation of the PM cue. The order 
of conditions was counter-balanced. Dependent variables were number of correct PM 
responses (max 4 per condition), correct ongoing task responses (percentage), and 
reaction time of correct responses (ms).
3) Filled delay 
To ensure the PM instructions were not held in working memory (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 
2000), children were engaged in a short activity prior to the dual-ongoing task/PM task. 
The first activity was the verbal sub-test of the Dutch version of the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children-III (WISC -III-NL; Kort et al., 2005), the second, the matrices task 
from the Wechsler Nonverbal Scale of Ability(WNV; Wechsler & Naglieri, 2008), and 
the third, the digit-span, also from the WISC-III-NL.
4) Dual-task block 
After approximately 8 minutes, the filled delay activity was paused (if not finished) and, 
without further reminder of the PM instructions, the children began the dual-task block. 
When they had finished, they received the instructions for the next salience condition, 
and then experienced a filled delay before completing the task, i.e. steps (2 to (4), which 
were repeated once more until all three conditions had been completed. 
5) Post-task PM task confirmation and picture recall  
Once all three conditions had been completed, participants were asked if there was 
anything else they were meant to do, other than the categorization task. All participants 
answered correctly. To further assess retrospective memory, participants were then 
asked to recall as many of the 12 target pictures as they could. If not all PM pictures 
were recalled, this was then followed by a PM target picture recognition task, whereby 
the 12 target pictures were presented, in the low salience format, with 12 non-target 
pictures and the children were asked to identify as many targets as possible. Thereafter, 
the children finished any sub-tests still uncompleted. 
Figure 1. 
Illustration of paradigm, showing sequence of steps: 1 – Single ongoing task; 2 – High visual salience instruction screen; 
3 – OT (70 trials) in dual-task block; 4 – PM (4 trials) target screen.
Filled delay (~10min): IQ measures
1s ISI
High visual salience condition
2
3
4
1
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6.3 RESULTS
6.3.1. PM performance
To assess PM performance, a 3 x 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the 
within-group factor salience (Low-salience, Hi-visual salience, Hi-auditory salience) and 
the between-group factor group (ASC and controls) was conducted. Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated ( χ2(2) = 15.72, p <.001), 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ɛ =.78).There was a significant main effect of salience, F(2, 90) = 55.32, p < 
.001, η²p = .55, but no main effect of group, F(1, 45) = 1.35, p = .251, η²p  = .03, and no 
significant interaction F(2, 90) = 1.93, p = .162, η²p  = .04 (see Fig. 2).  Participants overall 
achieved a greater number of correct PM responses in both the Hi-visual (M = 3.85, 
SD= .42) and the Hi-auditory (M = 3.68, SD = .66) salience conditions, compared to the 
low salience condition (M = 2.34, SD = 1.17), but performed equally well on the two 
high-salience conditions. There was no difference between the number of correct PM 
responses made by control participants (M = 3.20, SD = 1.22) and autistic participants 
(M = 3.38, SD = .86).
Figure 2. 
Mean number of correct prospective memory responses (max 4) by group. Error bars represent standard error of means.
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Reaction time, (in milliseconds), for correct PM responses was then analysed. Given that 
participants who scored zero correct responses were not included, participant numbers 
were therefore reduced for the control group (n = 18). A 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA, with the 
within-group factor salience (Low-salience, Hi-visual salience, Hi-auditory salience) and 
the between-group factor group (ASC and controls) was then carried out. There was a 
significant main effect of salience, F(2, 80) = 17.82, p < .001, η²p  = .308, but no main effect 
of group, F(1, 40) = .173, p = .68,  = .004. However, there was a significant salience by 
group interaction, F(2, 80) = 3.14, p = .049,  = .073 (see Fig. 3). Correct responses in both 
the Hi-visual (M = 1332.64, SD = 387.38) and Hi-auditory (M = 1450.45 SD = 457.77) 
salience conditions were quicker than correct responses in the low salience condition (M 
= 1842.61, SD = 622.72). Overall, correct PM response times of the control participants 
(M = 1513.43, SD = 496.29) were no different to the autistic participants (M = 1563.25, SD 
= 575.33). Subsequent pairwise comparisons revealed that, whilst both groups were 
quicker in the high-visual salience condition compared to the low-salience condition, 
(ASC: p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.16; controls: p = .005, Cohen’s d = 0.78), only the autistic 
group benefitted from the high-auditory salience condition as compared to the low salience 
condition (ASC: p < .001, Cohen’s d =1.08; controls: p = .30). There were no significant 
differences between the two high salience conditions for both groups (all ps > .13). There 
were no significant group effects for any of the salience conditions (all ps > .14). 
Figure 3. 
Mean response time of correct prospective responses by group. Error bars represent standard error of means.
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6.3.2 PM cue recall and recognition
To compare performance of the groups on the retrospective component of the PM task, 
i.e. memory for the PM cues, a 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on post-test, free 
recall of PM cues with the within-group factor cue salience (Low-salience cues, Hi-
visual salience cues, Hi-auditory salience cues), and the between-group factor of group 
(ASC and controls; see Table 2). There was no main effect for either factor (both ps > 
.37), and no interaction ( p=.57) indicating that all cues were encoded, and subsequently 
recalled, equally well by both groups.
Following the recall, participants were asked to identify as many of the 12 PM cues from 
a set of 24 pictures (see Table 2). A subsequent-independent-samples t-test revealed that 
there was a significant between-group cue-recognition difference, t(45) = 1.26, p = .041; 
however, as both groups’ means were greater than 11.5 (of a maximum 12) scores were 
at ceiling, a clear indication that cue recognition did not confound PM performance.
Table 2. 
Means (S.D.) of post-test probe and ongoing task performance across groups.
Table 2. Means (S.D.) of post-test probe and ongoing task performance across groups
ASC Controls
Post-test PM probes (max 12)
PM cue recall 7.08 (2.36) 7.83 (1.61)
PM cue recognition 11.83 (.38) 11.48 (.73)
Ongoing task
Accuracy (percent)
Baseline  88.13 (10.61) 89.57 (9.03)
Low salience 86.87 (8.58) 86.36 (8.74)
High visual salience 85.72 (9.76) 89.29 (5.80)
High auditory salience 88.01 (6.48) 86.72 (6.22)
Response times (ms)
Baseline  1284.09 (270.61) 1280.19 (236.46)
Low salience 1610.00 (298.93) 1513.18 (238.22)
High visual salience 1436.84 (262.94) 1387.52 (234.43)
High auditory salience 1422.62 (273.09) 1357.40 (290.80)
6.3.3 Ongoing task performance
To investigate performance of the two groups on the ongoing task (see Table 2), a 4 x 2 
mixed ANOVA, with the within-group factor task block (Baseline, Low-salience, Hi-
visual salience, Hi-auditory salience) and the between-group factor group (ASC and 
controls) was conducted. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated ( χ2(2) = 20.49, p =.001), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ɛ =.75). There was no main effect of task 
block, F(2.24, 135) = 1.305, p= .277, η²p  = .028, or group, F(1, 45) = .163, p= .688, 
η²p  = .004 and no significant interaction F(2, 135) = 1.79, p= .169, η²p  = .038.  Both groups 
achieved the same level of accuracy across all four task blocks.
To analyse the reaction time for accurate ongoing task responses (see Table 1), a 4 x 2 
mixed ANOVA, with the within-group factor task block (Baseline, Low-salience, Hi-
visual salience, Hi-auditory salience) and the between-group factor group (ASC and 
controls) was carried out. There was a significant effect of task block, F(3, 135) = 27.73, 
p < .001, η²p  = .381, but no main effect of group, F(1, 45) = .640, p= .428, η²p  = .014, and 
no significant interaction F(3, 135) = .784, p = .505, η²p  = .017. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that both groups were slower to respond in the Low-salience and Hi-visual 
salience blocks, compared to Baseline (both ps < .001). Moreover, participants overall 
responded slower in the the Low-salience block than both high salience blocks (all ps < 
.001). Response times did not differ between the high salience blocks ( ps > .44).
6.4 DISCUSSION
The current study set out to examine EBPM in autistic children of around 11-years-old, 
with a view to better understanding the reported EBPM difficulties experienced by this 
population when transitioning to secondary school. This was achieved by examining the 
role that cue salience plays in the EBPM of autistic children. The study also investigated 
the role of auditory cue salience in the EBPM of both autistic and non-autistic children, 
an important first, with regards to ecological validity, in the PM literature. No predictions 
were made regarding main group differences, with regards to either PM accuracy or 
response times, due to the mixed findings in the literature, with roughly half of studies 
showing intact EBPM (Altgassen & Koch, 2014; Altgassen et al., 2010; Henry et al., 
2014; Sheppard et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014) and half showing 
impaired EBPM (Brandimonte et al., 2011; Kretschmer et al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 
2016; Yi et al., 2014). However, main effects of salience were expected for both PM 
accuracy and correct PM response times. Specifically, that performance in the high 
salience conditions would yield more accurate, and faster, responses than the low 
salience condition. Furthermore, given the potentially beneficial role increased cue 
salience played in studies finding intact autism PM performance (e.g., distinctive blue 
words and bright yellow screen, Altgassen & Koch, 2014; Altgassen et al., 2010, 
respectively) , we expected a group x salience interaction, again, for both PM performance 
measures; that is, autistic participants were expected to perform less accurately, and 
slower, in the low salience condition, but as accurate and as fast in the high salience 
conditions, as non-autistic children. 
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No main effect of group, but an expected main effect of salience, revealed the increase 
in the visual and auditory salience of cues to be beneficial to both groups across both 
PM performance measures; that is, overall, participants were quicker and more successful 
in the visual and auditory salience conditions, compared to the low salience condition, 
though performance in both high salience conditions was similar. Further analysis 
revealed that both groups performed comparably, again, across both PM performance 
measures, in each of the salience conditions. Consequently, the expected group x salience 
interaction, whereby the autistic group were predicted to perform worse in the low 
salience condition but not the high salience conditions, did not emerge. 
However, there was an interesting and unexpected group x salience interaction in the 
response time data (but not the accuracy data), which represented an unpredicted difference 
in the way each group’s performance was affected by each of the high salience conditions. 
Specifically, whilst both groups were significantly faster to respond when the visual 
salience of the cues was increased, only the autistic group was also faster when cues were 
auditorily salient. Indeed, autistic participants were, on average, over 25 percent faster in 
both high salience conditions, compared to the low salience condition, accompanied by 
large effect sizes (both ds > 1), whereas the non-autistic group were just over a 10 percent 
faster in the visual condition (d > .7) but no faster in the auditory condition. 
The main effect of salience (driven by participants’ superior performance in both PM 
measures across both high salience conditions, compared to the low salience condition) 
provides important evidence in support of the positive inf luence of increased cue 
salience in PM as predicted by the multiprocess framework (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996) 
and is in line with those studies demonstrating benefits of increased visual cue salience 
(Altgassen et al., 2010; Kliegel et al., 2013; Mahy et al., 2014). Furthermore, these results 
suggest that, not only are auditorily salient cues as beneficial for PM as has been found 
for visually salient cues, but that this is also true for autistic populations. As there was 
no main group effect, nor the predicted group x salience interactions (i.e., between-
group differences in the low salience condition but not the high salience conditions) for 
either PM measure (accuracy nor response time), these results are suggestive of preserved 
event-based PM in autistic children, even with cues low in salience, and are thus in line 
with all literature reporting intact event-based PM in autism (Altgassen et al., 2010; 
Henry et al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014). 
However, it is important to note a limitation of the accuracy results; namely that both 
groups’ PM accuracy scores were at ceiling in the high salience conditions, which may 
have contributed to the lack of between-group differences (following a restricted 
capacity for variation, given the maximum score was 4). Indeed, ceiling effects have 
potentially confounded results of some of the previous studies that have also reported 
intact event-based PM in autism (Williams et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014). Further 
scrutiny of the response time data, therefore, with the greater capacity for variation, may 
help discern more subtle group differences, and help to further elucidate the nature of 
the retrieval processes underlying the salience effect. The significantly faster response 
by both groups to highly visual cues, and by the autistic group to auditory cues, compared 
to the response time for the low salience cues, is arguably indicative of faster, more 
automatic retrieval processes; that is, the more salient cues resulted in the intention 
more automatically ‘popping into mind’ thus reducing demand for the slower, more 
strategic and cognitively effortful processes of monitoring for the cue, retrieving the 
intention and inhibiting/switching from the ongoing task to execute the intention 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). This notion is supported by the ongoing task results, as 
ongoing task response times were also significantly slower for both groups in the low 
salience condition compared to both of the high salience conditions.
This cost to ongoing task performance has been suggested to ref lect an increase in 
cognitively demanding strategic processes (Leigh & Marcovitch, 2014; McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; Smith et al., 2007) associated with the additional PM task. It is also 
worth emphasising that the dominant measure for the relevant executive functioning 
tasks, such as task switching, when examined in the laboratory, is response time 
(Draheim et al., 2016; Kiesel et al., 2010). It may be, therefore, that the large decrease in 
response times, particularly for the autistic group, ref lects an amelioration of inhibition 
and task-switching costs normally incurred at the point of intention retrieval and 
execution, brought about by salience-induced automatic processes. This can only be 
speculation at this point, but a systematic investigation of the effects of salience on the 
underlying executive processes involved in PM for clinical and non-clinical populations, 
may prove a fruitful endeavour of future research.  
It is of significant interest here that the autistic participants, a group of children who 
were reported to almost exclusively react to visual and auditory information in an 
atypical, hyper-sensitive manner (see SSP scores, Table 2), reacted quicker to the auditory 
cues compared to the low salience cues. This was not true of the non-autistic group, 
resulting in the unexpected interaction. It is possible then, that the hypersensitive 
sensory responsiveness of the autistic participants resulted in a subjective amplification 
of the salience of these cues, thus causing them to be even more distinctive, thereby 
lending auditory cues a similarly beneficial effect as the visual cues. This implies, 
therefore, that an often-thought of impairment in autism, such as sensory hypersensitivity, 
could actually confer an advantage in everyday life. This notion is in line with the 
neurodiversity movement, advocating that the many characteristics of autism do not 
represent a ‘disorder’, but rather differences that can actually be a strength given the 
right context/environment (Baron-Cohen, 2017). 
With regard to PM in daily life, the current results contribute evidence in support of 
intact EBPM in autism. Given the consistently found deficit in TBPM (e.g, Kretschmer 
et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2014) it is important to, where possible, 
convert TBPM tasks to EBPM tasks by setting reminders (cues). This cognitive 
‘off loading’ should be supported and encouraged by caregivers, as autistic children have 
been shown not to always set reminders to offset their perceived difficulty of a task 
(Cherkaoui & Gilbert, 2017). In light of the current evidence, the reminders/cues should 
be as visually and auditorily salient as possible. Salient visual cues are already a core 
feature of effective visual communication systems commonly employed for autistic 
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children, such as the Pictorial Exchange Communication System (PECS; Bondy & Frost, 
1994) and others within the ‘Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related 
Communication-Handicapped Children’ (TEACCH; Mesibov, Shea, & Schopler, 2004). 
Such cues/systems could therefore be incorporated into the planning and execution of 
EBPM tasks for children in secondary school. Auditory cues could include, for example, 
smartwatch reminders, or iPad or Google Calendar alerts. The benefits of auditory cues 
in everyday life can be seen in the success of assistive technology currently used to 
support everyday tasks (many of which are of a prospective nature) in populations 
known to have difficulty with such activities (e.g., older adults, individuals with MCI, 
those with intellectual and neurodevelopmental disabilities), that employ tones or beeps 
to remind clients of the intended action (for a review of such technologies, actions and 
populations, see Gillespie, Best, & O’Neill, 2012).
However, it is important to note that this study is only the first step in understanding 
the effect of cue salience in PM in autism, and further investigation is required. The 
auditory cues in the current study, for example, were isolated beeps, presented within a 
quiet, controlled and relatively predictable environment, and thus not analogous to the 
noisy, multi-sensory environment of, say, a classroom. Performance in a controlled 
versus a naturalistic environment would also explain the discrepancy between the intact 
EBPM performance of the current study and the reported EBPM difficulties at school 
(Makin et al., 2017). Future studies should therefore investigate EBPM in autism as 
situated in, for example, a naturalistic school setting, whereby children perform several 
different PM tasks within a complex auditory, visual and even social environment, such 
as a classroom.
In sum, the current study provides evidence that increasing the salience of cues supports 
event-based PM performance in children of primary-to-secondary school age, which has 
important implications for supporting the tasks they find difficult during the transition 
(e.g., use of reminders for homework and extra-curricular activities). Importantly, these 
cue salience benefits were also seen in the PM of autistic children, a population known 
to experience particular difficulty during the transition to secondary school (Makin et 
al., 2017). Furthermore, the current study critically extended the common PM computer 
paradigm by including an auditory cue condition, providing important evidence for the 
benefit of auditory cues for all children. The evidence was especially interesting for 
autistic children, who, in contrast to the non-autistic children, were also faster in their 
response to auditory cues, an indication that sensory hypersensitivity, so prevalent in 
autism, can in fact be beneficial under certain conditions.
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7.1 THESIS AIM
The overarching aim of the current thesis was to better understand PM in autism, with a 
view to developing effective strategies to facilitate optimal PM performance. Given the 
importance of PM to successful daily functioning, improving PM may go some way to 
improving the currently low levels independent living (Anderson, Shattuck, Cooper, 
Roux, & Wagner, 2014; Newman et al., 2011) and employment (Howlin, Goode, Hutton, 
& Rutter, 2004) seen currently across the autistic population. This may then help to 
improve low levels of independent living, even compared to other disability groups) 
(Anderson, Shattuck, Cooper, Roux, & Wagner, 2014; Newman et al., 2011) and 
employment (Howlin, Goode, Hutton, & Rutter, 2004) currently seen in the population. 
Factors deemed key to the PM process by the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000) were investigated, leading to important findings regarding the relevance 
of autism symptom severity, cue salience and task importance/motivation to PM 
performance in autism. These results were included in a systematic review of all PM in 
autism studies. The importance of considering factors such as cue salience and motivation 
was emphasised, describing the way in which they could be optimised within the PM 
process to provide an optimal PM environment and maximise the chances of PM success 
in autism. The review chapter also emphasised the real-life, multifactorial and embodied 
nature of PM, the importance of considering the process as a whole, and the dynamic 
interaction within and between individual and environmental factors.
7.2 CHAPTER SUMMARY
Four of the five chapters investigated specific factors of the PM process, and demonstrated 
their relevance for PM in autism, and the way in which they may, under certain conditions, 
inf luence PM performance. The empirical papers presented in Chapters 3 to 6 are 
described and critiqued in detail in the review of Chapter 2, and so, to avoid repetition, 
will be only brief ly summarised here.
The systematic review of all PM and autism literature presented in Chapter 2, including 
papers of the current thesis, revealed that, despite considerable methodological 
heterogeneity amongst the studies, autism PM performance was generally in line with 
what would be predicted, given the known problems with PM-relevant cognitive 
functions, such as attention (Landry & Bryson, 2004), executive function (Corbett, 
Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009) memory and future thinking (Lind, 
Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014) and ToM (Baron-Cohen, 2000) and the varying cognitive 
demand of PM (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000); that is, that 
tasks demanding a high level of executive control and strategic processing, such as 
TBPM tasks, or EBPM tasks involving, for example, cues of low salience or focality and/
or difficult OTs, would prove very difficult for autistic individuals. 
Thus, of the experiments reviewed, all TBPM experiments saw impaired performance in 
autistic, compared to non-autistic, participants. The findings with regards to EBPM 
performance were more mixed, with tasks involving cues of low salience or focality, or 
difficult, attention-demanding OTs, seeing poorer performance; when these conditions 
were reversed (i.e., high cue salience/focality or easy OTs) autism performance paralleled 
non-autistic controls. These findings were in line with a recent meta-analysis of the 
same studies (Landsiedel, Williams, & Abbot-Smith, 2017).
Chapter 3 investigated autism severity by comparing PM performance of severely with 
mildly autistic children, and non-autistic children. The unprecedented inclusion of a 
group of severely autistic children was facilitated by running the task under more 
naturalist ic conditions (fun and engaging games with a hand puppet and an adult, in a 
classroom) and abil ity matching in an atypical way (teacher educational progress 
ratings, rather than, say, IQ tests, which are neurotypically biased and exclusive). The 
three headline results of the study were thus: the severely and mildly autist ic children 
differed in that only the severely autist ic group performed less well than the non-
autistic group, pointing to overall symptom severity as an important to consider with 
regards to PM abil ity in autism; the group difference emerged from the second round 
of two PM tasks, revealing that only the non-autistic children improved/learnt from 
experience; for one of the three PM tasks, in which they had to remember to pick up 
a desirable toy when leaving the class, the severely autist ic children performed as well 
as even the non-autistic children, suggesting that high motivation is important in the 
PM process. 
Chapter 4 also demonstrated the importance of motivation in PM performance by 
revealing the benefit of external incentives to the PM performance of young non-autistic 
children. That is, children in two age groups (5-year-olds and 7-year-olds) performed 
better when promised a surprise toy gift for good performance. The group difference in 
performance also supported the notion that age-related factors, such as executive 
function, are an important factor to consider.
Chapter 5 then investigated motivation in autistic and non-autistic adolescents in a 
TBPM task. A main group effect was consistent with TBPM difficulties found in all 
previous PM and autism studies. Furthermore, autistic groups did not differ despite 
receiving different instructions designed to elicit either social or personal motivation. 
The non-autistic group did, however, improve when personally motivated (by a promised 
cash reward). 
Chapter 6 investigated a factor highly relevant to autism and the well-known sensory 
processing differences in the population, namely, the visual and auditory sensory 
characteristics of the EBPM cues. The study found that the EBPM success of all children 
improved (of the primary-to-secondary school transition age of around 11-years-old) 
when the visual and auditory salience of the cues was increased. Interestingly, while 
both groups also became faster when the visual salience was increased, only the autistic 
children, who were nearly all rated to exhibit atypical sensory reactivity by way of the 
SSP, were also faster when the auditory salience of the cues was increased.
At a glance, the findings from these studies are in line with Figure 2 of the thesis (p8) 
in that they imply autistic PM performance is best for tasks that are highly motivating, 
and which are supported by focal, salient cues. Much of the cognitive effort of TBPM 
tasks is thus reduced by setting external prompts, or ‘intention off loading’ (Gilbert, 
2015a), a practice inherent to EBPM tasks. Cognitive effort can then be further reduced 
GENERAL DISCUSSIONCHAPTER 7
C
H
A
PT
E
R
 7
 
121120
by increasing cue salience and focality to invoke more automatic, rather than strategic, 
intention retrieval processes. The application of this reduced cognitive effort is then 
more reliably directed to the PM task by increasing the perceived PM ‘task importance’, 
relative to the OT, resulting in increased motivation for the PM task.
7.3 PROVIDING AN OPTIMAL PM ENVIRONMENT
When considering ways in which PM tasks can be devised/supported, the understanding 
that certain tasks, their particular constituents and contexts within which they are 
embedded can be difficult for autistic individuals, provides a good starting point. This 
knowledge can be used, as with current best practice for autism, to initially provide the 
most supportive environment to account for all possible difficulties, and then 
progressively tailor the support to realise individual potential.
In practical terms, practitioners can immediately begin to support PM in autistic 
individuals in a holistic, individual way, by off loading cognitive demand to reminders 
(cues) where possible, and optimising the effect of such cues by maximising salience 
(loud, incongruous beeps) and focality (processed with ongoing task, e.g. swimming bag 
by the door). The value, and instructions, of PM tasks should be conveyed, via person-
appropriate communication systems, maximising motivation (and so resource allocation). 
Individual abilities and preferences should always be considered, perhaps best achieved 
by involving the individual in the process (choice of incentive, self-setting targets/
rewards, choice of salient cue). 
7.4 DYNAMIC SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF PM
The evidence described in the thesis thus far provides useful insights into the factors 
important in the PM process, and the ways in which they might be optimised so as to 
provide an environment offering the best chances of PM success. These factors, and 
developed supporting strategies, were based on the way in which, according to the MPF 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) they inf luence the allocation of attentional resources. 
However, many questions remain. Why, for instance, do autistic individuals struggle 
with tasks that depend more on self-initiated strategic monitoring processes? Is it simply 
reduced executive function capacity? Or perhaps executive function is itself intact, but 
the control of such attentional resources is impaired by atypical sensory processing, 
being, for example, continuously distracted by auditory information due to 
hypersensitivity? Why, and how, does symptom severity inf luence PM performance? 
What is the optimal level of salience in relation to a person’s sensory processing profile? 
And in what way does the subjective, perceived value of the task interact with the control 
and implementation of such cognitive, perceptual and action processes? 
When considering such questions, one must consider the broad variation in the nature 
of PM tasks and the demand they put on cognitive resources (TBPM task, involving long 
delay and social interaction vs EBPM task involving short delay, salient focal cues and 
no social interaction), whilst also considering the broad variation in the individual 
difference of such resources, differences exemplified well by the heterogeneity of the 
autistic population. Prospective memory, therefore, is a complex process better seen as 
a network of dynamically interacting cognitive, behavioural, environmental and context 
specific factors. The relationships between factors will shift dynamically over time and 
through context changes, constrained by dynamically interacting individual differences. 
Figure 1a presented in the introduction can thus be developed to more accurately 
represent the dynamic structure of the PM process, as illustrated by Figure 1b, below.
Figure 1b. 
Representation of the individual and environmental factors involved with PM and the way in which they dynamically interact 
throughout the process.
PM PERFORMANCE
Memory function
Social function
Executive function
Perception Action
Individual (cognitive/behavioural) DIFFERENCES
PM (task composition) DIFFERENCES
Executive demand
Action demandPerceptual demand
Memory demand
Social demand
Such a complex, dynamic system makes PM performance very difficult to predict for any 
given person and/or environment, particularly with the pronounced individual difference 
often present in autism, thus limiting the ecological validity of the highly controlled, 
laboratory-based PM paradigms. The breakfast study by Altgassen, Koban, and Kliegel 
(2012) which involved planning and performing many tasks under social and time 
pressure, is perhaps the only study thus far to capture the dynamic multi-task, multi-
factor nature of real-life PM processes (a process which proved very difficult for the 
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autistic participants). Given that the overall aim of the thesis is to provide understanding 
to inform the provision of optimal PM environments, and the most effective intervention 
strategies, it is important to look to processes that may underpin the development and 
application of the functions so relevant to PM. In light of this, the final section of the 
review considered embodied predictive coding models as fundamental to PM and 
autism, and examined how impairments in predictive might account for autism and the 
PM difficulties found in the population. 
7.5 EMBODIED PREDICTIVE PROCESSING
Predictive coding is described in great detail from page 24 of Chapter 2 but, very simply, 
it describes the process of perception by which organisms progressively make sense of 
the world by continuously making predictions (top-down) about incoming (bottom-up) 
sensory information; prediction-errors then update and improve predictions, minimising 
future error. However, there is a limit to what can be predicted; some events are inherently 
and irreducibly unpredictable (the sudden, unseen laughter of fellow classmates, or the 
unseen scraping sound of a chair, for example). It is therefore important to learn to 
f lexibly and context-sensitively vary the confidence (precision) that a prediction-error 
can be minimised, and is thus attention worthy and should update prediction models. 
Thus, through optimal precision, within a developed model of a classroom, the unseen 
scraping sound of a moved chair would be surprising, not unexpected, would demand 
minimal attention and would not update the prediction model of a classroom. In this 
way, precision is the mechanism fundamental to learning and the development and 
control of executive and attentional resources (Van de Cruys et al., 2014), resources 
deemed by as critical to the PM process (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). 
Van de Cruys et al. (2014) situate the precision weighting mechanism as core to the 
development of autism. Specifically, they contend that autistic individuals uniformly and 
inf lexibly assign high precision to prediction errors, an impairment they term High 
Inf lexible Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism (HIPPEA). This would result in 
difficulty attending to relevant information, and would disrupt the progressive learning 
about the world, from sensory input to higher level context/conception. The authors 
argue that it is this process that leads to the social and communication difficulties, and 
the atypical sensory processing so characteristic of autism, and would indeed underpin 
the existing accounts of autism, such as executive dysfunction (Hill, 2004) WCC (Frith 
& Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006) and ToM (Baron-Cohen, 2000). We contend in 
Chapter 2 that this would also lead directly to the problems with PM seen in the 
population. Difficulties with the control of attention would make strategic monitoring 
of the time for TBPM tasks much more difficult; difficulty in selecting relevant cues in 
the environment would render EBPM cues as much less ‘salient’ relative to all other 
attention demanding sensory information.
Importantly, however, PM is inherently an embodied process; PM success is made 
possible through the effective understanding and coordination of one’s body in the 
service of navigating one’s environment, as it is perceived given one’s situation. The 
predictive coding account of PM and autism was thus extended accordingly, to include 
not just perception, but also movement and affect, as do predictive models formulated 
under active inference (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, & Rietveld, 2016; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & 
Friston, 2015; Seth, 2013). Under such a model, perception and action work to resolve 
prediction-error. Thus, agents do not only try to improve predictions, but they also act 
on the environment to cause it to conform to predictions. Therefore, the role of 
prediction error minimisation, and the impact of any impairment such as HIPPEA, 
becomes much more significant, as it mediates all interactions between the brain, the 
body and the environment within and between all hierarchical levels (i.e. low-level 
stimulus to high level concepts/abstractions), facilitating understanding of the self and 
the world in which it is situated. Such an impairment would therefore explain many of 
the other, more embodied difficulties seen in autism, such as a  high prevalence of 
alexithymia (Milosavljevic et al., 2016), difficulties with interoception (Shah, Hall, 
Catmur, & Bird, 2016), differences in rhythm and timing (Isenhower et al., 2012; 
Sheridan & McAuley, 1997), movement and associated social difficulties ( J. Cook, 2016; 
J. L. Cook, Blakemore, & Press, 2013), and diminished sense of agency (Grynszpan et 
al., 2012; Sperduti, Pieron, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2014; Zalla, Miele, Leboyer, & Metcalfe, 
2015), linked to deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thinking (Lind, 2010).
The roles that active inference and error-minimisation play in determining and attending 
to important and PM task-relevant, internal and environmental cues, at each level of the 
PM process was described as follows (and illustrated by Figure 2 below): the environment 
will create PM demands (work supervisor asks you to pass on important information to 
a work colleague), generating intentions within the individual (pass message on to 
colleague). This intention is internalised in terms of relative value (need to please 
supervisor; consequence for colleague of not receiving message; likely personal emotional 
state – personal, physical and social consequences of success/failure) which would 
interact with chances of success (beliefs about own ability to successfully execute task, 
given likely future context in which task/cue is situated, and predicted ability to employ 
appropriate action within it). These states are accompanied by physiological responses 
(increased heart rate, adrenaline/cortisol) and associated affective responses (arousal, 
worry, stress) that would need to be understood in the context of their situatedness in a 
socio-cultural setting. In addition, successfully realizing the PM task requires 
understanding how attentional resources are employed to perceive relevant cues 
(recalling my supervisor’s request upon seeing my colleague). Crucially then, a person 
performing a PM task must be selectively perturbed, via effective error-minimisation, 
by aspects of the environment and the self (change your behaviour when seeing your 
colleague, but try to not get distracted by your phone) in a way that is in line with longer-
term plans and goals and the demands of the situation (such as your supervisor’s request). 
If one was perturbed by each and every aspect of the self and environment, as is 
hypothesised by HIPPEA, then selecting those aspects relevant to your PM goals would 
be extremely difficult, suffused as they would be in a barrage of other, non-relevant 
sensory information.
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Figure 2. 
Diagram depicting the role of predictive processing in mediating between the brain, body and environment throughout the 
prospective memory process. Illustrates importance of attending to relevant cues (solid arrows), via effective precision-
weighting, against a barrage of competing, often task-irrelevant, information (dashed arrows). 
7.6 INTERVENTIONS/SUPPORTING STRATEGIES
Critical to supporting complex, dynamic (PM) behaviour, underpinned by embodied 
predictive processes impaired by HIPPEA, is the employment of holistic, embodied 
interventions, employed to maximally reduce uncertainty, both in the self and in the 
environment. Indeed, striving to reduce increase environmental predictability is a basic 
tenet of established and successful approaches to supporting autism, such as TEACHH 
(Mesibov, Shea, & Schopler, 2004)  and PECS (Bondy & Frost, 1994). These approaches 
deem consistent, clear and visually-supported structure and communication as essential 
to the understanding, learning and well-being of autistic individuals. Any PM intervention 
should thus incorporate any and all existing systems developed under these approaches, 
including, for example, PM instructions supported by person-appropriate visual cues, 
cues which could also be used as the PM cue. Other established autism interventions 
involving the development of attention, such as Attention Autism (Dawson et al., 2004), 
would also support the attentional difficulties implied by HIPPEA, and so also related 
PM difficulties.
General mind-body interventions would support mind-body interactions and 
understanding, improving, for example, coordination, which may then support the effort 
of physically switching between OT and PM tasks. Support for this notion can be found 
in the relative success of embodied interventions in autism, such as movement (for a 
review, see Lee, Lambert, Wittich, Kehayia, & Park, 2016), drama (Corbett et al., 2011), 
music (Whipple, 2004), and art therapies (Koch, Mehl, Sobanski, Sieber, & Fuchs, 2014).
A further approach described in Chapter 2, one more specifically addressing PM, is the 
use of metacognitive strategies. Metacognitive strategies have been shown to benefit the 
learning of individuals with learning difficulties (Chevalier, Parrila, Ritchie, & Deacon, 
2017) and have been found to play a role in PM; for example, metacognitive expectations 
of PM task demands have been shown to inf luence attention allocation strategies 
(Rummel & Meiser, 2013); and awareness of one’s cognitive capacities may encourage 
one’s use of reminders (Gilbert, 2015b; Phillips, Henry, & Martin, 2008). Interestingly, 
however, autistic participants did not set reminders to compensate for accurate judgements 
of their own PM abilities (Cherkaoui & Gilbert, 2017). The authors posited this was 
suggestive of intact meta-awareness, but impaired meta-control, in line with research 
pointing to difficulties with metacognitive control in autism, and to deficits in using 
monitoring processes to inf luence cognitive control (for similar results see Grainger, 
Williams, & Lind, 2016; Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, & Strauss, 2010; but see Wojcik, 
Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011 for contrasting findings). 
Metacognitive strategies, therefore, could be employed to explicitly direct attention 
towards relevant information, both internal and external, important to every phase of 
the PM process, thus compensating for the attentional deficits implied by an embodied 
HIPPEA. Drawing on the principles of TEACCH (Mesibov et al., 2004), namely, to 
provide a highly structured, visual and predictable environment, we suggested engaging 
autistic individuals in a cyclical PM predict-perform-evaluate processes (see Figure 3), 
directing individual’s attention to important information, such as the importance of the 
task, likely chances of success, and the cues they predict would be most effective and 
salient for them. 
Figure 3. 
Schematic representation of a predict-perform-evaluate process through which individuals would be encouraged to think 
deeply about all self and environmentally-related aspects of a PM task, with each evaluation informing the subsequent 
prediction, engendering a cyclical process of continuous improvement.
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(ability/context)
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Context
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Post-task evaluations would allow individuals to consider their performance, and how it 
matched up to predictions and cue choice, information that could be used to inform 
future predictions. In this way, individuals would be explicitly augmenting the largely 
unconscious error minimisation process (see Figure 4 for an example of how this could 
be implemented in a school setting).
Figure 4. 
PM metacognition worksheet to support individuals with specific PM tasks. Metacognitive awareness and control would 
be developed by encouraging individuals to regularly predict and evaluate their PM performance, based on their 
understanding of self- PM ability, task importance, past performance, self-chosen reminders/cues, and the likely 
environment in which it will occur. Levels of support, formatting, could be adapted to an individual need-appropriate 
level, e.g., full adult support, the use of symbols in place of words.
7.8 FUTURE RESEARCH
The examination of such metacognitive processes, examined when implemented within, 
say, school-based intervention studies, would provide important insights into both the 
practical and theoretical value of metacognition in PM, understanding that is as yet 
lacking with regards to autism. The currently suggested “predict-perform-evaluate” 
process could also provide a basis for future research in, for example, cognition training 
and possible transfer effects. For example, would such meta-cognitive PM training only 
improve PM performance on the specific task, or would it transfer to other PM tasks, or 
event to other meta-cognitive tasks? Indeed, could such real training improve ability in 
other related domains, such as executive function? Whilst there is currently a lack of 
research investigating the potential transfer of benefits of real-life, embodied training to 
closely/distantly related naturalistic and/or computer-based abilities, there is some 
promising evidence that training working memory in the playground, for example, can 
transfer to computer-based working memory tasks (Zhao, Chen, Fu, & Maes, 2015).
7.9 CONCLUSION
The findings from the empirical papers and systematic review presented within the 
current thesis suggest that autistic individuals would find the majority of PM tasks 
difficult. As such tasks pervade daily life, these difficulties likely contribute to the 
problems with independent living and employment, and associated mental health 
problems, so common to the population. However, the current thesis also provides 
evidence that good PM performance is possible, and highlights factors, such as cue 
salience and motivation, as key to success, providing quick and practical methods of 
supporting autistic individuals in achieving optimal PM performance. After viewing the 
PM process as a complex, dynamic interaction between individual and environmental 
factors, we put forward embodied predictive coding processes as fundamental to PM. As 
such, the disparate and primarily cognitive mechanisms (e.g. executive function and 
memory) commonly considered to underlie the PM process, and the understanding of 
self, critical to interpreting bodily signals and coordinating the body in acting to execute 
PM intentions, were seen as fundamentally underpinned by prediction and error-
minimising processes. Our embodied predictive coding account of autism, based on that 
by Van de Cruys et al (Van de Cruys et al., 2014), suggests that the cognitive, motor 
and social differences so characteristic of autism, are in fact due to differences in 
prediction error weighting ability, as are, consequently, difficulties with PM. To best 
support PM in autism, therefore, it is best to support and understand the fundamental 
problems of perception and action by way of embodied, metacognitive interventions and 
research paradigms. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
Bij het wakker worden schiet je gelijk die belangrijke e-mail te binnen die je nog aan je 
supervisor moet sturen voorafgaand aan de vergadering van 10:00 uur. Deze gedachte 
ontlokt misschien het herinneren van een reeks andere intenties die ook nog moeten 
worden gerealiseerd later op die ochtend, dag of zelfs week, zoals het opzeggen van een 
TV-abonnement, een belangrijke belastingaangifte op de bus doen, en het ophalen van 
kattenvoer na werk. Wanneer de ochtendroutine eenmaal is opgestart, moeten er 
waarschijnlijk nog meer intenties worden herinnerd en uitgevoerd in een veel korter 
tijdsbestek, zoals het terug plaatsen van het dopje van de tandpasta, onthouden om het 
strijkijzer uit het stopcontact te halen en om binnen een uur antibiotica in te nemen. Dit 
soort taken die het vormen en op een juist moment voltooien van een intentie vereisen, 
worden prospectieve geheugentaken (PG) genoemd. PG-taken worden ofwel op een 
bepaalde tijd (op tijd gebaseerd; TBPG) of bij een bepaalde gebeurtenis (op gebeurtenis 
gebaseerd; GBPG) uitgevoerd, en zijn overal in ons dagelijks leven te vinden; zij zijn 
daarom cruciaal voor een succesvol dagelijks leven.
Autismespectrumstoornis (vanaf hier: autisme) wordt gekenmerkt door moeilijkheden in 
de sociale communicatie, repetitief gedrag en atypische (hypersensitieve/hyposensitieve) 
reacties op sensorische input. Naast deze vastgestelde diagnostische kenmerken, wordt 
autisme ook gekarakteriseerd door evidence-based cognitieve en gedragsmatige 
verschillen, inclusief executieve problemen met, bijvoorbeeld, plannen en het f lexibel 
switchen tussen verschillende taken of aandachtsfoci, tekortkomingen in het episodisch 
geheugen en theory of mind (ToM), en verminderd episodisch toekomstdenken. 
Bovendien wordt verondersteld dat veel van deze cognitieve en sociale functies ten 
grondslag liggen aan PG, en daarmee wijzen op een PG probleem in autisme, wat weer 
kan zorgen voor moeilijkheden met een veilig, onafhankelijk leven.
Het  overkoepelende doel van het huidige proefschrift is daarom om een bijdrage te 
leveren aan de beperkte en inconsistente literatuur over PG en autisme. Een beter begrip 
van PG in deze conditie kan tot tastbare strategieën leiden om een optimale en 
onafhankelijke PG prestatie en het welzijn te ondersteunen. Dit kan weer helpen om de 
zelfstandigheid en arbeidsparticipatie in de autistische populatie te verbeteren. Factoren 
waarvan door het invloedrijke ‘Multiproces Framework’ gedacht wordt dat zij essentieel 
zijn bij PG processen zijn onderzocht, wat heeft geleid tot belangrijke bevindingen met 
betrekking tot het belang van symptoomernst bij autisme, de mate waarin cues saillant 
(dat will zeggen, hoe opvallend deze zijn in relatie tot de context), en taak motivatie bij 
PG prestatie bij autisme. De resultaten zijn meegenomen in een systematische review 
van alle PG studies in autisme. Het belang van het in beschouwing nemen van factoren 
zoals de mate waarin cues saillant zijn en motivatie werden benadrukt, waarbij een 
methode is beschreven om deze te optimaliseren binnen PG proces om een optimale PG 
omgeving te bieden en da kansen op PG succes in autisme te optimaliseren. Het review-
hoofdstuk benadrukt ook het echte leven, de multifactoriële en geïntegreerde aard van 
PG, het belang om het proces als geheel te beschouwen en de dynamische interactie 
binnen en tussen individuele en omgevingsfactoren.
Samenvatting van de hoofdstukken
Vier van de vijf hoofdstukken hebben specifieke factoren van het PG proces onderzocht, 
en de relevantie van deze factoren voor PG bij autisme aangetoond, en de manier waarop 
deze, onder bepaalde condities, PG prestatie beïnvloeden. De empirische artikelen 
gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 6 worden in detail beschreven en kritisch 
beschouwd in de review van Hoofdstuk 2, en worden, om herhaling te vermijden, 
hieronder slechts kort samengevat.
Hoofdstuk 3 heeft de ernst van autisme onderzocht door de PG prestatie tussen ernstig 
autistische, mild autistische en niet-autistische kinderen te vergelijken. De drie 
belangrijkste resultaten van deze studie waren: de ernstig en mild autistische kinderen 
presteerden verschillend, waarbij alleen de ernstig autistische groep minder goed 
presteerde dan de niet-autistische groep, wat aanduidt dat algemene symptoomernst een 
belangrijke factor moet worden gezien bij PG vermogens in autisme; de groepsverschillen 
die ontstonden uit de tweede ronde van twee PG taken lieten zien dat alleen de niet-
autistische kinderen verbeterden/leerden van ervaring; voor één van de drie PG taken, 
waarbij moest worden onthouden om een leuk speeltje mee te brengen wanneer de klas 
werd verlaten, werd gevonden dat de ernstig autistische kinderen net zo goed presteerden 
als de niet-autistische kinderen, wat suggereert dat een grote motivatie kan compenseren/
belangrijk is in het PG-proces.
Hoofdstuk 4 heeft ook het belang van motivatie in PG-prestatie aangetoond, door het 
voordeel van externe prikkels op PG-prestatie in jonge niet-autistische kinderen te 
demonstreren. Dat wil zeggen, kinderen in twee leeftijdsgroepen (5 jaar oud en 7 jaar 
oud) presteerden beter wanneer zij een verassingscadeautje waren beloofd voor een 
goede prestatie. De groepsverschillen in prestatie worden ondersteund door de notie dat 
leeftijd gerelateerde factoren, zoals executieve functies, een belangrijke factor zijn om te 
overwegen.
Hoofdstuk 5 heeft de motivatie in autistische en niet-autistische adolescenten in een 
TBPG-taak onderzocht. De resultaten lieten verschillen tussen de groepen zien die 
overeenkwamen met bevindingen uit eerder onderzoek naar PG en autisme. Daarbij 
verschilden de autistische groepen niet wanneer zij verschillende instructies kregen om 
ofwel sociale ofwel persoonlijke motivatie op te roepen. De niet-autistische groep 
daarentegen verbeterde bij persoonlijke motivatie (een beloofde financiële beloning).
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzocht een factor die zeer relevant is bij autisme en de bekende 
verschillen in sensorische verwerking in de populatie, namelijk, de visuele en auditieve 
sensorische kenmerken van de GBPG-cues. Deze studie vond dat GBPG-succes van alle 
kinderen (op de leeftijd rond 11 jaar wanneer de transitie van basis- naar voortgezet 
onderwijs plaatsvindt) verbeterde wanneer de visuele en auditieve saillantie van de cues 
was versterkt. Interessant genoeg bleek dat terwijl beide groepen sneller werden wanneer 
de visuele saillantie werd vergroot, alleen de autistische kinderen, die bijna allemaal 
scores van atypische sensorische reactiviteit behaalden op de Short Sensory Profile 
(SSP), ook sneller waren wanneer de auditieve saillantie van de cues was vergroot.
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De systematische review van alle PG-en autismeliteratuur, inclusief de artikelen uit het 
huidige proefschrift, gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 2 toonde aan dat, ondanks aanzienlijke 
methodologische heterogeniteit tussen studies, de PG-prestatie bij autisme over het 
algemeen in lijn was met wat zou worden voorspeld, gegeven de bekende problemen met 
PG-relevante cognitieve functies, zoals aandacht, EF, geheugen en toekomst denken en 
ToM en de variërende cognitieve eis van PG; dat wil zeggen, de taken die een hoge mate 
van executieve controle en strategische verwerking vereisen, zoals TBPG-taken, of 
GBPG-taken die bijvoorbeeld cues met lage mate van saillantie en/of  moeilijke ongoing 
tasks (OTs), erg moeilijk blijken te zijn voor autistische individuen. Dus, van de 
gereviewde experimenten, vonden alle TBPG-experimenten verminderde prestatie in 
autistische in vergelijking met niet-autistische deelnemers. De bevindingen met 
betrekking tot GBPG prestatie waren tegenstrijdiger, waarbij taken die bijvoorbeeld laag 
saillante cues of moeilijke aandacht vragende OTs hadden, slechtere prestatie lieten 
zien; wanneer deze condities werden veranderd met hoog saillante cues en makkelijke 
OTs, bleek de autisme-prestatie vergelijkbaar aan niet-autistische controles. Deze 
bevindingen zijn in lijn met een recente meta-analyse van dezelfde studies.
De bevindingen verkregen uit de artikelen van het huidige proefschrift laten zien onder 
welke condities PG waarschijnlijk moeilijk is voor autistische individuen en bieden 
suggesties om taken aan te passen en succes te faciliteren. Echter, in de zoektocht naar 
een meer fundamenteel proces, beschreef het huidig proefschrift PG en autisme door de 
lens van ‘predictive coding’. Het PG proces en de cognitieve functies waarvan wordt 
verondersteld dat deze hieraan ten grondslag liggen, werd beschreven als ontstaan vanuit 
een effectief predictive coding mechanisme, een mechanisme waarvan wordt gedacht 
dat het aangetast is in autisme. Deze predictive coding benadering van autisme werd 
vervolgens uitgebreid onder ingebedde predictive coding modellen om de gedragsmatige, 
cognitieve en bewegingskenmerken van autisme verder te begrijpen.
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CURRICULUM VITAE
Daniel Patrick Sheppard was born in Clapham, London, on August 2nd 1979. In 2003, 
having graduated with honours with a Bachelor of Arts (BA) in Business Administration 
at Brighton University, he secured a position as a sales analyst at a multinational 
organisation. In 2005, following his drive to try and contribute in a more meaningful 
way to society, and to have a positive inf luence on young people’s lives, he switched 
careers and began teacher training. He gained qualified teacher status in 2006, and that 
year began teaching his first class of 32 9- and 10-year-olds. In 2009, Daniel secured a 
position in a school for children with severe learning difficulties.
After two years, his desire to understand, and thus better support, behaviour at a deeper, 
more psychological level led to his desire to become a clinical psychologist. Accordingly, 
he completed a Master of Science in Psychology (MSc) from the University of 
Hertfordshire, graduating with Distinction. After an unsuccessful attempt at joining the 
Doctorate of Clinical Psychology in 2013, Daniel gained a split-position of teacher/
assistant psychologist at a school for severely autistic children. Then, in 2014, he was 
fortunate to be presented with an opportunity to begin a PhD at the Donders Institute 
for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour at Radboud University Nijmegen, during which 
he could continue the work he began with his Master’s thesis on prospective memory 
in autism. The next step is to continue with the clinical aspirations, and train as a 
clinical psychologist, ultimately by gaining a place on the Doctorate of Clinical Psychology 
in the UK. 
PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONSAPPENDICES
A
PP
E
N
D
IC
E
S
161160
PUBLICATIONS
Sheppard, D. P., Terrett, G., Rendell, P., & Altgassen, M. (2017). Did you hear? Auditory 
prospective memory cues benefit autistic children more than non-autistic children. 
Manuscript submitted for publication.
Altgassen, M., Sheppard, D. P., & Hendriks, M. (2017). Do importance instructions 
improve time-based prospective remembering in autism spectrum disorders? Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
Sheppard, D. P., Bruineberg, J., Kretschmer, & A., Altgassen, M. (in press). Prospective 
memory in autism: theory and literature review. The clinical neuropsychologist, 1-35 
Sheppard, D. P., Kvavilashvili, L., & Ryder, N. (2016). Event-based prospective memory 
in mildly and severely autistic children. Research in developmental disabilities, 49, 22-33. 
Sheppard, D. P., Kretschmer, A., Knispel, E., Vollert, B., & Altgassen, M. (2015). The 
role of extrinsic rewards and cue-intention association in prospective memory in young 
children. PloS one, 10(10), e0140987.
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
Sheppard, D. P., Terrett, G., Rendell, P., & Altgassen, M. (2016, September). Auditory 
cue salience and prospective memory in autistic children. Presented at the 11th Autism-
Europe Congress, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Sheppard, D. P., Terrett, G., Rendell, P., & Altgassen, M. (2016, July). Auditory cue 
salience and prospective memory in autistic children. Presented at the 6th International 
Conference on Memory (ICOM), Budapest, Hungary.
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For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young 
scientists. To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour 
established the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience (DGCN), which 
was officially recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. The Graduate School 
covers training at both Master’s and PhD level and provides an excellent educational 
context fully aligned with the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students in 
biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and related 
disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment of the 
best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni show 
a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, e.g. 
Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, MPI 
Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, 
North Western University, Northeastern University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University 
of Vienna etc.. Positions outside academia spread among the following sectors: specialists 
in a medical environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. 
Specialists in a psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, 
psychological diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or 
lecturers. A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, analysts or head of 
research and development. Fewer graduates  stay in a research environment as lab 
coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities are positions 
in the IT sector and management position in pharmaceutical industry. In general, the 
PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with high-quality positions that play an 
important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit: 
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/

